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INTRODUCTION
During the signing ceremony authorizing the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII” or “Act”), President Lyndon B. Johnson
thoughtfully remarked, “The purpose of the law is
simple. . . . [T]he
only
limit
to
a
man’s
hope
for
1
happiness . . . shall be his own ability.” Consistent with that
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1
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill
(July 2, 1964) [hereinafter Johnson’s Remarks], available at http://millercenter.org/
president/speeches/detail/3525. The entire relevant portion of the President’s
remarks reads:
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perceptive encapsulation, the Act’s fair employment component2
prohibits workplace discrimination predicated on race, sex, color,
national origin, and religion.3 To mark Title VII’s fiftieth
anniversary, this Article reasserts, in light of greatly developed
antidiscrimination law, the thesis that this author urged nearly
thirty years ago.4 President Johnson’s sentiment aptly elucidates
what was and remains Congress’s overarching principle, the
Act’s first principle, if you will: To assure that a person indeed is
“limit[ed]” only by his or her “own ability,” any use of the five
forbidden criteria as terms or conditions of employment defies
Title VII unless it satisfies a textual exemption or defense.5
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The purpose of the law is simple. It does not restrict the freedom of any
American, so long as he respects the rights of others. It does not give
special treatment to any citizen. It does say the only limit to a man’s hope
for happiness, and for the future of his children, shall be his own ability.
Id. Perhaps, needless to say, President Johnson spoke in the idiom of his time, using
male nouns and pronouns as shorthand to denote things that apply to all persons.
Indeed, even provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Act”) proscribing sex
discrimination in employment use the male third person singular pronoun. See infra
note 3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)). Accordingly, President Johnson’s
signing statement certainly should not be construed as gender-specific.
2
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
3
Most prominently, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
The Act contains additional proscriptions; the most significant for this Article is a
nearly twenty-five-year-old amendment clarifying that to prevail, a plaintiff need
not prove that animus was the “but-for” cause of the defendant’s discriminatory
employment action. Rather, a plaintiff may obtain nonmonetary relief, including
injunctions and attorney fees, upon proving that discrimination based on one of the
five forbidden classes was a “motivating factor” of the defendant’s behavior. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The profound importance of § 2000e-2(m) to the very
definition of unlawful discrimination under Title VII is discussed infra at notes
213–44 and accompanying text.
4
See generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition
of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769 (1987).
5
Strictly speaking, Title VII does not assure that individuals’ employment
opportunities will be “limit[ed]” only by their “own abilit[ies].” Johnson’s Remarks,
supra note 1. By its express text, the Act’s “[p]rotection is limited to individuals who
are discriminated on the basis of ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ ” Kiley
v. Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 F. App’x 107, 109 (2d Cir.
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Indeed, from the standpoint of its statutory text, the Act’s
“first principle” permitting only such discrimination as
specifically authorized therein appears both explicit and obvious.6
Yet, reaffirmation of that first principle is necessary to debunk
the judicially prominent “unequal burden” doctrine. Specious
when introduced roughly forty years ago,7 “unequal burden”
continues to flourish notwithstanding United States Supreme
Court rulings plainly invalidating its underpinnings, although
admittedly without mentioning that doctrine by name.8 Applied
particularly to grooming and appearance, such as male-only
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2008). Therefore, Title VII permits invidious discrimination based on unenumerated
classes, as well as other extraneous considerations such as nepotism. See, e.g., id.
(holding that Title VII does not forbid discrimination based on “sexual orientation”
per se); Thomas v. Wash. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 925 (4th Cir. 1990)
(“Nepotism is not per se violative of Title VII.”). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this
Article, President Johnson’s understanding essentially is correct: Persons’ ability to
work and their actual work product should be judged on their individual merit, not
on the irrelevant bases of their race, sex, color, ethnicity, or religious inclination.
6
Kiley, 296 F. App’x at 109.
7
See Bayer, supra note 4, at 843–80 (discussing primarily unequal burden’s
initial incarnation as “mutable characteristics” theory). While this Article offers a
detailed and multilayered structure to refute unequal burden theory, a simple but
extraordinarily telling scenario suggested by Professor B. Glenn George debunks the
doctrine. “Consider an employer who pays his black employees one cent less than
similarly situated white employees. Trivial? Certainly. A violation of Title VII?
Absolutely.” B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment
Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1993). Professor George offers other examples, such as
an employer who provides individual coffee pots to all male employees but requires
female employees to use a women’s-only communal coffee pot. See id.; cf. Picou v.
City of Jackson, Miss., 91 F. App’x 340 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $10,000 in attorney fees to a
Title VII plaintiff who obtained only $1.00 in nominal damages); Barber v. T.D.
Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an award of
$1.00 in nominal damages in a Title VII sexual harassment case does not evince
that, in actuality, the plaintiff suffered no harm and that no legally prohibited
harassment occurred); Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 393 (2d Cir. 1994).
Through such examples, Professor George illustrates the core statutory theme: The
very act of differentiating pursuant to one of the five proscribed classifications
insults and demeans the personhood—the humanity—of the discriminatees. Such is
harm even if unaccompanied by attendant injuries such as loss of income, of
advancement, or of training.
8
See infra notes 165–86 and accompanying text. Many of these decisions
postdate this author’s 1987 article in the University of California at Davis Law
Review. See generally Bayer, supra note 4. Moreover, four years after that
publication, Congress enacted a significant amendment reaffirming Title VII’s “first
principle.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), discussed infra notes 214–45 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the Act’s half-century mark offers an apt opportunity
both to augment and to expand that earlier argument with contemporary materials.
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short hair rules,9 the theory purports that certain per se
discriminatory employment practices do not statutorily constitute
“discrimination” if those practices are “reasonable” and impose
Because these supposed reasonable
no unequal burden.10
employment terms and conditions are factually but not legally
discrimination, defendants need not justify their facially biased
standards under the Act’s exacting, textually explicit
exceptions.11
Typically summarizing the unequal burden theory, the en
banc United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
asserted a mere decade ago that under Title VII, “the touch-stone
is reasonableness.”12 The Ninth Circuit’s crucial phrasing is an
apparent reworking of, but in fact misrepresents the pivotal
explication of, statutorily permissible discrimination that the
Supreme Court declared soon after Title VII’s enactment: “The
touchstone is business necessity.”13 Thus, from the beginning,
our highest court recognized that nothing short of “necessity”
excuses discrimination under Title VII.14 “Necessity” is quite
distant from the unequal burden doctrine’s dilution of the Act’s
“touchstone” to mere “reasonableness.”15 This Article explains
how the courts strayed so far afield and why their deviation is so
erroneous.
Simply put, courts have no authority to create extrastatutory
varieties of lawful discrimination under a banner of
“reasonableness,” especially varieties thoroughly dissimilar from
Congress’s legislated exclusions.
Contrary to fundamental
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9
See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir.
1998) (holding that an employer’s rule requiring men but not women to wear short
hair does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII); Willingham v. Macon
Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (same).
10
Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that the FBI’s
“gender-normed [physicial fitness tests]” do not impose unlawful unequal burdens);
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108–11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc); cf. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1088.
11
See infra notes 133–50 and accompanying text discussing Title VII’s defenses.
12
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113 (holding that an employer’s rule requiring only
female bartenders to wear prescribed facial makeup is lawful because plaintiff failed
to prove an “unequal burden”); see discussion infra notes 75–89 and accompanying
text.
13
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (describing the “disparate
impact” cause of action under Title VII, including the “business necessity” defense);
see also infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
14
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
15
Compare Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113, with Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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“separation of powers,”16 unequal burden theory elevates to
supremacy judicial determinations that certain forms of
discrimination are lawful due simply to their seemingly
widespread acceptance, which acceptance the courts feel is
reasonable.17 But, the rightful definition of reasonable prejudice,
which I take to mean lawful prejudice, is found solely in Title
VII’s subsections specifically permitting consideration of race,
sex, and other otherwise unlawful criteria.18 Consequently, by
creating within Title VII a classification of lawful extratextual
discrimination titled “reasonable,” unequal burden theory
illegitimately permits employers to impose the very class-based
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16
Separation of powers concerns the proper authority exercised by each branch
of the federal level of government. “Our Constitution divided the ‘powers of the new
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial.’ ” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483
(2010) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
17
Certainly, the judiciary’s duty to discern how given legislation applies to
discrete situations is thorny because often, “with many . . . narrow issues of
statutory construction, the general language chosen by Congress does not clearly
resolve the precise question.” Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deffered Annuity &
Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1107–08 (1983) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (Title VII decision). Equally vexing is the interpretive quandary that
even seemingly straightforward applications of unambiguous statutory commands
may engender results confounding the very policies underlying the given legislation.
See, e.g., United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 11 (2008); see
also infra notes 247–52 and accompanying text. Accordingly, as their title denotes,
judges should, indeed must, exercise judgment in their attempts to enforce statutory
provisions consistent with legislative will. As Judge—later Justice—Cardozo
instructed nearly a century ago, “The question is in every case [how] the legislature,
if [the given issue] had been foreseen, would have wished the statute to be
enforced . . . . The answer must be reached pragmatically, by the exercise of good
sense and sound judgment, by considering how the statutory rule will function . . . .”
People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 60 (1920) (Cardozo,
J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quote editing extrapolates on observations
specifically regarding whether invalidation of a portion of a statute requires
invalidation of the entire act). Cognizant that the latitude accorded to the courts is
and should be generous, this Article urges nonetheless that despite its widespread
acceptance, the unequal burden doctrine is an abuse—indeed, a particularly
unsubtle and inappropriate abuse—of the discretion attendant to the exercise of
discerning statutory meaning through judicial review.
18
See infra notes 132–62 and accompanying text. As Dean Van Detta observed,
“But what prerogative does Title VII leave to employers to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin? None, of course, except as expressly
defined in such narrow statutory exceptions as the bona fide occupational
qualification defense . . . .” Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An
Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every
Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 71, 123 (2003).
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stereotypes, suppositions, and biases that Congress sensibly and
legitimately outlawed.19 For example, unequal burden theory
would uphold regulations requiring female judges to emphasize
their femininity by wearing black robes adorned with white
lace.20 One might have thought that such a ridiculous outcome
offends Title VII per se. Yet, given its dominance, explaining the
wrongfulness of the unequal burden doctrine remains necessary
at the Act’s half-century mark.
This is hardly the first work to despair over judicially
created Title VII doctrine that undeniably legitimizes race- and
sex-specific grooming, clothing, and appearance rules in apparent
Perhaps
disregard of express statutory protections.21
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19
See infra notes 170–208 and accompanying text. Even when the explicit text
of civil rights laws does not expressly or impliedly exempt discriminatory practices,
too frequently, judges mistake their personal preferences for legislative meaning
simply because these judges find their view to be proper, or at least unobjectionable.
See, e.g., Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace
Appearance Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 290 (2009); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2556 (1994). Such offends
elementary American separation of powers often learned during the first semester of
law school, if not before: Courts are obliged to enforce what Congress actually
enacted, not what the courts suppose Congress should have enacted. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently reiterated, “The role of this Court is to apply the statute as
it is written—even if we think some other approach might ‘accor[d] with good
policy.’ ” Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014) (alteration in original)
(quoting Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 252 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text (reviewing the proper
mode of statutory construction under Title VII).
20
See infra notes 308–10 and accompanying text. Arguably, “unequal burden”
could validate as well facially neutral criteria. For example, applying unequal
burden precedents, the court in Finnie v. Lee County, Mississippi upheld the Lee
County Juvenile Detention Center’s (“JC”) requirement that all detention officers
wear pants issued by the sheriff’s department. 907 F. Supp. 2d 750, 772–75 (N.D.
Miss. 2012). Discerning no discriminatory animus, Finnie concluded that the JC’s
policy reasonably assures uniformity among officers. Additionally, the court rejected
Ms. Finnie’s Title VII argument that the JC’s pants-only policy unlawfully denied
her the option of “wearing traditional female apparel.” Id. at 774. While Finnie’s
holding may be correct, its reliance on unequal burden theory is problematic.
Regardless, given space considerations, this Article limits its critique of unequal
burden theory to facially discriminatory employment standards and, thus, leaves for
another article whether, as one might suppose, the same or similar arguments would
invalidate the use of that theory in Title VII litigation where discriminatory animus
is not obvious.
21
See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 19, at 2541; D. Wendy Greene, Black Women
Can’t Have Blonde Hair . . . in the Workplace, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405
(2011); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice
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understandably deeming Title VII a promise yet unfulfilled,
scholars such as Gowri Ramachandran conclude that
“[a]ntidiscrimination law is not the best law for protecting
Instead, Professor
identity performance such as dress.”22
Ramachandran proposes a singular and separate “freedom of
dress” legal standard because “[t]he fact that identity
performance is so contextual and complex makes it hard, if not
impossible, to formulate legal rules for protecting identity
performance under the traditional equality-based rubrics of
antidiscrimination law.”23
Provocative entreaties such as Professor Ramachandran’s
certainly inform, inspire, and enlighten. Still, it is unlikely that
either Congress or the courts soon will discard the egalitarianism
underlying American civil rights laws—although as their
membership changes they may be amenable to appreciating
traditional concepts in new ways. Therefore, while the likelihood
of success remains uncertain, it may be easier to sway the
judiciary, particularly newer judges, to reverse unfortunate
rulings by way of established civil rights milieus than to convince
courts to undergo the particularly uncomfortable process of
overturning precedent by first requiring them to endure the
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of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (2009); Yofi Tirosh, Adjudicating Appearance:
From Identity to Personhood, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 49 (2007).
22
Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of
Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 21
(2006).
23
See id. at 23. Doubtless, Title VII and similarly designed civil rights statutes
are too constrained because, to borrow Professor Ramachandran’s phrasing, “the
traditional equality-based rubrics of antidiscrimination law” omit bigoted conduct no
less offensive, arbitrary, and destructive to a given individual than are racial,
sexual, and other commonly outlawed animus. Indeed, nearly three decades ago, this
author identified a constitutional doctrine remedying such urgent criticisms. See
generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality—and the Irrational Underinclusiveness
of the Civil Rights Laws, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1988) (explaining why due
process of law under the U.S. Constitution requires that statutes first identify areas
of endeavor, such as employment and voting, and then proscribe all discrimination
of any kind that unreasonably obstructs successfully achieving those endeavors).
Accordingly, to be constitutional, legislation such as Title VII must proscribe all
arbitrary employment discrimination including but not limited to that act’s five
forbidden classes. Given, however, that the proposition set forth in this author’s
Rationality article has not, and likely will not, be judicially adopted, the notion that
legislatures reasonably may limit civil rights protections to chosen classes remains
good constitutional law.
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comparably disagreeable process of adopting essentially new,
unaccustomed, and likely unwelcome frameworks of legal
analysis.24
Moreover, as mentioned previously, over the last three
decades, both Congress and the Supreme Court have enriched
familiar discrimination theory,25 particularly regarding what
constitutes unlawful stereotyping.
Although not fully
appreciated by many lower courts, these happy clarifications
amply discredit those courts’ rationales allowing employers to
indulge unnecessary racial and sexual categorizing through
Therefore, despite the
grooming and appearance rules.26
thoughtful
conclusions
of
critics
such
as
Professor
Ramachandran, this Article need not, and does not, go afield
from the considerable body of jurisprudence enforcing Title VII’s
“first principle,” sounding in traditional antidiscrimination
theory, that any form of discrimination based on the Act’s five
forbidden criteria is unlawful unless expressly textually
exempted.
The line of argument is not complex. Part I explicates the
unequal burden doctrine and its link to the predecessor theory of
“mutable characteristics.”27 Part II offers the aforementioned
statutorily formal argument, disproving unequal burden theory
through an examination of Title VII’s plain language and
structure28 in light of modern Supreme Court precedents
addressing Title VII’s ban against stereotyping.29 This analysis
places special emphasis on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m),30 in which
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C M
Y K

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 11 Side A

24
Cf. Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1251 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Just how complex
and difficult the new argument plaintiffs ask us to address, and thus the reason for
our particular reluctance to decide it with finality, is worth pausing to underscore.”);
Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why
This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175, 1218
n.281 (1996) (“[I]t [often is] more difficult for doctrinally-minded judges to craft new
theories . . . to deal with new problems because they lack the doctrinal tools to
confront novel problems.”).
25
See infra notes 162–240 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 57–58, 62 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 45–79 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 107–31 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 165–86 and accompanying text.
30
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 [hereinafter “the
CRA of 1991”].
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See infra notes 214–45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 246–307 and accompanying text.
33
See, e.g., Bandsuch, supra note 19, at 305–06; Ramachandran, supra note 22,
at 50–51. Often aligned with utilitarianism, consequentialism avers that in any
given situation, the morally correct resolution is that which produces the best
outcome in terms of some sort of societal good, often measured as the greatest
aggregate happiness. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor:
Why the Constitution Is a “Suicide Pact,” 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 294–96
(2011).
34
See Bayer, supra note 33, at 292.
35
See id. at 295–96.
36
See, e.g., Bandsuch, supra note 19, at 305–06; Ramachandran, supra note 22,
at 50–51.
32
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Congress clarified that plaintiffs prevail when discriminatory
animus merely is a “motivating factor” rather than the “but-for
cause” of the defendants’ conduct.31
Although not the lengthiest discussion herein by any means,
Part III presents what may be this Article’s most substantial
enhancement to relevant scholarship by applying abstract moral
philosophy, specifically modern dignity theory, to assure that the
doctrinal arguments presented in Part II do not constitute
unduly literal—absurd—applications of the Act’s text.32
Eschewing as patently mistaken the “consequentialist” approach
adopted by most commentators criticizing unequal burden
theory,33 this Article argues in favor of deontology, the belief that
“morality is transcendent, a set of a priori principles discernable
through
reason.
[Contrary
to
consequentialism,
m]orality . . . does not care what the possible outcomes of a
particular moral problem may be.”34 Pursuant to deontological
theory, the concern in grooming code cases is not whether the
given race- or sex-based appearance rule—say, forbidding male
employees from wearing long hair—engenders good or bad
outcomes.35 Rather, rejecting the “balancing” approach that
characterizes determining the aggregate “good,”36 the issue is
whether the employer’s rule objectively is immoral, thereby a
violation of Title VII, or is objectively moral, in which case it
comports with Title VII. Indeed, this Article shows that although
ostensibly logical, the morality of civil rights is not discerned by
balancing tests because such protocols inevitably endorse as the
meaning of “morality” the personal preferences, predilections,
and biases of the judge, administrator, commentator, or indeed
any person performing the “balance.” Instead, morality must be
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37
Thus, for instance, it is irrelevant whether in the aggregate male employees
do or do not feel more deeply offended by a male-only hair rule than the employer
would feel offended if that rule were invalidated under Title VII. Likewise, whatever
the data reveals, it is irrelevant that the given reviewer, judge, or scholar personally
believes that the interests of one of the parties—employer or male
employees—outweighs the interests of the other. Instead, the answer derives from
what a priori, objective reason establishes as the morally correct resolution.
38
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., 3d ed. 1996).
39
See infra notes 266–307 and accompanying text.
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understood as independent in its own right, not as the
culmination of reviewers’ private, albeit deeply held and sincere,
inclinations.37
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that placing Title VII
analysis within a deontological milieu—where it squarely
belongs—renders a particularly unique benefit to critical
analysis: explaining in a disinterested, thus unprejudiced,
fashion why Title VII’s protection of individual dignity cannot
depend on the personal preferences and predilections of
employers, employees, job applicants, or the judges who review
the allegedly discriminatory employment policies. Deontology
forestalls what many commentators inappropriately embrace:
defining and applying moral precepts based on what makes
either the given commentator or those whom that commentator
respects—possibly the employer, possibly the employee—happy.
Deontology compels the disentangling of private preferences from
moral argument. Accordingly, one can prove that unequal
burden theory truly is immoral, thus unlawful, only if the
reviewer accepts unequal burden theory’s immorality even if the
reviewer deems resulting outcomes distasteful, such as
compelling employers to tolerate male employees’ long hair. That
the moral analysis offered herein to invalidate the unequal
burden doctrine may please this author—as indeed it does—is a
fortuitous happenstance, and surely no independent proof that
this Article discerned the correct moral and legal result.
This Article explains Title VII’s applicable moral principles
using “Kantian ethics,” that is, the concepts of human dignity
and moral comportment expounded in broad terms by the noted
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant.38 As detailed in
Part III, albeit implicitly and perhaps instinctively rather than
knowingly, Congress embraced Kantian deontology through
enacting Title VII—and indeed any of its civil rights laws.39 Title
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VII declares that by imposing unnecessary racial, sex-based,
religious, color, and ethnic criteria, employers and unions offend
the innate, intrinsic human dignity of employees and
employment applicants, which first and foremost is a moral
offense although it likely offends victims’ economic, professional,
and social statuses as well.40 While these latter offenses are
hugely significant, it is the moral offense that explains—indeed
justifies—Congress’s intrusion by way of Title VII into
traditional management prerogative.41
Accordingly, this conclusion confirms that unless truly
necessary to the conduct of the given business, Title VII prohibits
employers from imposing their racial, sex-based, ethnic, or
religiously inspired grooming and appearance standards, even if,
in light of widely accepted social conventions, the vast majority
would feel exceptionally uncomfortable in the presence of
employees who refuse to comport with their employers’
discriminatory rules.42 Indeed, nearly four decades ago, with
40

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
Certainly, even a modicum of proof that employment discrimination affects
interstate commerce technically is sufficient to sustain Title VII’s constitutionality.
Much theory supports the argument that discrimination obstructs rather than
enhances commerce. Cf. Jessica Leigh Rosenthal, Comment, The Interactive Process
Disabled: Improving the ADA and Strengthening the EEOC Through the Adoption of
the Interactive Process, 57 EMORY L.J. 247, 268 n.162 (2007) (citing Russell Powell,
Beyond Lane: Who is Protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act, Who Should
Be?, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 25, 50 (2004)). It is equally well-established that Congress
need not be motivated by purely economic considerations when exercising its
commerce authority. Rather, the legislature’s authority to implement the Commerce
Clause and its other constitutionally enumerated powers to prevent immoral
governmental and private conduct is well-established. E.g., Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (addressing the
Public Accommodations Act, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a–2000a-6); see also United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1118–19
(9th Cir. 2006) (same). Pursuant to such moral authority, Congress almost certainly
would not rescind Title VII even if presented with compelling evidence that
discrimination does not disrupt or even enhances interstate commerce. That hiring
criteria and employment standards affect interstate commerce, favorably or not, is
constitutionally sufficient, therefore, Congress may address what apparently is its
primary concern: the immorality of imposing employment conditions predicated on
racial, ethnic, sex-based, and religious stereotypes. Cf. Andrew Brenton, Comment,
Overcoming the Equal Pay Act and Title VII: Why Federal Sex-Based Employment
Discrimination Laws Should Be Replaced with a System for Accrediting Employers
for Their Antidiscriminatory Employment Practices, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y
349, 372–75 (2011) (discussing how arguably efficient employment discrimination
“practices are not permissible under the inexorable sex-blind logic of the [Equal Pay]
Act and Title VII”).
42
See infra notes 308–19 and accompanying text.
41
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correct simplicity and directness the Supreme Court recognized
Title VII’s first principle: “Congress intended to prohibit all
practices in whatever form which create inequality in
employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, sex, or national origin.”43 Therefore, contrary to
the harsh dismay expressed by Judge Richard Posner, Title VII’s
enlightened prohibition against discrimination indeed and quite
rightly recognizes “a federally protected right for male workers to
wear nail polish and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince
about in high heels, [and] for female ditchdiggers to strip to the
waist in hot weather,”44 if such prohibitions are predicated on
unnecessary sex-based bias, as almost certainly they would be.
I.
A.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNEQUAL BURDEN DOCTRINE

Unequal Burden Doctrine’s Precursor: Mutability Theory

Normally, it would seem unremarkable to conclude that
distinctly sex-specific terms of employment, such as rules
forbidding only male employees from wearing long hair, are per
se gender discriminatory.45 After all, based manifestly on the
affected workers’ sex, such patently gender-specific work rules
apparently violate Title VII’s express and unequivocal
antidiscrimination prohibition. Indeed, reviewing the plain
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43
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (emphasis added)
(citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971)); accord, e.g., Cnty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981);
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999); Miranda v. B & B
Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1992).
44
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J., concurring).
45
Because most of the applicable precedents concern sex discrimination, it is
worth noting that although sometimes differentiated in other disciplines, as a
matter of antidiscrimination law, courts treat the terms “gender” and “sex”
synonymously and so will this Article. E.g., Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 738
F.3d 214, 220 (9th Cir. 2013); Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball
Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 116 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317
(11th Cir. 2011). See Mark E. Berghausen, Comment, Intersex Employment
Discrimination: Title VII and Anatomical Sex Nonconformity, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1281, 1286–92 (2011), for an interesting, accessible discussion explaining why the
concepts gender and sex are and should be distinct, although certainly related. Id. at
1286 (“It has become an academic norm to use the term ‘sex’ to refer to gonadal,
chromosomal, or genital anatomy and to use the term ‘gender’ to refer to the socially
expected behaviors and preferences commonly ascribed to each sex.”).
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language and underlying policy of the Fair Employment Act, the
first decisions addressing hair length and similar grooming rules
simply but sensibly concluded, “It is clear, therefore, that [Title
VII’s] term ‘discrimination’ in this context contains no
qualifications. Every difference in treatment is discrimination.”46
These holdings were short lived, quickly replaced by
appellate decisions asserting that, as a general matter, Title VII’s
prohibition against discrimination covers only terms and
conditions
of
employment
premised
on
“immutable
characteristics”—essentially irreversible attributes associated
with the Act’s five forbidden criteria—rather than “mutable”
characteristics meaning easily alterable traits.47 Mutability
theory posits that because the protected classes themselves are
immutable,48 Congress intended Title VII to apply only when
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46
Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 665 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
Early opinions rightly understood that sex-specific grooming rules confound not only
the Act’s unambiguous text, but also the Act’s pivotal humanitarian and empathetic
principles. As the Aros court frankly and firmly reasoned forty years ago, “The issue
of long hair on men tends to arouse the passions of many in our society today. In
that regard the issue is no different from the issues of race, color, religion, national
origin and equal employment rights for women, all of which are raised in Title VII.”
Id. at 666. Initially, several courts agreed with the Aros court. See Willingham v.
Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 482 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1973) (divided panel), vacated on
reh’g, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F.
Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055,
1057 (N.D. Ohio 1971). Identically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), the agency that enforces Title VII, consistently has determined that Title
VII proscribes employers’ male-only hair policies. See E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-1529, 3
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 952 (Apr. 2, 1971); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-2343, 3 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1253 (June 3, 1970); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
§ 15-VII(B)(5), 2006 WL 4673430 (2006). But see EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
§ 619.2(a)(4), 2006 WL 4672749 (2006) (noting that federal courts have not adopted
the EEOC’s position).
47
See generally Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977) (divided
panel); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976) (divided
panel); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title
Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (per curiam); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(divided panel). An en banc opinion overruled the sole court of appeals decision
holding that male-only hair rules constitute per se sex-based discrimination. See
Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092. With rare exceptions, state precedent likewise finds
that local anti-discrimination statutes do not per se forbid sex-specific hair
standards. See 3 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 45.02[2] (2d ed.
2015) (collecting cases).
48
Specifically, one cannot transform one’s race or national origin. Similarly,
there is no serious dispute that based on today’s science, changing one’s skin color or
sex, although not impossible, is difficult and extraordinarily costly in time, effort,
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discriminatory employment policies relate to the affected class’s
very immutability, such as refusing to hire women because of
their gender.49 By contrast, because hair is mutable—with
arguable ease, one can cut and style one’s hair and recut and
restyle hair as it grows back—rules forbidding only male
employees from wearing long hair and similar grooming
requirements fall outside the Act’s sphere of protection.50
Although acknowledging, as they must, that male-only hair rules
regulate employees due to their immutable gender,51 courts
accented that such rules apply not only to the entire protected
class but also to a subset of a sex: men who wish to wear long
hair.52 Courts maintained that because the “plus” or modifying
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and trauma, thus rendering those attributes effectively immutable. By contrast,
deciding to either adopt or to change one’s religion is hardly immutable. “Religion is,
of course, a forbidden criterion [under Title VII], even though a matter of individual
choice.” Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying mutability
analysis to uphold employers’ English-only rules). Possibly, changing religious
affiliation may be sufficiently psychologically arduous to fall into a special category:
mutable but difficult to alter. See discussion infra note 65 and accompanying text.
Recognizing that religion is not immutable, opinions assert that religion is
among Title VII’s protected groups due to its time-honored elevated status as
evinced by the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125
n.22. This attempt to salvage mutability theory, however, is infirm because it
contradicts the Supreme Court’s admonition that the definition of discrimination
under Title VII is not predicated on either the concept of or the law explicating
fundamental rights under the Constitution. See, e.g., Barker, 549 F.2d at 404
(McCree, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976)). See
Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title
VII’s Failure To Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 453 (2010), for a thoughtful critique of mutability analysis as courts apply it to
religious discrimination in employment.
49
E.g., Baker, 507 F.2d at 897 (“Since race, national origin and color represent
immutable characteristics, logic dictates that sex is used in the same sense rather
than to indicate personal modes of dress or cosmetic effects.”); see also, e.g., Gloor,
618 F.2d at 269; Earwood, 539 F.2d at 1351; Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125.
50
Barrett v. Am. Med. Response, N.W., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1166 (D. Or.
2001) (citing Earwood, 539 F.2d at 1351).
51
See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028,
1032 (7th Cir. 1979).
52
Rules affecting portions rather than the totality of a protected class are
known as “plus” rules, as in “race-plus” or “sex-plus.” For instance, the Sixth Circuit
recently noted, “[A] plaintiff can maintain a claim for discrimination on the basis of
a protected classification considered in combination with another factor. In many of
these so-called ‘sex-plus’ cases, the plaintiff's subclass combines a characteristic
protected by Title VII with one that is not.” Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt., Ltd., 744
F.3d 948, 957–58 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (citing Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam)).
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aspect concerns a mutable characteristic such as hair, the
employment rule is not statutorily sex discrimination despite the
rule’s application solely to one gender.53 Consequently, mutability
theory does not aver that flagrant sex- and race-based
employment standards are prima facie illegal pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)54 but are legal nonetheless under a textual
exception such as the Act’s express bona fide occupational
qualification (“BFOQ”) defense.55 Rather, although no statutory
provision so suggests, the courts propounded that when involving
mutable characteristics, employment terms and conditions
tangibly predicated on race or sex are not per se statutorily
predicated on race or sex.56
Predictably, courts expanded mutability-immutability
theory, hewing a substantial safe harbor of legal sex
discrimination.57 Lamentably consistent with its basic premise,
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53
E.g., Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1335–36 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Bartlett, supra note 19, at 2559–65; see Bayer, supra note 4, at 842.
54
See supra note 3 for the text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
55
Title VII provides that employment classifications may be based on certain
usually forbidden criteria when “religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1); see also infra notes
133–46 and accompanying text.
56
As explicated infra at notes 68–91 and accompanying text, the judiciary’s core
rationale is that such indisputably sex-based policies are not statutorily problematic
because they promote customary, “reasonable” management prerogatives. See, e.g.,
Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The
Seventh Circuit expressed tidily the general presumption, “So long as [sex-specific
attire and grooming rules] find some justification in commonly accepted social norms
and are reasonably related to the employer’s business needs, such regulations are
not necessarily violations of Title VII even though the standards prescribed differ
somewhat for men and women.” Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi.,
604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
57
See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215–16 (8th Cir. 1985)
(finding that sexually based dress and appearance code to enhance company’s image
is proper exercise of management prerogative); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 181 (3d. Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (same); Fountain v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding an employer’s policy requiring
male employees to wear ties); Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (analogizing to Title VII precedent and holding that judges may require male
attorneys to wear neck ties to preserve courtroom decorum). Not surprisingly, courts
have been equally loath to strike governmental employers’ grooming rules as
violations of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests. E.g., Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (holding that the police department’s male-only
hair length rules were lawful under rational basis analysis if they helped make
officers recognizable to the public or promoted internal “esprit de corps”); Weaver v.
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mutability theory applies as well to racial-ethnic grooming
standards, including facially neutral employment rules that
disproportionately hinder racial and ethnic groups.58 Indeed,
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Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 13–14 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that the police department’s
“no mustache” rule was at least constitutionally rational to help induce
departmental cohesion); Rathert v. Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that the police department may ban male officers from wearing ear
studs when both on and off duty). Importantly, these representative decisions are
not premised on the necessity of police or other administrative departments to
promote the safety of either the general public or of fellow law enforcement officers,
although such would likely be legitimate reasons to uphold grooming and
appearance codes. Rather, the rationales are grounded in traditional employers’
prerogatives regarding worker comportment and workplace ambiance. Thus, the
constitutional law cases are analogous to the Title VII cases discussed herein.
58
See, e.g., Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 486 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1973)
(finding that the discharge of a black male because his sideburns did not conform to
employer’s grooming requirements did not result from racial discrimination);
Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 26,
1981) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s ban against racial discrimination in contracts
does not forbid an employer from banning the cornrows hairstyle that at the time
was particularly popular among African Americans).
A much cited telling instance is worth a bit of detail. In Rogers v. American
Airlines, Inc., the district court rejected Renee Rogers’s challenge that her
employer’s policy forbidding the cornrow hairstyle unlawfully discriminated against
her on the basis of African Americanism. 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Rogers rebuffed plaintiff’s contention that cornrows, then prevalent among African
Americans of both sexes, represent a cultural and historical expression of racial
identity. Dismissing the popular hairstyle as a mere fad, the court reasoned that Ms.
Rogers’s claim failed because she could not demonstrate that “an all-braided hair
style is worn exclusively or even predominantly by black people.” Id. at 232. The
court might have ended its analysis there, but, significantly, felt compelled to reject
entirely any argument that a particular grooming or appearance style’s proven racial
or ethnic significance is relevant under Title VII. See Rhode, supra note 21, at
1058–59 (discussing Rogers in detail). Specifically, the court ended its analysis by
reaffirming the legal preeminence of mutability analysis as virtually an absolute
trump: “An all-braided hair style is an ‘easily changed characteristic,’ and, even if
socioculturally associated with a particular race or nationality, is not an
impermissible basis for distinctions in the application of employment practices by an
employer.” Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
Although its reasoning arguably has been supplanted by contemporary
“unequal burden” theory, the thirty-five-year-old Rogers is no relic. E.g., Pitts v.
Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *5–6 (M.D. Ga.
Apr. 25, 2008) (applying the Rogers mutability theory to uphold employer’s ban on
cornrows hairstyle); McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779,
at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (upholding employer’s ban on braided hair styles
under the Rogers court’s mutability theory).
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courts enlarged the doctrine to validate intrusions into core
indicia of ethnic personhood, such as rules forbidding the use of
languages other than English.59
Despite significant amending of Title VII and the profound
maturation of federal court judgments recognizing employers’
unlawful use of sexual, racial, and other forms of “stereotyping,”60
the nearly thirty years since the publication of this author’s
Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination
Under Title VII61 have seen no surcease of the judicial dogma, in
both federal and state courts, that explicitly sex-based
appearance and grooming codes are not per se discrimination
Indeed, the impact likely is especially
under Title VII.62
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59
See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding that a meat and poultry producer’s rule forbidding the use of any language
other than English on the job did not violate the Title VII rights of predominately
Spanish-speaking employees and, thus, need not be validated as a BFOQ); Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an employer’s rule forbidding the
use of Spanish in the presence of an English-speaking customer was not
discrimination and, thus, need not be defended under BFOQ); cf. Church v. Kare
Distribution, Inc., 211 F. App’x 278 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Gloor, 618
F.2d at 266–69) (holding that firing sales representatives who could not speak
Spanish did not violate Texas Labor Code § 21.051).
60
See
infra
notes
214–45
and
accompanying
text
(discussing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)); see also infra notes 165–200 and accompanying
text (discussing unlawful stereotyping under the Act).
61
See Bayer, supra note 4, at 772.
62
See, e.g., Kare Distribution, Inc., 211 F. App’x at 281 (holding that firing sales
representatives who could not speak Spanish does not violate section 21.051 of the
Texas Labor Code); Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (finding that the employer gambling casino’s requirement that
female bartenders must wear makeup was not unlawful); Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that unlawful
harassment may occur if a male employee suffers discrimination for acting in a
too-feminine manner, but noting that reasonable sex-based dress and grooming
standards are not necessarily per se unlawful under Title VII); Harper v.
Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that a
male-only hair length policy did not violate Title VII); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile
Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908–09 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (upholding a male-only hairlength rule); Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1490 (upholding rule forbidding use of any
language other than English on the job); Bellissimo, 764 F.2d at 181; Pitts, 2008 WL
1899306, at *5–6 (applying mutability theory to uphold employer’s ban on cornrows
hairstyle); Dodd v. SEPTA, No. 06-4213, 2007 WL 1866754, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 28,
2007) (upholding employer’s ban against male employees wearing ponytails);
Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. 03-1540 (JBS), 2004 WL 1739724, at *4–6
(D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2004) (finding that a male employee who wanted to wear his ponytail
set in a neat bun stated no claim under Title VII); Boyce v. Gen. Ry. Signal Co., No.
99-CV-6225T, 2004 WL 1574023, at *2–3 (W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2004) (upholding a
male-only hair-length rule); Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. 99-5025, 2000 WL
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widespread because one reasonably might assume that numerous
potential plaintiffs now are chilled from challenging patently
discriminatory grooming policies.63
B.

“Unequal Burden” Doctrine Essentially Replaces Mutability
Theory

The judiciary realized that mutability theory qua mutability
theory is facially problematic. First, courts properly have
invalidated employment rules premised on sex traits that
technically are mutable but nonetheless difficult to alter, such as
disparate weight standards for male and female airline
stewards.64 Such policies impose greater difficulties on women
than men because, although mutable, weight control often is
arduous.65
Additionally, despite the then-prevailing mutability theory,
courts invalidated employment policies they considered
excessively humiliating, demeaning, and disrespectful to
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124559, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2000) (upholding rule forbidding male employees
from wearing earrings); McBride, 1996 WL 755779, at *2–3 (upholding a employer’s
ban on braided hair styles under mutability theory); Seitz v. O’Connor, No. 95 CV
0122 (SJ), 1995 WL 745012, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1995) (upholding a male-only
hair-length rule); Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 170 P.3d 655, 658–59 (Alaska 2007)
(holding that sex-based hair-length policies do not violate state contract law’s
“implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”); Matthews v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys.,
Inc., No. B206764, 2009 WL 117406, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2009) (noting that
an employer’s male-only hair-length rule is not unlawful unless it imposes an
unequal burden); Schiavo v. Marina Dist. Dev. Co., 2013 WL 4105183 (N.J. Super.
Ct. July 18, 2013) (finding Borgata Casino’s sex-based grooming and appearance
policies reasonable, thus, lawful); Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 603–04
(Or. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that employer’s rule forbidding men from wearing facial
jewelry does not violate OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030(1)(b)); Rohaly v. Rainbow
Playground Depot, Inc., No. 56478-1-1, 2006 WL 2469143, at *4–5 (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 28, 2006) (addressing employer’s gender-neutral requirement that all
employees wear specified red blazers, the court noted that employer’s sexually
disparate dress and grooming codes are lawful under state and federal law absent an
unequal burden).
63
Likewise, legal counsel may feel obliged to dissuade potential plaintiffs from
suing due to the improbability of a successful outcome or, worse, lest such claims be
adjudged frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise worthy of sanctions pursuant to, among
other things, FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
64
See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2000).
65
Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(striking the weight requirement that applied exclusively to female stewards); see
also, e.g., Frank, 216 F.3d at 854–55 (holding that the airline unlawfully required
female flight attendants to be proportionally slimmer than their male counterparts).
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women.66 For example, deeming the situation different from
male-only hair-length rules, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, in Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings &
Loan Ass’n of Chicago,67 invalidated a bank’s policy instructing
male employees to use good judgment when choosing business
attire but requiring female employees to choose their work outfits
from a limited, preset wardrobe euphemistically called a “career
ensemble.”68 The court rejected the bank’s rationale that, unlike
men, women are apt to engage in “dress competition” and
otherwise cannot be trusted to dress appropriately.69 Similarly,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Allen
v. Lovejoy,70 invalidated, as an offense to the individual
personhood of women, the Health Department of Shelby County,
Tennessee’s rule requiring married female employees to assume
Such holdings correctly
their husbands’ surnames.71
acknowledge that discriminatory animus often arises in response
to
what
Professor
Ramachandran
elegantly
denotes
“performative” aspects of behavior, facets that well may concern
mutable characteristics either predominately or through some
interplay of mutable and immutable attributes.72 Nonetheless,
preserving the fundamental failing of mutability analysis,
Carroll’s and Lovejoy’s rationales permit courts to uphold
purportedly “reasonable” facially discriminatory grooming and
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66
See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028,
1032–33 (7th Cir. 1979).
67
604 F.2d 1028.
68
Id. at 1032–33; see also infra notes 288–91 and accompanying text.
69
Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033.
70
553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977).
71
Id. at 523–24.
72
Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 20–21 (footnote omitted). Professor
Ramachandran noted:
[O]ur identities are either wholly or partially ‘performative,’ meaning that
they are constituted not just by immutable, biological traits but also by our
actions, such as the sexual acts we engage in, the way we wear our hair,
the way we speak, our clothing, and even the magazines we like to read.
Thus, when an African-American woman wears her hair in braids, this act
is usually part of what constitutes her status as an African-American
woman. . . . It is, after all, largely her outward appearance and
behavior—certainly not the shape of her genitals—that signals to most
people who interact with her that she is a woman, and that at least
partially signals her identity as an African American.
Id. See generally Bandsuch, supra note 19, at 291–97 (critiquing immutability
theory).
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comportment policies.73 In that regard, their jurisprudence
remains infirm, for Title VII’s text and structure define as
unlawful all discrimination based on the five forbidden classes
unless proven necessary, and not simply useful, to the given
defendant-business.74
Courts substantially have replaced mutability analysis with
unequal burden theory,75 although the embers of the former
continually warm the latter.76 Indeed, if only implicitly, courts
continue to rely on concepts of mutability—particularly ease of
conformance with employers’ grooming demands—to discern
unequal burden.77 The “reasonableness” vel non of employers’
facially discriminatory appearance and grooming rules may well
depend upon how purportedly easily discriminatees can comply.
Logically, the more ostensibly mutable the affected trait, the
more likely the courts are to conclude the challenged
discrimination is legal. Therefore, mutable characteristics theory
surely remains a silent yet inappropriately influential partner in
grooming case analysis.
The archetypal modern opinion espousing “reasonableness”
as the definition of Title VII discrimination, thus enabling the
“unequal burden” approach, is Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating

73

See, e.g., Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032.
See infra notes 132–50 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII’s textual
exceptions).
75
For example, Rohaly v. Rainbow Playground Depot, Inc. held that requiring
only female employees to purchase and to wear specified navy blazers is not facially
discriminatory but might be unlawful if imposed for discriminatory purposes. No.
56478-1-I, 2006 WL 2469143, at *5–6 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2006). Therein, the
court noted that mutability analysis is “outdated.” Id. at *4 n.10.
76
Modern opinions espousing the unequal burden doctrine often cite mutable
characteristics decisions. E.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104,
1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). However, such opinions tend not to discuss, much
less expressly endorse, mutability analysis per se, indicating that perhaps courts cite
mutable characteristics decisions not to reprise that theory but to demonstrate the
historical persistence of upholding facially discriminatory grooming rules. But see
Church v. Kare Distribution, Inc., 211 F. App’x 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(using mutability theory to uphold under the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act, the firing of a sales employee who could not speak Spanish); Pitts v. Wild
Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *5–6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25,
2008) (applying mutability theory to uphold employer’s ban on the cornrows
hairstyle); McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *2–3
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (upholding employer’s ban on braided hairstyles under
mutability theory).
77
Brian P. McCarthy, Note, Trans Employees and Personal Appearance
Standards Under Title VII, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 964 (2008).
74
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Co.78 Therein, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit rebuffed Darleen Jespersen’s Title VII challenge to
that aspect of Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming and appearance
policy requiring female, but not male, bartenders to wear
makeup or lose their jobs.79 Ms. Jespersen argued that her
long-standing and deeply felt disdain for facial cosmetics
exemplified why Harrah’s sex-based makeup standards
unlawfully inflict the common stereotype that genuine women
wear cosmetics to enhance their femininity but real men do not
lest they appear ladylike and weak.80
In a ploy derived from mutability analysis, Jespersen held
that Harrah’s policy is not statutorily sex-based because it strives
to enhance the productivity and attractiveness of all bartenders,
both male and female.81 Acknowledging that certain rules are
unequivocally gender specific, Jespersen pronounced such sex
differentiation to be merely judicious nods to reasonable
prevailing social conventions.82 Indeed, Jespersen reiterated the
familiar bizarre canon of mutability analysis:
“Grooming
standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders
78

444 F.3d 1104.
Id. at 1110–13. Regarding Jespersen’s specific facts, Harrah’s Corporation
owns and manages resorts combining hotels, restaurants, bars, and gambling
casinos. Id. at 1105. Harrah’s Reno, Nevada, facility set grooming standards
containing sex-neutral rules as well as both male- and female-specific rubrics. Id. at
1107. Men may not wear hair extending below the top of their shirt collars, may not
wear ponytails, and must keep their hands and fingernails clean and their
fingernails neatly trimmed at all times. Id. Similarly, male employees cannot wear
colored nail polish or use facial or eye makeup. Id. Female employees are required,
among other things, to keep their hair teased, curled, or styled and always worn
down. Id. Nail polish can be only clear, white, pink, or red, and nails may not be
unduly long or sport “exotic nail art.” Id. In addition, “[m]ake up (face powder, blush
and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary colors. Lip color
must be worn at all times.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
80
Id. at 1107–08. She testified that wearing makeup both slighted her personal
dignity and “took away [her] credibility as an individual.” Id. at 1108 (alteration in
original). Professor Tirosh, accenting the physical as well as emotional effects of
Harrah’s grooming code, stated, “Jespersen’s earlier attempts to wear makeup made
her feel emotionally distressed, ‘sick, degraded, exposed, and violated.’ Still, when
makeup became mandatory in her workplace, she tried wearing it in order to
conform to the new regulations, but again felt extremely unconformable [sic] and ill.”
See Tirosh, supra note 21, at 70 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc)) (citing Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1194 (D. Nev. 2002)).
81
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109–10.
82
Id. at 1107, 1112.
79
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are not facially discriminatory.”83 Declaring that Title VII’s
“touch-stone is reasonableness,”84 the Ninth Circuit essentially
embraced mutability theory’s principle conceit: “So long as they
find some justification in commonly accepted social norms and
are reasonably related to the employer’s business needs, such
regulations are not necessarily violations of Title VII”85
regardless whether such sex- or race-specific regulating of
employees meets any of the express exemptions or defenses
Congress chose to include within Title VII.
The issue then became whether Harrah’s sex-based
standards impose an “unequal” and thus inappropriate or
unequal burden, a requisite Ms. Jespersen failed to meet.86
Specifically, nothing in the record suggested to the Ninth Circuit
that Harrah’s sex-based grooming requisites would “objectively
inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job.”87 The court similarly
opined that Harrah’s female-specific requirements “are not more
onerous” either in theory or practice than are its male-only
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83
Id. at 1109–10 (emphasis added). Such reasoning is obstinate. That courts
think it appropriate to carve a “reasonableness” exception to Title VII regarding
employers’ grooming rules cannot alter the actuality that, borrowing Jespersen’s
prose, “standards . . . differentiat[ing] between the genders” is exactly what “facially
discriminatory” means. Id.; see Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Foster-Hall, No. 97
C 1441, 97 C 2209, 1998 WL 419483, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1998) (“[The
employer’s] policy was facially discriminatory because by its own terms it
dictated . . . disparities along racial lines. That is what it means for a policy to be
‘facially discriminatory.’ ” (emphasis omitted)).
84
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1113; see also supra notes 12–20 and accompanying
text.
85
Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th
Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). Similarly, one of the pivotal mutable characteristics
rulings asserted uncritically:
We may take judicial notice that reasonable regulations prescribing good
grooming standards are not at all uncommon in the business world, indeed,
taking account of basic differences in male and female physiques and
common differences in customary dress of male and female employees, it is
not usually thought that there is unlawful discrimination “because of sex.”
Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
86
The court averred, “Our settled law in this circuit, however, does not support
Jespersen’s position that a sex-based difference in appearance standards alone,
without any further showing of disparate effects, creates a prima facie case.”
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (citing Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th
Cir. 2000); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
87
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
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requisites.88 Absent evidence of an unequal or unequal burden,
the court refused to find even a prima facie case of
discrimination.89
In brief, the now prevailing standard holds that employment
grooming, attire, or appearance requisites—and their
like—facially premised on any of the five forbidden criteria are
not discriminatory under Title VII if (1) they are reasonable,
likely because they mirror purportedly innocuous, socially
prevalent sexual statuses or otherwise are judicially deemed
inoffensive and (2) they impose no burden judicially determined
to be “unequal” or otherwise undue.
This author avers today no less adamantly than he did
nearly thirty years ago90: Courts know or should know that the
principles this writing assembles as “undue burden” theory—a
modest variation of the older mutability standard—defiantly
thwarts the letter, structure, purpose, and spirit of Title VII.
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88
Id. at 1109. Indeed, the majority declined to “take judicial notice of the fact
that it costs more money and takes more time for a woman to comply with the
makeup requirement than it takes for a man to comply with the requirement that he
keep his hair short.” Id. at 1110. The dissenting judges strongly disagreed, urging
that while perhaps it would have been helpful had Ms. Jespersen supplemented the
district court record, common knowledge and experience debunks the majority’s rash
and willful disregard of commonly known facts:
[I]s there any doubt that putting on makeup costs money and takes time?
Harrah's policy requires women to apply face powder, blush, mascara and
lipstick. You don’t need an expert witness to figure out that such items
don’t grow on trees. Nor is there any rational doubt that application of
makeup is an intricate and painstaking process that requires considerable
time and care. . . . Makeup, moreover, must be applied and removed every
day; [Harrah’s] policy burdens men with no such daily ritual. While a man
could jog to the casino, slip into his uniform, and get right to work, a
woman must travel to work so as to avoid smearing her makeup, or arrive
early to put on her makeup there.
Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Pursuant to Jespersen, plaintiffs now must
engage in extensive fact-specific, discrete proofs when the social reality, worthy of
judicial notice, informs that the costs in time, money, and stress of most women’s
grooming exceeds that borne by most men. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at
1096.
89
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110–11. This Article accepts but does not concede that
without unequal burden, individuals may change to employers’ satisfaction the
traits, characteristics, and behaviors encompassed in “unequal burden” cases. The
thesis, herein, is that the moral imperatives of Title VII do not allow employers to
impose such intrusions absent BFOQs. However, many commentators strongly and
cogently dispute judges’ usually rough assertions that changing reviewed
mannerisms and appearances incurs no burden worthy of judicial note. See infra
note 182 and accompanying text.
90
See generally Bayer, supra note 4.
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Inferring a “reasonableness” exception, the judiciary devised its
own regime of professed wisdom to supplant imagined
inadequacies of Title VII’s unadorned, uncomplicated,
unambiguous structure prohibiting five classifications of
discrimination unless justified by textual exceptions.91 This
Article offers below arguments supporting its author’s admittedly
vehement contention.
II. THE MANY INFIRMITIES OF MUTABLE CHARACTERISTICS CUM
UNEQUAL BURDEN THEORY
A.

Title VII Is Not Limited to Policies Directly Affecting Work
Product

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

91
This Article notes for thoroughness that one respected commentator would
adopt a reasonableness standard but modified as a balancing test, comparing the
employer’s need to impose the grooming standard with the extent the standard
inappropriately invades individuals’ choices of how to define themselves. LEX K.
LARSON, 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 45.02 (2d ed. 2015). Consequently, Mr.
Larson strongly criticizes court rulings that find grooming issues trivial pursuant to
mutable characteristics theory. Certainly, Larson’s balancing test would more
closely approximate the commands of Title VII; however, as urged herein, Congress
nowhere so much as hinted that discrimination purportedly imposing no unequal
burden is a special, lesser subcategory of discrimination nor did Congress establish a
“reasonableness” standard to discern if per se sex- or race-based employment policies
are sufficiently unreasonable to premise a triable cause of action.
92
See supra Part I.B.
93
See supra notes 79, 88–89 and accompanying text.
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Unequal burden doctrine is premised on a flurry of doubtful
ancillary propositions borrowed from “mutable characteristics”
theory to defend the brusque declaration that Title VII’s text
implicitly excludes “reasonable” discrimination from statutory
coverage.92 Notably, Jespersen accented that Harrah’s policy is
detailed, explicitly covering both male and female employees,
with some provisions applying identically to both genders, some
setting gender disparate rules, and some addressing only one
sex.93 But, while interesting, those facts have neither logical nor
legal significance because by definition, all grooming and
appearance codes pertain to both sexes either explicitly or
implicitly. No less than exclusively single-sex grooming codes,
dual-gender grooming codes instruct what both sexes may or may
not do. Thus, any dress or grooming code—or any discrete
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provisions therein—applying to only one gender deliberately
frees the other from coverage, thereby permitting the other to do
what the covered sex may not.94
Hence, contrary to Jespersen, that Harrah’s took the time to
draft a detailed set of rules makes the gender-exclusive aspects
thereof no more nor less sexually discriminatory than any other
employer’s appearance rules, thorough or sparse, new or
longstanding, written or unwritten.
On a different tack, accenting a remnant of mutability
theory, Jespersen highlighted that grooming rules do not affect
the actual ability of individuals to work.95 That practical fact,
however, has no legal meaning because Congress appropriately
extended Title VII’s protection beyond blanket refusals to hire
members of a protected class and similar discriminatory policies
directly denying or limiting opportunities for employment.96 To
offer a prominent example, employers cannot impose pension
plans that discriminate on the basis of sex.97 Not surprisingly,
courts routinely invalidate similar discrimination regarding
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94
Certainly, a female-specific makeup standard is no less gender-specific
whether part of a larger grooming policy or standing as the sole appearancerequisite demanded by a given employer.
95
See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir.
2006). Reiterating the premises of mutability theory, the Eleventh Circuit likewise
offered the following farcical conclusion regarding a sex-based rule setting a sine qua
non for obtaining or retaining employment: “[T]he [male-only short hair] grooming
policy at issue in Willingham ‘related more closely to the employer’s choice of how to
run his business than to equality of employment opportunity.’ ” Harper v.
Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Willingham
v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)).
96
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). In fact, a consistent principle of Title VII
jurisprudence affirms, “[T]he language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or
‘tangible’ discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’
evinces a congressional intent ‘ “to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women” ’ in employment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986) (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978), superseded in part by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (2012),
as recognized in Parris v. Keystone Foods, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303 (N.D.
Ala. 2013)); see also infra note 114 and accompanying text.
97
Perhaps most notably, the Supreme Court invalidated an employer’s pension
program that, based on empirically reliable actuarial tables, charged female
employees more than similarly situated male employees. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711.
The Supreme Court confirmed and expanded Manhart’s rationale when it held that
employers may not so much as offer pension annuity plans that charge employees
equally but pay less in benefits to female retirees than to similarly situated male
retirees. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans
v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074–75 (1983) (per curiam).
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other beneficial perquisites that are unrelated to either discrete
work duties or the actual quality of employees’ work.98 For
instance, the Act prohibits discriminatory vacation pay.99
While certainly an inducement to work proficiently,
employees can perform perfectly well even if employers’ pension
funds, vacation policies, or other perquisites are discriminatory,
or indeed, if employers offer any benefits at all. Thus, Title VII
proscribes discriminatory employment policies that do not
directly inhibit employees from successfully performing their
jobs.100 Nonetheless, under the unequal burden model, Darleen
Jespersen had to accept the female-only aspects of Harrah’s
grooming policy or be fired lawfully.101 Paradoxically, Ms.
Jespersen would not have to endure gender distinct pension
plans, vacation pay, or similar discrimination as conditions of her
continued employment if Harrah’s imposed such terms. It makes
no sense that extant Title VII doctrine prohibits employers from
indulging discriminatory preference regarding perquisites, but
permits employers to enforce discriminatory grooming codes as
conditions for employment itself with no regard for whether such
grooming codes are essential to performing the particular work.
The pension rulings strongly explicate the logical fallacy of
unequal burden theory in a separate but related regard.102
Remarkably, the Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that Title
VII prohibits employers from offering perquisites predicated on
98
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EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) ¶ 7230, 2009 WL 3608272 (2009).
E.g., Craig-Wood v. Time Warner N.Y. Cable LLC, 549 F. App’x 505, 509 (6th
Cir. 2014); Atkinson v. N. Jersey Developmental, 453 F. App’x 262, 263–66 (3d Cir.
2011).
100
One might respond that a disparate pension fund or similar employment
perquisite is a monetarily significant “term” of employment under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). Therefore, any sex-based employment practice
adversely affecting pensions imposes an unequal burden. However, failing to obtain
work or being fired are more costly employment outcomes in terms of money, lost
opportunities, and other manifest harms for the obvious reason that the employee is
no longer employed. Indeed, § 2000e-2(a)(1) begins, “It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual . . . .” Id. Section 2000e-2(a)(1)’s inaugural language evinces Congress’s
deep concern that discrimination’s first significant adverse effect is to cause
discriminatees either to lose or to be denied gainful employment. In that regard, the
“burden” judicially validated in the grooming cases—loss of employment for failure
to conform—is much greater than the burdens courts actually forbid in the cases
addressing pensions and other work perquisites.
101
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
102
See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1074−75; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711, 716–17.
99
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the scientifically accurate “stereotype[]” that the average female
will outlive the average male even if unfortunate economic
consequences result.103
The Court so ruled despite an
incredulous rejoinder by Chief Justice Warren Burger:
[T]o operate economically workable group pension programs, it
is only rational to permit [employers] to rely on statistically
sound and proved disparities in longevity between men and
women. Indeed, it seems to me irrational to assume Congress
intended to outlaw use of the fact that . . . women as a class
outlive men.”104

If employers cannot take into account such relevant
actualities as economic disparities revealed by empirically
reliable sex-based actuarial data, certainly they may not require
that, as a condition of obtaining pensions and other perquisites,
employees conform with sex-based policies that are completely
irrelevant to such economic realities. For instance, surely courts
would not uphold an employer’s rule allowing longhaired men to
work but prohibiting them from earning vacation days,
accumulating sick leave, and participating in the pension and
insurance plans available to shorthaired male employees and
female employees of any hair length. Absent untoward political
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103
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708; see also Norris, 463 U.S. at 1080. Title VII’s ban
against stereotyping is explicated infra at notes 167–79 and accompanying text.
104
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 726 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Five years later, four
dissenting Justices similarly worried that the Court’s strict, indeed literal,
application of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination would result in harm
to employers and employees alike with no apparent countervailing benefit:
Employers may be forced to discontinue offering life annuities, or
potentially disruptive changes may be required in long-established methods
of calculating insurance and pensions. . . . If the cost to employers of
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carriers choose not to
write such annuities, employees will be denied the opportunity to purchase
life annuities—concededly the most advantageous pension plan—at lower
cost. If, alternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer
these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits probably will
be passed on to current employees.
Norris, 463 U.S. at 1095, 1098–99 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun
& Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). As explicated infra at notes
165–200 and accompanying text, the Norris majority elegantly articulated the core
infirmity of the dissenters’ analysis: “[The] underlying assumption—that sex may
properly be used to predict longevity—is flatly inconsistent with the basic
teaching . . . that Title VII requires employers to treat their employees as
individuals, not ‘as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national
class.’ ” Norris, 463 U.S. at 1083 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Manhart, 435
U.S. at 708).
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motives, courts should find such rules unlawful under Title VII,
either as unequal burdens or as utterly irrational, for there is no
logical reason why longhaired men may be deemed employable
but unworthy of valuable employment perquisites.105
Nonetheless, if its precepts are to be believed, unequal
burden theory sustains such ridiculous employment standards;
because the employer could have refused in the first instance to
hire longhaired males, any employment-related discrimination
imposed on such employees is permissible. Yet, hiring men with
long hair but refusing them benefits seems as untoward as the
unlawful practice of hiring but limiting benefits to women. The
answer must be that, like discriminating against women,
prejudice against longhaired men is arbitrary, humiliating, and
otherwise harmful. Such discrimination is unlawful and thus
burdensome per se, which means any arguable lack of economic
or other sex-specific adverse effects is irrelevant, although such
harm would be pertinent to a court’s determination of
appropriate remedy. Accordingly, employers must have valid
reasons to impose male-only hair-length rules or, indeed, any
discriminatory grooming rules, as requirements for either
employment itself or any term or condition thereof.106
B.

The Statutory Definition of Discrimination Eschews
Judicially Created Exceptions

C M
Y K
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105
It would be perverse to argue that the very irrelevance of the sex-based
requirement insulates that discriminatory condition from Title VII’s purview. When
a bigoted employer believes that her discriminatory policy enhances productivity, we
can at least ascribe some modicum of legitimate motivation to her discrimination.
For instance, an employer who supposes, rightly or not, that some customers will
refuse to be served by longhaired men evinces a rational—but, this Article argues,
insufficient—basis to impose a male-only hair-length rule. That employer’s motive is
not wholly malevolent. By contrast, mandating a discriminatory policy unrelated to
efficiency or safety simply is vindictive and, as such, is all the more offensive and
illegal under Title VII than would be discrimination fostering a less malicious
motive.
106
See infra notes 132–50 and accompanying text (Congress enacted the
meaning of “valid reasons” through express Title VII defenses and exemptions).
107
Perez v. Postal Police Officers Ass’n, 736 F.3d 736, 741 (6th Cir. 2013)
(emphasis added) (quoting Metro. Hosp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
712 F.3d 248, 259 (6th Cir. 2013)). Identically, very recently the Supreme Court
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Unequal burden theory defies the respected canon that “[w]e
discover a statute’s plain meaning ‘by looking at the language
and design of the statute as a whole.’ ”107 Appreciating that these
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tenets expound nothing less than the Constitution’s equilibrium
of legislative and judicial authority, the Court explained, “Our
charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted.”108 A reliable
legal compendium expressed superbly the enduring norm in
terms that undermine the jurisprudence of Jespersen:
[A]n omission or failure to provide for contingencies, which it
may seem wise to have provided for specifically, does not justify
any judicial addition to the language of the statute. To the
contrary, it is the duty of the courts to interpret a statute as
they find it, without reference to whether its provisions are wise
or unwise, necessary or unnecessary, appropriate or
inappropriate, or well or ill conceived.109
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reiterated, “Our duty, after all, is ‘to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.’ ”
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Graham Cnty. Soil & Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010)).
Indeed, three years ago, noting Title VII’s detailed and thorough design, the
Court reaffirmed, “Just as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so
too are its structural choices.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517,
2529 (2013) (Title VII case). These admonitions, of course, derive from the venerated
axiom, “Absent ambiguity, our analysis also ends with the statutory
language. . . . ‘[W]e must presume that the statute says what it means.’ ” Fed. Hous.
Fin. Agency v. UBS Ams. Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted)
(quoting Devine v. United States, 202 F.3d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
108
Lewis v. City of Chi., Ill., 560 U.S. 205, 217 (2010) (Title VII case); see, e.g.,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998) (Title VII
case). The Eighth Circuit nicely linked that esteemed axiom to the Constitution’s
structure of government, stating, “Our role is to interpret and apply statutes as
written, for the power to redraft laws to implement policy changes is reserved to the
legislative branch.” Doe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 519 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir.
2008).
109
73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 164 (2015) (footnotes omitted). Nearly a century
ago, albeit in the context of criminal law, Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court
likewise scolded, “What the government asks is not a construction of a statute, but,
in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by
inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the
judicial function.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) (emphasis
added). Eight decades later, immediately after quoting Iselin, the Court expounded,
“There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and
rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.” Lamie v.
U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618, 625 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit employs a fortuitously appropriate apparel metaphor
encapsulating the proper judicial function: “When a statute is as
clear as a glass slipper and fits without strain, courts should not
approve an interpretation that requires a shoehorn.”110
Applying the constitutionally predicated framework of
statutory interpretation, Title VII’s text, organizational
structure, and national objectives reveal the true meaning of
Indeed, federal courts recognize that
discrimination.111
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 itself—the Act’s central guarantee of “fair
employment”—defines unlawful discrimination.112
Moreover,
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110
Demko v. United States, 216 F.3d 1049, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Eight years
prior, somewhat overplaying the reference, that court wrote, “The language of this
statute is as clear as a glass slipper, there is no shoehorn in the legislative history,
and the government, just as surely as Cinderella’s step-mother, cannot make the fit.”
Brush v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 982 F.2d 1554, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Shortly before
Brush, the Federal Circuit offered a more extended image, “When the law has been
crafted with the clarity of crystal, it also has the qualities of a glass slipper: it cannot
be shoe-horned onto facts it does not fit, no matter how appealing they might
appear.” Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
111
Indeed, the Supreme Court freshly reiterated that because Title VII is a
detailed statutory scheme, a textual approach is essential to discern the meaning of
both the Act as a whole and its constituent parts. “ ‘Congress’ special care in drawing
so precise a statutory scheme’ as Title VII ‘makes it incorrect to infer that Congress
meant anything other than what the text does say.’ ” EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC,
738 F.3d 171, 174 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133
S. Ct. 2517, 2530 (2013)), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015). Likewise, as the highly
regarded legislator Senator Edmund Muskie pleaded during legislative debates, “I
submit that, read in their entirety, these provisions provide a clear and definitive
indication of the type of practice which this title seeks to eliminate.” 110 CONG. REC.
12,618 (1964) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie); see also infra note 120 and
accompanying text for additional remarks confirming Congress’s intention that the
text of Title VII speaks for itself.
112
E.g., Palesch v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir.
2000); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), quoted in Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir. 1977); Lucido
v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Rogers,
454 F.2d at 238; Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 409−10 (2d Cir. 1975);
Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Puntolillo v.
N.H. Racing Comm’n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1091−92 (D.N.H. 1974)). See generally
Bayer, supra note 4, at 774–80.
Of utmost importance, the Supreme Court agrees with the above-cited
circuit and district courts. Regarding that portion of § 2000e-2 providing special
status to bona fide seniority systems, the Court explained:
On its face, § 703(h) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)] appears to be only a
definitional provision; as with the other provisions of § 703 [§ 2000e-2],
subsection (h) delineates which employment practices are illegal and
thereby prohibited and which are not. . . . [I]t is apparent that the thrust of
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discerning Title VII’s definition of discrimination must conform
with the sensible canon, “When faced with a remedial statute,
our interpretive charge is simple: Employ a ‘standard of liberal
construction [to] accomplish [Congress’s] objects.’ ”113 That tenet
applies with exceptional rigor because Title VII’s “policy of
outlawing such discrimination should have the ‘highest
priority.’ ”114
1.

The Extraordinarily Expansive Breadth of Protection Under
Title VII

Cognizant of these norms, the Supreme Court definitively
and with uncomplicated elegance stated the applicable,
overarching definition which this Article deems to be Title VII’s
first principle: “Congress intended to prohibit all practices in
whatever form which create inequality in employment
opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
A decade later, the Court
sex, or national origin . . . .”115
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the section is directed toward defining what is and what is not an illegal
discriminatory practice . . . .
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 758, 761 (1976) (emphasis added); see
also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69 (1982); accord Balint v. Carson
City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Franks, 424 U.S. at 761).
Clearly then, not all definitions are found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)–(n), the Act’s
provision specifically entitled “Definitions.” Thus, the Seventh Circuit perhaps
obdurately opined, “Title VII does not define ‘discrimination,’ the key term . . . for
§ 2000e-2(a) . . . .” Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir.
2005). It is true that the actual term “discrimination” is not specifically defined but
the nature of the unlawful conduct—discrimination or to discriminate—is clear from
the Act’s words and configuration. In that regard, the idea of “to discriminate” is
self-evident as next discussed in this Article’s text.
113
Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 444 (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949)); see also, e.g., Marais
v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 736 F.3d 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2013); Long v. Tommy Hilfiger
U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 2012).
114
Franks, 424 U.S. at 763 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 47 (1974)); see also, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523 (1994);
EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc., 667 F.3d 510, 516 (4th Cir. 2012); cf. Fox v. Vice, 563
U.S. 826, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)) (noting generally that statutes vindicating
civil rights protect national interests of the “highest priority”).
115
Franks, 424 U.S. at 763 (emphasis added) (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44;
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971)); accord, e.g., Cnty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 180 (1981). Expectedly, that definition still controls Title VII analysis. E.g.,
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999); Miranda v. B & B
Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1992). Interpreting Franks,
the EEOC exclaimed, “Today, the national policy of nondiscrimination is firmly
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reasserted the comprehensive scope Congress explicitly enacted.
“[T]he language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or
‘tangible’ discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘ “to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women” ’ in employment.”116
The Supreme Court’s definition explicitly and unswervingly
demands the elimination of workplace bigotry. Consistent with
its duty not to alter Congress’s express construct,117 the Court’s
explication of unlawful discrimination neither suggests nor
invites judicially conceived exceptions such as “unequal burden”
theory, which would thwart Congress’s goal that, to borrow from
desegregation cases, “discrimination would be eliminated root
Rather, courts emphasize that Congress
and branch.”118
demarcated discrimination expansively by, among other things,
not including many examples of discrete discriminatory conduct
which courts might mistakenly interpret to connote narrow,
particularized coverage.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit rightly
clarified that Title VII’s text “evinces a Congressional intention
to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms. Congress
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rooted in the law.” EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) ¶ 8700 n.3, 2009 WL 3608301 (2009)
(quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 763).
116
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (emphasis added). The
Court consistently has reaffirmed that understanding of Title VII. E.g., Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009) (“[O]ur decision[s] must be consistent with the
important purpose of Title VII—that the workplace be an environment free of
discrimination, where race is not a barrier to opportunity.”); Pa. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004) (holding that Title VII recognizes claims of
“constructive discharge”); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
115−16 (2002); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998).
117
See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
118
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 486 (1992) (quoting Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also United States
v. Fletcher ex rel. Fletcher, 805 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that once
complete desegregation is accomplished, control of the particular school district
should return to local hands); Everett v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 788 F.3d 132, 140
(4th Cir. 2015). Courts rightly have applied that objective in employment
discrimination cases. For example, as the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts noted, “[T]he duty of a court once racial discrimination is
established is clear and undoubted—to extirpate racial discrimination root and
branch, adequately compensate its victims, and creatively invoke its equitable
powers to provide equal opportunity to all citizens free of the blight of racial
animus.” Cotter v. City of Bos., 193 F. Supp. 2d 323, 327 (D. Mass. 2002), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 323 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2003).
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chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor
to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious
activities.”119
Properly then, the Act’s uncomplicated but thoroughgoing
ban against discrimination may be considered Title VII’s first
principle.120
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119
Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir.
1977)) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). See generally Bayer, supra note 4, at
774–80. A decade ago, the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico summarized the idea superbly: “Congress could well have believed that
protecting everyone involved in a protected activity was so important to the remedial
structure that it was better to be overbroad rather than leave any gaps or
distinctions that might narrow Title VII’s protections.” Kelley v. City of
Albuquerque, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1224 (D.N.M. 2004) (finding that
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012) covered a retaliation claim brought by a former city
attorney averring she was fired by the mayor for participating in the defense of a
mediated Title VII claim).
120
Title VII’s legislative history accents the remarkable and deliberate breadth
of coverage properly recognized by the courts. See Bayer, supra note 4, at 780–82.
For example, in their authoritative memorandum to their colleagues, Senators Clark
and Case, the bipartisan floor managers of the fair employment portion of the
proposed Civil Rights Act, stated Title VII’s purpose succinctly, unequivocally, and
lucidly with no hint that facially discriminatory employment rules would be
excluded from coverage due to purported reasonableness:
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it
is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to
make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those
distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by
section 704 [enacted as § 2000e-2(a)] are those which are based on any five
of the forbidden criteria . . . .
110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). Courts cite the Clark-Case Memorandum to clarify
legislative intent under Title VII. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454
(1982); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350–52 & n.35 (1977);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434–36 (1971); Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc.,
168 F.3d 468, 474 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999); Thornley v. Penton Publ’g, Inc., 104 F.3d 26,
29 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997). Similarly, Senator Clark asserted in response to a question
from the skeptical minority leader, Senator Everett Dirksen, “To discriminate is to
make distinctions or differences in the treatment of employees, and are prohibited
only if they are based on any of the five forbidden criteria (race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin); any other criteria or qualification is untouched by this bill.” 110
CONG. REC. 7218 (1964) (statement of Sen. Joseph S. Clark). Identically and in
seeming anticipation of judicial aversion to the Act’s deliberately expansive breadth,
an exasperated Senator Edmund Muskie pleaded:
What more could be asked for in the way of guidelines, short of a complete
itemization of every practice which could conceivably be a violation? . . . I
submit that, read in their entirety, these provisions provide a clear and
definitive indication of the type of practice which this title seeks to
eliminate. Any serious doubts concerning its application would, it seems to
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The Act Protects Every Covered Person Regarding the Full
Panoply of Employment

While the foregoing should suffice to establish that Congress
brooked no extratextual weakening of Title VII’s proscriptions,
care and thoroughness require this Article to note that, of equal
significance and entirely consistent with its first principle, the
Act vindicates the individual over the collective. That is, the text
does not protect groups but rather “individuals” from
discrimination based on their affiliation with the Act’s five
covered classes.121
Reviewing § 2000e-2(a)’s wording,122 the
Supreme Court has long recognized, “The statute’s focus on the
individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individuals
as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national
class.”123 Accordingly, a class of but one person enjoys the full
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me, stem at least partially from the predisposition of the person expressing
such doubt.
Id. at 12,618 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie) (emphasis added).
121
E.g., Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
579 (1978); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708–09 (1978).
The Eighth Circuit recently reaffirmed that “[t]he principal focus of [Title VII] is the
protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority
group as a whole.” Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th
Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42
n.4 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54). In fact, the reliable legal
encyclopedia American Jurisprudence determined this principle to be so
fundamental that it included in the brief opening section of its extensive exposition
of Title VII, “It has also been said that the principal focus of Title VII is the
protection of the individual employee rather than the minority group as a whole.”
45A AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 1 (2015) (footnoting Lewis, 591 F.3d 1033 and
Chadwick, 561 F.3d 58).
122
See supra note 3.
123
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. Manhart concluded that “[e]ven if the statutory
language were less clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on
fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes.” Id. at 709; see also Ariz.
Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463
U.S. 1073, 1080 (1983) (Marshall, J., with four Justices, concurring in part); id. at
1108 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708); Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653
F.3d 582, 587–88 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Discrimination against one Hispanic employee
violates the statute, no matter how well another Hispanic employee is treated.”);
Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he courts have
consistently emphasized that the ultimate issue is the reasons for the individual
plaintiff’s treatment, not the relative treatment of different groups within the
workplace.”); Bayer, supra note 4, at 784–85.
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protection of the Act.124 It does not matter if the employer
neutrally treats every member of a protected class except one;125
the person singled out for discrimination enjoys full statutory
protection.126
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124
E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (holding that
discrimination directed to a particular individual is unlawful); Diaz, 653 F.3d at 588.
125
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579 (“It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed
by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race,
without regard to whether members of the applicant’s race are already
proportionally represented in the work force.”). Therefore, “discrimination against
one employee cannot be remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another
employee in that same group.” Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 42 n.4; see also, e.g., Diaz, 653
F.3d at 587–88; Henderson, 257 F.3d at 252; Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of
Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998).
126
To accent using a prominent example, over thirty years ago the Supreme
Court invalidated the “bottom line” theory. Specifically, the Court ruled that
employment criteria, standards, or tests that disqualify a disparate number of
applicants within a protected class may be unlawful even if the employer hired
enough such applicants from among the few who satisfied the disparate criteria to
match their percentage within the “applicant flow,” that is, among those who applied
for work. Teal, 457 U.S. at 454–55 (holding that individual discriminatees may
challenge the portion of their employer’s hiring process that disqualified them, even
if final hiring statistics reveal no unlawful discrimination); see also, e.g., Furnco, 438
U.S. at 580 n.9 (finding that an employer’s policy of hiring only bricklayers
previously known to the employer may result in discriminatory denial of
employment opportunity to “at the gate” minority applicants even if the minority
group happens to be well represented in the bricklayer workforce); Lewis, 591 F.3d
at 1039–40 (discussing Teal, 457 U.S. at 453–54); Bayer, supra note 4, at 815–18.
For example, suppose for ten vacant positions, fifty persons apply of which
twenty-five are African American and twenty-five are white. Hence, the “applicant
flow” reveals that half the applicants are minority and half are majority. Suppose
further that the employer’s application process includes requirement X, which
immediately disqualifies twenty African-American but only five white applicants.
Under Title VII’s “disparate impact” cause of action, see infra note 147 and
accompanying text, unless justified as a “business necessity,” requirement X might
well be unlawful because it eliminated fully eighty percent of the minority
applicants but only twenty percent of the nonminority job seekers. That requirement
X excluded four times as many African Americans as whites is sufficient to establish
a statutory violation. However, suppose the employer fills the ten vacant slots with
five white applicants and the five African-American individuals who satisfied
requirement X. In that case, the employer might aver that the “bottom
line”—ultimate hiring outcome—reveals no unlawful discrimination because the
hiring percentages and the applicant flow are identical at fifty percent minority and
fifty percent nonminority. The Supreme Court’s Teal ruling clarified that because
Title VII protects “individuals,” “bottom line” data cannot insulate the employer
from colorable claims brought by minority applicants who but for failing to meet
requirement X might have been among those hired. Teal, 457 U.S. at 442 (“We hold
that the ‘bottom line’ does not preclude respondent employees from establishing a
prima facie case, nor does it provide petitioner employer with a defense to such a
case.”).
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Congruently, the judiciary applies Title VII’s coverage of
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”127 as generously
as those words allow. Capturing the manifest expanse of Title
VII’s first principle, as earlier quoted, the Supreme Court
enthused, “We have held that this not only covers ‘terms’ and
‘conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense, but ‘evinces a
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women in employment.’ ”128
The Courts’ rationale is no mystery. Congress understood
that discrimination causes harm that in many ways is shared
among discriminatees yet is unique to each victim.129 Congress
sought to preserve nothing less than the dignity of every person
from the degradation of discrimination.130 Therefore, as next
explained, an employer must have a compelling reason and not
simply, as in unequal burden theory, a plausible purpose, to
inflict the financial and career harm plus humiliation attendant
to discrimination.131
3.

The Limited Impact of Title VII’s Express Exceptions

Fittingly and of equal importance, Congress carefully curbed
its otherwise expansive definition of discrimination through
express but narrow exceptions.132
Most notably, Congress
127

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (emphasis
added) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
129
See Bayer, supra note 4, at 785–86.
130
See, e.g., Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Don’t Awaken the Sleeping Child: Japan’s
Gender Equality Law and the Rhetoric of Gradualism, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
143, 149 (1999); Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: The Challenges of
Creating Sexual Harassment Protections for Prisons and Other Nonworkplace
Settings, 83 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1, 52–68 (2009). As Justice Souter observed, the Act
“vindicates an interest in dignity as a human being entitled to be judged on
individual merit.” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 247 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring), modified on other grounds, Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755. See infra Section C for a detailed
account of the meaning and extent of dignity as applied to Title VII.
131
“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to be accorded a liberal
construction in order to carry out the purposes of Congress to eliminate the
inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation of . . . discrimination.” Sandoval v. Am.
Bldg. Maint. Indust., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2009) (ellipsis in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir.
1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132
Courts acknowledge that Congress drafted Title VII’s defenses and
exemptions narrowly, expecting the judiciary to “read [them] narrowly.” Int’l Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (discussing specifically the
128
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enacted the statutory defense popularly known as BFOQ, short
for bona fide occupational qualification: Employment standards
may be based on otherwise forbidden criteria when “religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise.”133
BFOQ is based on one sound, crucial principle: Because
usually unnecessary to the sustainability of the particular
business, discrimination is an illegitimate impediment to inflict
on employees and job applicants.134 By contrast, when truly
necessary to fulfill the given lawful employment’s minima,
discrimination becomes reasonable because it is essential.
Consequently, BFOQs are not measured purely by employers’
subjective preferences,135 nor is it enough that discriminatory
policies may enhance business efficiency, promote convenience, or
otherwise seem “reasonable.” Indeed, because the “test [is] one of
business necessity, not business convenience,” BFOQs do not
concern business practices that may be lawful, even rational in a
business sense, such as maximizing profits or enhancing
efficiency.136 Were it otherwise, Title VII’s first principle would
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BFOQ defense); see also, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,
122–25 (1985); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); Teamsters Local
Union No. 117 v. Wash. Dept. of Corr., 789 F.3d 979, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2015).
133
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).
134
See Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep’t, 709 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir.
2013) (impermissible criteria under Title VII means that such considerations are
“illegitimate”); United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 951 (4th Cir. 1994) (Title VII
prohibits, among other things, “an action by an otherwise unfettered
actor . . . animated by an illegitimate discriminatory bias”); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines
Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 298 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
135
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 201.
136
Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 303 (discussing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)). The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning nearly a halfcentury ago still aptly defines the meaning of BFOQ: “We begin with the proposition
that the use of the word ‘necessary’ in section 703(e) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)]
requires that we apply a business necessity test, not a business convenience test.
That is to say, discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex
exclusively.” Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388; see also, e.g., Henry v. Milwaukee Cty., 539 F.3d
573, 579–80 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing Diaz); Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391
F.3d 737, 748 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388); W. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985) (BFOQ under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act)); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.3d 697, 704 (8th Cir.
1987).
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be devoured by the BFOQ defense for employers commonly can
demonstrate that blatant discrimination enhances profits by
catering to customers’ bigoted preferences.
Consequently, the employer objectively must show that the
discriminatory criterion is essential to the safe and effective
operation of the business.137 As explicated at Part III,138 in such
cases the individual’s dignity remains intact—she is not
humiliated, that is, treated as inherently inferior due to her race,
gender, national origin, color, or religion. Rather, she is denied
employment that she has no reasonable expectation of obtaining
because she cannot perform the required tasks. There is nothing
untoward in requiring that individuals be capable of
accomplishing the jobs for which they seek employment.139
Hence, absent extraordinary instances such as patients’
bodily privacy interests at medical and retirement facilities,140 to
construe the BFOQ defense as narrowly as possible,141 customers’
preferences cannot constitute BFOQs.142
Otherwise, even
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137
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 204 (“[T]he BFOQ provision
itself . . . suggests that permissible distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to
perform the duties of the job.” (emphasis added)).
138
See infra notes 246–307 and accompanying text.
139
Correspondingly, any law forcing employers to hire incapable individuals is
not only ridiculous but also a probable violation of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
due process as thoroughly irrational.
140
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained, “In
the non-prison context, other courts have held that privacy concerns may justify a
discriminatory employment policy.” Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d
128, 133–34 (3d Cir. 1996); see also AFSCME v. Mich. Council 25, 635 F. Supp. 1010,
1014 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (noting that privacy rights of mental health patients can
justify a BFOQ to provide for same-sex personal hygiene care); Backus v. Baptist
Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195–96 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (noting that the essence of
an obstetrics nurse’s business is to provide sensitive care for a patient’s intimate and
private concerns), vacating as moot 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir.1982); Fesel v. Masonic
Home of Del., Inc. 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978) (retirement home
patients), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); see also, e.g., Chaney v.
Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing cases involving
medical patients’ privacy interests).
141
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
142
E.g., Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrangements
and Sexy Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 257, 257–58 & n.5 (2007); see
also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding
that stereotyped customer preferences do not justify sexually discriminatory
practices); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that the airline violated Title VII by refusing to hire male flight attendants
even though customers preferred women for the job); Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75
F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that the employer could not refuse to
hire male massage therapists even though women customers preferred women).
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disinclined employers would discriminate to enhance profits by
satisfying customers’ prejudices.143 As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s pivotal decision in Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.144 aptly explained forty-five years
ago, “[I]t would be totally anomalous . . . to allow the preferences
and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these
very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.”145
In sum, pursuant to Title VII’s first principle, unless
justified by a bona fide occupational qualification, employment
discrimination predicated on any of the five protected classes is
illegal. In the direct words of the Supreme Court, “The only
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143
See, e.g., Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913 (“It is now widely accepted that a
company's desire to cater to the perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a
defense under Title VII for treating employees differently based on race.”); Gerdom
v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 606–08 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Fernandez,
653 F.2d at 1276–77.
144
442 F.2d 385.
145
Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389; accord Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 609; EEOC v. St. Anne’s
Hosp. of Chi., Inc., 664 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1981). This Article has no quarrel
with the proposition that in exacting instances, sex-specific grooming and
appearance rules might be BFOQs if marketing sex appeal truly is the core function
of the particular company:
If worker freedom of dress is truly interfering with core job functions and
the core goals of the enterprise in question, then I believe we should not
protect employee dress. To do so might eliminate or heavily burden certain
sectors of the market, such as the entertainment and clothing
industries. . . . Protecting the freedom of dress might also pose safety
problems in certain industries.
Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 62. However, a mere preference for unisex
uniforms or similar seeming sex-neutral rules could infringe on individuals’
“freedom of dress.” Id. at 62–63. Therefore, employers’ requirements that male
employees wear short hair or that female employees groom themselves with makeup
are legal if the given business actually meets the rigorous requisites of the BFOQ
defense. However, to be lawful, the appearance policy cannot simply be “reasonable”
as unequal burden theory would have it. Rather, sex or race must be the core
function of the given enterprise, not an adjunct or enhancement. E.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d
at 389 (finding that an airline may not hire only women as flight attendants even
though customers prefer to be waited on by women); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, Inc., 517
F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that even though hiring only women as
flight attendants and advertising itself as the “love airline” may have helped the
newly incorporated airline to emerge from bankruptcy, sex was not a BFOQ for the
job because Southwest’s primary purpose is safe, efficient, punctual air
transportation, which indeed was that airline’s primary reputation). On this aspect
of BFOQ, Professor McGinley’s thoughtful exegesis, supra note 142, at 267–75
(detailed, provocative discussion of this point as it relates to casinos), is particularly
compelling. See also, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 19, at 2541.
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plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all
other circumstances, a person’s gender may not be considered in
making decisions that affect her.”146
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146
E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (evidencing a
plurality opinion accepted by lower courts as controlling law); see infra note 167 and
accompanying text; see also, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity
& Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1080 (1983); L.A. Dep’t of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708–09 (1978). As noted, the text of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) accords the BFOQ defense to but three of Title VII’s five
covered classes: sex, national origin, and religious discrimination. See supra note
133 and accompanying text. This has led some courts and commentators to conclude
that there can be no BFOQ for race or color discrimination. Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913;
Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Knight v.
Nassau Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981); 110 CONG. REC.
2550–63 (1964) (expressly rejecting race as a BFOQ under Title VII during house
discussion). See generally Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News
and Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F.
L. REV. 473 (2001). However, judgment informs that Title VII includes an implied
BFOQ for race and color in the rare instances where race- or color-based
determinations are essential to the legitimate conduct of lawful businesses. Baker v.
City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting in dicta that
race may be an appropriate consideration in law enforcement undercover
operations); see also 110 CONG. REC. 7213, 7217 (1964) (memorandum of Sens. Clark
and Case, the bipartisan floor managers of the fair employment provision of the
proposed civil rights act) (“Although there is no exemption in Title VII for
occupations in which race might be deemed a bona fide job qualification, a director of
a play or movie who wished to cast an actor in the role of a Negro, could specify that
he wished to hire someone with the physical appearance of a Negro.”). Baker’s
dictum is not simply sensible, it is indispensable to Title VII’s design. As discussed
in the text, the legitimacy of the BFOQ defense is not that the discrimination under
review is simply efficient, or that it enhances profits. Rather, to be lawful,
discrimination must be essentially indispensable to the successful completion of
valid business goals. See supra notes 133–45 and accompanying text. For example, it
seems clear and uncontroversial that, as opined in Baker, a police department might
assign only a Caucasian male officer to infiltrate a violent “white supremist”
organization reasonably believed to be planning unlawful activities. In that example,
the very race of the undercover agent is crucial to his successful infiltration of the
suspected unlawful group. In the foregoing critical regard, inferring a race or color
BFOQ although Title VII’s text includes none is utterly unlike the judicially
contrived mutability and unequal burden theories inventing an extratextual form of
non-BFOQ yet lawful discrimination. The former addresses situations where
individuals are not hired because they actually cannot complete the given work
successfully. Unqualified persons suffer no legally cognizable harm because they
have no legitimate claim to be hired. See supra notes 246–307 and accompanying
text. The latter substitutes court-made social and legal dogma for explicit statutory
antidiscrimination directives in situations where discrimination is not essential to
the successful conduct of business.
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While perhaps BFOQ is the most renowned, Title VII
contains other provisions limiting its coverage. For instance,
“disparate impact”147 is lawful only if the offending employment
device meets the BFOQ-like “business necessity” test.148 Like
BFOQ, “business necessity,” is exacting. Culling precedents, the
Fifth Circuit explained, to be related to employment, “[T]he
employer must demonstrate that the qualification standard is
necessary and related to ‘the specific skills and physical
requirements of the sought-after position.’ ”149 That court added,
“Similarly, . . . to be ‘consistent with business necessity,’ the
employer must show that it ‘substantially promote[s]’ the
business’s needs.”150
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147
Title VII recognizes four overarching types of discriminatory conduct: (1) per
se discrimination, that is, employment terms, conditions and actions that are facially
discriminatory such as expressly refusing to hire African Americans or, yes,
requiring that female employees wear makeup; (2) “individual disparate treatment”
wherein through direct or circumstantial evidence plaintiffs seek to prove that a
seemingly neutral employment decision directed at one or a small number of
individuals actually was motivated by unlawful animus; (3) “systemic disparate
treatment” wherein through direct or circumstantial evidence, particularly
statistical data, plaintiffs seek to prove that the given employer’s widespread and
broad-based seemingly neutral employment practices were motivated by unlawful
animus; and (4) “disparate impact” wherein through statistical evidence, plaintiffs
seek to prove that a facially neutral employment standard, test or criterion, such as
use of a standardized intelligence test or refusing to hire persons with arrest
records, disproportionately adversely affects members of a protected class. Unlike
the first three causes of action, plaintiffs do not have to prove under disparate
impact that the employer intended to discriminate against the protected class. See
generally Bayer, supra note 4, at 795–818.
148
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
149
Atkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667, 682 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting
Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
150
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 511
F.3d 974, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Very recently, the Court answered yes to the
issue of “whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing
Act.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. (ICP), 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015). As part if its overall review of disparate-impact precedent
and how that cause of action under Title VII informs its application in FHA suits,
the ICP Court stated, “These cases also teach that disparate-impact liability must be
limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to make the practical
business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic
free-enterprise system.” Id. at 2518. Read in inappropriate isolation, ICP’s florid
prose might be taken to substitute practicality, such as enhanced efficiency or
increased profitability, for true business necessity as a defense to disparate-impact
claims. However, shortly thereafter, the Court clarified its meaning by reaffirming
the long-established explication of business necessity that has animated
disparate-impact theory since its inception nearly half a century ago:
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Congress provided limited immunity to seniority systems to
safeguard the legitimate vested interests of innocent workers
who likely were not responsible for discrimination that indirectly
affected the operation of the given seniority plan.151 Specifically,
Title VII does not permit a disparate impact claim against a bona
fide seniority system.152 However, seniority systems purposefully
designed or operated to effect discrimination are unlawful.153
Furthermore, the Act only applies to employers engaged in
interstate commerce who employ fifteen or more employees.154
Those limitations may be understood to assure the
constitutionality of Title VII,155 although policy motives likewise
influenced limiting the Act’s coverage to larger employers.156
Nothing about the above-described provisions even obliquely
invites the judiciary to circumvent Title VII’s first principle by
devising new exclusions. Indeed, the inclusion of exceptions in
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As the Court explained in Ricci, an entity “could be liable for
disparate-impact discrimination only if the [challenged practices] were not
job related and consistent with business necessity.” Just as an employer
may maintain a workplace requirement that causes a disparate impact if
that requirement is a “reasonable measure[ment] of job performance,” so
too must housing authorities and private developers be allowed to maintain
a policy if they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid interest.
Id. at 2522–23 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 436 (1971)). Importantly, the Court augmented its rationale by accenting that
policy consideratons informing housing, particularly public housing projects, may
differ markedly from the economic dynamics of employment. “To be sure, the Title
VII framework may not transfer exactly to the fair-housing context, but the
comparison suffices for present purposes.” Id. at 2523. In light of the ICP Court’s
precise quoting of both Griggs and that decision’s reaffirmation in Ricci, coupled
with the admonition that application of the defense in housing cases may differ from
employment cases, there is no reason to suppose that within ICP, an FHA decision,
the Court suddenly decided to dilute the stringent standards of the business
necessity defense under Title VII.
151
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
152
Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75–76 (1982).
153
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 709–10 (2009); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353–54 (1977).
154
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
155
E.g., EEOC v. Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now, No. 95-30347, 1996 WL
197411, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 1996).
156
“Congress [among other things] did not want to burden small entities with
the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims. . . . Congress decided to
protect small entities with limited resources from liability . . . .” Miller v. Maxwell’s
Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), quoted in Fantini v. Salem State Coll.,
557 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2009).
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157
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177 (2013); see also, e.g., Elgin
v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2134–35 (2012); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 n.8 (2010) (Title VII case).
158
Compare, for instance, the discussion at note 146 supra explaining why Title
VII impliedly recognizes a BFOQ for race and color discrimination even though
Congress deliberately did not include those among the classes explicitly covered by
the BFOQ defense.
159
Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) (interpreting a criminal
statute); see also supra notes 107–11 for citations to similar precedent.
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the very text of the Act demonstrates exactly what the judiciary
frequently admonishes: “Congress knows how to limit a court’s
discretion . . . when it so desires.”157
Moreover, even if the above-discussed subprovisions
impliedly invite the judiciary to enhance Title VII, such
augmentation must be reasonable, that is, must comport with,
not defiantly confound, the Act’s framework and objectives. 158 In
that regard, unequal burden theory falls outside the meaning
and spirit of Congress’s allowance of discrimination.
By
definition, unequal burden is not a defense, unlike BFOQ and
business necessity, nor does it protect the vested seniority and
similar perquisites of blameless employees, nor is it necessary to
premise Congress’s authority under the Constitution to enact
civil rights laws. Rather, unequal burden is a judicial policy
legitimizing discriminatory employer and customer preferences
that courts believe should be legal although not integral to job
responsibilities, thus not BFOQs.
In sum, Title VII’s precise, uncomplicated, explicit structure
establishes its first principle: Employment discrimination based
on any of the forbidden categories is unlawful absent satisfying
an express exception.
Adapting apposite Supreme Court
language nearly a century old, contriving “lawful” but not
textually excepted discrimination is “not a construction of a
statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it, . . . [and] [t]o supply
Thus, the
omissions transcends the judicial function.”159
“unequal burden” doctrine encroaches into authority that is
exclusively left to Congress by creating an entirely new species of
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statutorily lawful discrimination.160 Under the Constitution,
Congress alone has discretion to create such a new exception by
amending the Act.161

04/08/2016 13:04:55

C M
Y K

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 29 Side A

160
It is worth noting that, even assuming Congress is acutely aware of the
judicially contrived unequal burden theory, failure to statutorily reverse such
precedent does not evince legislative approval. “As a general matter, we are
‘reluctant to draw inferences from Congress’ failure to act.’ ” Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 632 (1993) (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293,
306 (1988)). But see Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 629 n.7 (1987) (noting that Congress may have approved Supreme Court
rulings that established when non-BFOQ, race-based voluntary affirmative action
plans are lawful under Title VII by not statutorily overturning those cases).
Research has disclosed no evidence that congressional inaction infers legislative
approval of unequal burden theory. To the contrary, Congress’s response to Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–41 (1989), evinces the opposite. Hopkins
reaffirmed Title VII’s comprehensive ban against employers’ use of non-BFOQ
stereotypes predicated on any of the Act’s five forbidden classes. See infra notes
165–86 and accompanying text. Indeed, as presently emphasized, Hopkins and
analogous precedents implicitly abrogate mutability and unequal burden theory,
although not mentioning those doctrines by name. While leaving the Court’s
analysis of unlawful stereotyping intact, in 1991, Congress statutorily reversed an
entirely different portion of the holding in Hopkins that discriminatory animus must
be the “but-for” motivation of the defendant-employer’s offending conduct, not simply
a motivating cause. See infra notes 214–45 and accompanying text discussing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Aware of the various legal propositions in Hopkins, had
Congress wished to reverse that opinion’s implicit rejection of unequal burden
theory, it could have and likely would have done so, just as it overturned the
Hopkins Court’s evidentiary standard under Title VII. Congressional silence, then,
may well evince that the legislature endorses the utter rejection of non-BFOQ
discriminatory stereotyping in Hopkins. Alternatively, at the very least, referencing
its silence yields no reliable conclusions of legislative intent because we cannot know
whether Congress’s present-day inaction is based on approving unequal burden
theory, approving the Hopkins Court’s implicit overruling of that theory, lack of
interest, or simple inertia.
161
This is an appropriate juncture to mention briefly a singular prominent
instance wherein courts properly declined to apply Title VII’s text literally. Readers
may ask: If non-BFOQ race- and sex-based grooming codes are per se unlawful even
when employers reasonably believe that they are beneficial for business, how can
race- or sex-based voluntary affirmative actions plans (“AAPs”) be legal? Courts
recognize the legality of carefully delineated, limited race- and sex-based affirmative
action programs “designed not to demean or debase downtrodden groups, but to
remedy the effects of discrimination.” Bayer, supra note 4, at 827. Thirty-five years
ago, the Supreme Court famously upheld a voluntary recruitment and training AAP
negotiated by the United Steelworkers of America and Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corporation to rectify persistent racial imbalances in certain workforces.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (five-two opinion).
Among other reasons, union and management entered into the AAP to forestall
costly agency proceedings and litigation by voluntarily reforming certain
employment practices that could premise nonfrivolous, although very possibly
unsuccessful, court challenges. Thus, Kaiser and the union recognized that even if
not technically unlawful, extant tenacious employment disparities both generated
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the serious prospect of litigation and affronted Title VII’s general goal “to eliminate
traditional patterns of racial segregation.” Id. at 201. On its face, the KaiserSteelworkers’ AAP apparently violated per se 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) and (d),
which prohibits racial discrimination in terms and conditions of employment,
including training programs. Moreover, the Act neither then nor now contains an
express provision exempting voluntary race-based affirmative action programs
except those authorized by a competent court under § 2000e-5(g)(1) as part of
ongoing litigation to remedy proven statutory violations. Nonetheless, Weber, 443
U.S. at 201, noted longstanding precedent holding that sometimes challenged
conduct may offend a statute’s “letter” but safeguard its “spirit.” In such instance,
particularly regarding remedial, humanitarian enactments, such as civil rights
statutes, the spirit prevails as the true index of the legislature’s intent. Accordingly:
[T]he Court recognized two Title VII’s: a long-range enactment that
foresees the day when employment discrimination will be eliminated, and a
short-range statute that permits occasional and duly limited race or gender
conscious measures to achieve restructuring of the labor market. Thus, to
reach the day when the long-term Title VII becomes a reality, the shortterm Title VII permits limited race-conscious, voluntary affirmative action
even absent pending litigation. The interesting irony is that the very
measures used to help reach that day of transformation will themselves
become unlawful when that day arrives.
See Bayer, supra note 4, at 834–35 (discussing Weber, 443 U.S. at 201–04). In sum,
although employers and unions understandably need not admit that pre-AAP
employment conditions constitute actual Title VII violations, Weber coherently
concluded that it would be absurd to require Kaiser and the Steelworkers Union to
wait until they were sued before they could take effective measures to cure what
appeared to be labor conditions contrary to the essence, if not the letter, of the Act.
Under such conditions, AAPs may be lawful so long as their remedial provisions are
duly limited in both duration and scope and do not “unnecessarily trammel” the
interests of other employees. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. The courts repeatedly have
reaffirmed, indeed enlarged, the law and theory of Weber. E.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at
631, 641–42 (voluntary sex-based AAP instituted by a public employer); Sharkey v.
Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 262 F. App’x 598, 603–04 (5th Cir. 2008); Schurr v.
Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 496–97 (3d Cir. 1999). The pivotal difference
between AAPs and the unequal burden doctrine is uncomplicated. Properly
constrained AAPs carry out Title VII by eliminating pockets of apparent
discrimination through voluntary compliance. By contrast, mutability and unequal
burden theory frustrate Title VII’s letter and spirit by validating the very type of
discrimination that the Act’s express language proscribes and that none of its
exceptions excuses. It is as simple as that. For thoroughness, this Article notes the
Court’s recent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), holding that an
employer violates Title VII by refusing to apply the racially disparate results of its
own facially neutral employment test unless a “strong-basis-in-evidence” evinces
that utilizing the test’s scores actually would result in unlawful disparate impact. Id.
at 582–84. While its full effect has yet to be determined, arguably Ricci does not
apply to a classic AAP, that is, when “an employer has undertaken a race- or genderconscious affirmative action plan designed to benefit all members of a racial or
gender class in a forward-looking manner only.” United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d
65, 72 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Ricci does not displace the classic Weber-Johnson framework), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 9, 2015) (No. 15-742). Therefore, Ricci does not seem to have
undermined Weber at its core. Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta: Signaling a New
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Three Key Directives Enforcing Title VII

Pursuant to its explicit text, thoroughgoing structure, and
humanitarian purpose, the Supreme Court fittingly has
identified three systemic directives augmenting Title VII’s ban
against discrimination:162 (1) Title VII’s definition of unlawful
discrimination forbids employment actions based on racial,
sexual, ethnic, and religious stereotyping; (2) Title VII’s
proscriptions may invalidate, and indeed have invalidated,
practices that the enacting and amending congresses might have
considered neither problematic nor illegitimate; and (3) Title
VII’s protections are not limited to discrimination traditionally or
popularly considered wrongful.163 Indeed, as next explained,
pivotal decisions establishing these directives invalidated
discriminatory policies with which the discriminatees might have
conformed without “unequal burden.”
Thus, although not
mentioning such theories expressly, the Court effectively has
overturned the mutability and unequal burden doctrines.164
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Standard for Affirmative Action Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 242
(2011) (“Ricci, while having dealt a blow to disparate impact theory, has not
necessarily dealt a fatal blow to affirmative action in the process.”); Charles A.
Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate
Impact Road?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 426 (2010). But see Stephen M. Rich, Against
Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 73 (2011) (“Ricci calls the Weber-Johnson
rationale into question . . . .”).
162
Although strongly hinted in earlier decisions, the Court elucidated and
enriched these directives in rulings postdating this author’s 1987 Mutable
Characteristics article, cited supra note 4. It is gratifying to have the opportunity to
update that work, this author’s debut law review article, in recognition of Title VII’s
golden anniversary.
163
In these important regards, one might conclude that Congress intended Title
VII to lead rather than lag common social sentiments regarding what is or is not
acceptable race and sex discrimination. Within the realm of dignity and fairness in
society, such is the authority and, one might go so far as say, the duty of the national
legislature empowered to shape conduct if not attitudes. This, of course, is in stark
contrast to things over which law has little, sometimes no, actual or legitimate
control. For instance, a popular legal maxim–perhaps more a cliché–holds, “Law lags
science; it does not lead it.” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183,
1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202
(11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
164
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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Title VII Prohibits Discrimination Based on Stereotyping

Turning to the first directive, discriminatory stereotyping,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins165 expounded expansively upon the
Court’s earlier judgment:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.”166

The Court’s breadth of language evinces appropriate fervor for
Congress’s intended coverage of the Act,167 particularly so when
165

490 U.S. 228 (plurality opinion with concurring and dissenting opinions).
Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
167
Lower courts appropriately have accepted as controlling Title VII law the
Hopkins plurality’s explication of unlawful stereotyping. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros.
Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 479 (5th Cir. 2013) (Jones, C.J., dissenting); Vickers v.
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006); Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005). Indeed, that explication arguably
represents the unanimous sentiment of the Hopkins Court. Concurring in the
judgment, Justices White and O’Connor explained their particular positions
regarding a separate and distinct procedural issue: whether plaintiffs’ evidence of
“direct discrimination”—noncircumstantial proof that agents of the defendant
considered sex when rendering their employment decisions—shifted the burden of
persuasion to the defendant. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258–61 (White, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 261–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Both
Justices agreed, however, that Ms. Hopkins should prevail and expressed no
criticism of the plurality’s interpretation that sexual stereotyping poisons the
workforce environment and taints a given employment decision in violation of Title
VII. In fact, Justice O’Connor expressly stated that Ann Hopkins had made a
sufficient case of discriminatory animus based on sexual stereotyping to shift the
burden of proof to defendant Price Waterhouse. Id. at 272–74. Therefore, at the very
least, Justices White and O’Connor impliedly joined the plurality’s analysis of
unlawful stereotyping for, having taken the effort to write separately on other
matters, surely they would not have relinquished the opportunity to dissent had
they disagreed on such a profound and manifestly far-reaching understanding of
Title VII. Similarly, although vigorously dissenting regarding the issue of causation
and burden shifting, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia
embraced the substantive rule that evidence of unlawful stereotyping can
demonstrate a claim of unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 279–95
(Kennedy, J., with Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting). “Evidence of use by
decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to the question of
discriminatory intent. The ultimate question, however, is whether discrimination
caused the plaintiff's harm.” Id. at 294. The dissenters explicated, “In this case,
Hopkins plainly presented a strong case both of her own professional qualifications
166
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considered in combination with the Hopkins Court’s
accompanying
unambiguous
edict
that
§ 2000e-2(a)’s
“words . . . mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions.”168 In that light, it is worth recalling that even a
scientifically or empirically true race or gender stereotype cannot
support an employer’s decision to treat each covered individual
as though he or she shared the given group’s stereotypical
characteristic.169
Therefore, the Court’s definition and
understanding of unlawful stereotyping seems to be as broad as
that term allows: Absent BFOQ, if considerations of sex played
any part in the employer’s actions, the plaintiff states an
actionable claim.170
True, some thoughtful critics view stereotypes as empty
vessels used by advocates to sort and to stow distinctions they
consider appropriate from distinctions they perceive as wrongful,
thus stereotyping.171 Especially in the realm of civil rights, one
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and of the presence of discrimination in Price Waterhouse’s partnership process.
Had the District Court found on this record that sex discrimination caused the
adverse decision, [we] doubt it would have been reversible error.” Id. at 294–95
(Kennedy, J., with Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting).
168
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240; see also, e.g., Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586,
592 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240–41). Presumably, Hopkins
mentioned only “gender” because Plaintiff-Respondent Ann Hopkin’s Title VII claim
sounded in sex discrimination. Certainly, one could augment the Court’s statement
to read, the Act’s “words . . . mean that [discrimination based on any of the five
proscribed classes] must be irrelevant to employment decisions.” Miller, 47 F.3d at
592.
169
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708; Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity
& Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 (1983) (opinion of Marshall,
J., with Brennan, White, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ.) (per curiam); see supra notes
97–104 and accompanying text discussing pension benefits. Consistent with earlier
discussion in this Article, see supra notes 121–31 and accompanying text, the Court
accented that because “Title VII’s ‘focus on the individual is unambiguous,’ ”
employers cannot offer employees sexually disparate retirement annuity plans.
Norris, 463 U.S. at 1080 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
170
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 239–51. The Court unambiguously ruled:
Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take
gender into account in making an employment decision, namely, when
gender is a “bona fide occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of th[e] particular business or
enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e). The only plausible inference to draw
from this provision is that, in all other circumstances, a person’s gender may
not be considered in making decisions that affect her.
Id. at 242 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
171
It surely is germane to note Professor Bernstein’s lament that professionals
and laypersons alike tend to use the term “stereotype” frequently but somewhat
offhandedly. See Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong With Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV.
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could conclude that stereotype is simply a synonym for
discrimination because both concern treating individuals or a
group pursuant to some generalized notion, accurate or
inaccurate, about the particular group.172 Nonetheless, judicial
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655, 658 (2013) (quoting 16 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 651 (2d ed. 1989)). In
particular, legal application tends to imbue stereotyping with negative connotations.
However, as Professor Bernstein explained:
[T]hese definitions of stereotypes are agnostic on the question of whether
the associations asserted or implied are true or false or somewhere in
between.
. . . [Certainly,] not all stereotypes are wrong in the sense of doing harm
that is severe enough to warrant sanction from the law, a costly response.
Some stereotypes might be false or unreliable but do not offend the groups
of people they reference. Some might offend but have the virtue of being
reliable, or true enough.
. . . [Still,] many—probably most—messages in stereotypes are reductive
and demeaning[, commonly inspiring significant, extensive, and numerous
kinds of devastating harms to individuals, groups, and communities].
Id. at 659 (footnote omitted). Similarly, Professor Render believes that emphasis on
stereotyping is distracting because “stereotype” is an heuristic—“empty”—construct;
that is, too often commentators label beliefs or practices as “stereotypes” and, having
done so, conclude tautologically that the particular beliefs or practices must be
unfair:
This is because the idea of a stereotype carries with it a connotation of
unfairness or injustice, but it does not delimit or offer specific guidance
about the type of unfairness that transforms a garden-variety nonuniversal
generalization into a stereotype. Thus, to determine whether a
generalization is a stereotype, an analyst or adjudicator must first be
committed to a principle of justice by which the “fairness” of the application
of the generalization can be measured.
Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 144 (2010)
(footnote omitted). In that way, such commentators deliberately or negligently avoid
critical analysis while essentially daring readers to disagree with their unproven but
intimidating application of the damning label. See id. at 134–40. In light of
Professors Bernstein’s and Render’s astute concerns, although the use of the term
“stereotype” remains familiar, even comfortable, this Article proposes a moral
framework, see infra notes 246–307 and accompanying text, for Professor Render
rightly insists that such is needed to prove any assertion that a given stereotype
indeed is untoward.
172
Of course, while conceptually connected, stereotyping and discrimination
surely need not become indistinguishable. Stereotyping could be defined
dispassionately as the act of describing groups according to rightly or wrongly
perceived shared characteristics. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 171, at 657–59
(defining “stereotype”). Discriminating, by contrast, is actually imposing terms and
conditions differentiating persons or things based on stereotypical characteristics.
Cf. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 306–07 (Kennedy, J., with two Justices dissenting) (noting
that sexual stereotyping is not necessarily discrimination under Title VII).
Therefore, one can stereotype without discriminating although the obverse might be
impossible. Nonetheless, one of Professor Render’s overarching excellent projects is
alleviating any confusion that legal stereotyping analysis unintentionally imposes to
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emphasis on stereotyping seems notably useful at least
pragmatically. Hopkins reaffirms that civil rights theory views
uncritical stereotyping as hugely problematic.173 Thus, even if
not synonymous, perhaps more than discrimination itself, the
idea of stereotyping evokes with singular intensity impressions
depicting why discrimination typically is unreasonable.174
Understanding
stereotyping
prompts
the
concurrent
understanding that discrimination tends to be the injurious and
unjust supposition that a given individual possesses attributes
accurately or otherwise rendered to particular classes. The
concept of stereotypes, then, helpfully reminds us that (1) any
given
stereotype
may
be
mistaken
thus
reliance—discrimination—thereon is arbitrary and (2) even if
accurate, not all individuals necessarily share the stereotypical
characteristic, thus, reliance on the stereotype in the context of
individual rights portends arbitrariness.
The foregoing prelude leads to a particularly important
point: The Hopkins Court did not moderate its comprehensive
condemnation of sexual stereotyping as a proxy for individual
merit even though the discrimination Ann Hopkins endured
concerned
predominately
grooming
and
appearance
characteristics that she could control at will.175 The theory of
unlawful sterotyping in Hopkins, then, evinces a scrupulous
commitment to enforce fully Title VII’s broad proscriptions,
including, contrary to unequal burden theory, abrogating nonBFOQ gender-based conceptions of beauty and comportment.176
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discern what should be considered unlawful sex discrimination vel non. See
generally Render, supra note 171.
173
See also, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 171, at 659.
174
E.g., Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing
the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law
and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 67 n.173 (1995) (discussing how the term “lipstick
lesbian” arouses certain images); Chris Watkins, Comment, Beyond Status: The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Parental Rights of People Labeled
Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1415, 1456–57
(1995) (discussing how descriptive labels about individuals and groups induce
stereotypical impressions); Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1229 n.153 (1974) (“Like race and alienage,
mental illness evokes a stereotype which carries a stigma of inferiority . . . .”).
175
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235.
176
Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity
Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657, 672 (2010);
Allison T. Steinle, Comment, Appearance and Grooming Standards as Sex
Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 261, 287–95 (2006)
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Specifically, Ms. Hopkins, an accountant with the thenthriving Price Waterhouse firm, alleged she was denied
promotion to partnership due to both conscious and unwitting
discriminatory attitudes of voting partners.177 Throughout the
promotion process, several partners, including some of Ms.
Hopkins’s supporters, described her appearance and demeanor in
uncomplimentary, gender-explicit terms evincing the sex-based
stereotype that women should act in a demure, ladylike manner:
Supervisors described her as “macho,” “somewhat masculine,”
“a lady using foul language” who “overcompensated for being a
woman,” as well as someone in need of “a course at charm
school.” One evaluator suggested that Hopkins could improve
her partnership chances if she would “walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”178

Paradoxically, many of the pejoratives leveled against Ms.
Hopkins, such as purportedly being overaggressive, would have
been compliments if directed to male accountants, thus evincing
further the sexually stereotypical nature of Price Waterhouse’s
decision not to promote her.179
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(contrasting and analyzing, in depth, the facts of Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 and
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)).
177
Among its many significant rulings, Hopkins explained that officers,
managers, and other business decision makers may be unconsciously prejudiced,
that is, unaware that they are acting out sexual biases. Unconscious though it may
be, such bias can taint the decision making of corporate agents as readily as willful
discriminatory action. Indeed, because actors are unaware of, and therefore cannot
recognize and purge, their prejudice, unwitting discrimination can be more insidious
than deliberate bias. Rightly then, obliviousness is neither an excuse nor a
justification for acts stemming from actors’ discriminatory attitudes. Hopkins, 490
U.S. at 251, 255–56.
178
See Bernstein supra note 171, at 682 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hopkins,
490 U.S. at 235).
179
Indeed, the Court recognized, “An employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and
impermissible Catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if
they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251; see
also, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111–12; Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL
5436, at *10 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992). Similarly, Professor Yuracko noted what has
been termed the “double-bind” effect:
Hopkins was required to be feminine, while the successful performance of
her job required her to adopt more traditionally masculine traits and
behaviors. As the Court explained, given the demands placed on her,
Hopkins would be out of a job if she behaved aggressively, and out of a job
if she did not.
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Significantly, virtually all of the sex-based condemnations
against Ann Hopkins involved mutable characteristics adaptable
without unequal burden.180 Ms. Hopkins could have taken “a
course at charm school,” dressed and walked as her critics
preferred, adjusted her attire, wore some jewelry, and adopted a
less aggressive, more demure, ladylike attitude.181 Aside from
charm school, assuaging the partners’ predilections would have
engendered costs in time and money comparable to getting
haircuts roughly every month, buying and applying makeup, and
other activities required to satisfy lawful gender-distinct
grooming rules.182
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Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 762 (2013). Importantly for the thesis of this Article,
stressing Title VII’s “first principle” that all discrimination based on the five
forbidden classes is unlawful unless justified by a BFOQ, both the Hopkins opinion
itself, 490 U.S. at 242, 252, and subsequent Supreme Court precedent, confirm that
even if Ms. Hopkins had not been caught in the “double-bind,” the discrimination she
suffered is unlawful. Thus, plaintiffs need not prove that they have been subject to
the “double-bind” or “Catch-22” to state an actionable claim based on unlawful
stereotyping; although certainly the “double-bind” is an aggravating factor
emphasizing the illegality of particular sexual stereotyping. See infra notes 183–86
and accompanying text.
180
See Jones, supra note 176 (“[T]he Court placed reduced reliance upon
immutability, a quality the Court has used often to justify protection for certain
classifications, including gender. Although the attributes for which Ann Hopkins
was penalized were arguably mutable, the Court nonetheless recognized sex
stereotyping as a form of sex discrimination.”); McCarthy, supra note 77, at 962–63
(discussing the implied mutability analysis in Jespersen); Steinle, supra note 176, at
277–83.
181
This list of Price Waterhouse partners’ criticisms of Ms. Hopkins is found at
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 256.
182
Some
commentators
compellingly
dispute
from
an
empirical
perspective—physical and psychological—the very idea of an “unequal burden,”
arguing that persons in Ms. Hopkins’s predicament cannot comport either easily or
readily with their superiors’ race- and sex-based criticisms. For instance, Professor
Yoshino insightfully explained:
This comment reveals that while being too masculine is not valued, being
too feminine is not valued either. To succeed as a woman, one must have
the correctly titrated balance of masculine and feminine traits. One must
be “authoritative” and “formidable,” but remain an “appealing lady.” . . . If
a woman covers too much, then the reverse covering demand will be made
to bring her back into the zone of appropriate behavior.
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 910 (2002). Professor Yoshino’s
conclusions not only make eminent good sense, but they also underscore that
conforming with the types of grooming rules the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen and
virtually every other circuit deem reasonable may be much more demanding and
intrusive than judges realize. Yes, cutting one’s hair and applying makeup may
seem to be, and perhaps are not, difficult endeavors. But when, as in Hopkins and
Jespersen, discrete sex-based grooming requirements are both numerous and part of
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Given the verve of the Court’s denunciation of sex
discrimination by way of sex stereotyping in Hopkins, the Court
surely would not alter its stance on the contention that Ms.
Hopkins could have kowtowed with ease.183 Under the Hopkins
Court’s statutory analysis, any non-BFOQ sex-based grooming
code violates Title VII’s first principle that “gender must be
irrelevant to employment decisions.”184 Indeed, it is worth
recalling that after reviewing § 2000e-2 in its entirety, the Court
ruled, “The only plausible inference to draw from [§ 2000e-2(e)(1),
the BFOQ] provision is that, in all other circumstances, a
person’s gender may not be considered in making decisions that
affect her.”185 The term “in all other circumstances” manifestly
instructs that courts may not concoct extratextual forms of legal
employment discrimination, of which “unequal burden” certainly
is one.186
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a larger, complex schema of appearance standards, successful fulfillment of these
tasks may be elusive. E.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., with Graber
and Fletcher, JJ., dissenting). This is particularly true where, as Professor Yoshino
accents, grooming and appearance rules—express or implied—are so integrally
linked to employers’ stereotypical conceptions of gender comportment that to retain
employment, or to earn promotions, raises, transfers, and similar advantages,
females must maneuver the precarious path of being neither too male nor
excessively female. The foregoing, of course, does not consider the burden grooming
and appearance discrimination inflicts on employees’ psyches—a burden that,
contrary to the dismissive attitudes of the courts, is substantial. See infra notes
286–307 and accompanying text. If Professor Yoshino is correct, as likely he is, then
grooming rules such as those in Jespersen should be considered unequal burdens per
se and, thus, unlawful under Title VII. But, even if compliance with the employment
standards discussed in Hopkins and Jespersen would not be difficult, this Article
pursues its contention that the Supreme Court implicitly and appropriately has
invalidated unequal burden theory.
183
See Steinle, supra note 176, at 293–95. As the Court accented, “By focusing
on Hopkins’ specific proof, however, we do not suggest a limitation on the possible
ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment
decision . . . .” Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251–52. Possibly, had Ms. Hopkins assuaged her
critics, she would have been promoted to partnership. Of course, she would have had
a valid Title VII claim if she were trapped in the “double-bind,” that is, losing her
promotion because she was considered too meek and submissive to be an effective
partner after having altered her comportment to conform with some Price
Waterhouse partners’ stereotypical perceptions of femininity. See supra note 179
and accompanying text.
184
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240, quoted in Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 592
(3d Cir. 1995).
185
Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
186
E.g., Patrick S. Shin, Vive La Différence? A Critical Analysis of the
Justification of Sex-Dependent Workplace Restrictions on Dress and Grooming, 14
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 491, 493 (2007) (symposium issue on grooming and Title
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Although among the most significant, the Court’s analysis of
discriminatory stereotyping in Hopkins is not the first instance of
Supreme Court implicit disapproval of unequal burden theory.187
The analogous context of sexual harassment, of which there are
two kinds,188 certainly springs to mind. First, “quid pro quo”
harassment in which employers demand sexual favors as
preconditions either to receive employment benefits or to avoid
employment detriments is per se unlawful.189 Moreover, the
courts have repeatedly held that “hostile work environment”
harassment is illegal if “the work environment was so pervaded
by discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment
were altered.”190 The employer is liable for unlawful quid pro quo
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VII). At least two circuits properly understand Hopkins in that regard. Albeit in
dictum, the Sixth Circuit stated as a clear and obvious legal fact, “[a]fter Price
Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women because, for instance,
they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.” Smith v. City of Salem, 378
F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit agreed, finding that the plaintiff
stated an actionable sex discrimination claim that her employer, a motel, dismissed
her because she appeared too mannish and lacked the “Midwestern girl look.” Lewis
v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1041–42 (8th Cir. 2010); see also
Finnie v. Lee Cnty., Miss., 907 F. Supp. 2d 750, 775 (N.D. Miss. 2012) (quoting and
distinguishing Smith, 378 F.3d at 574, the court held that the county’s policy
requiring all detention officers to wear identical uniforms, including pants, was
gender-neutral, reasonably implemented to assure uniformity among officers, and
was not a pretext for discrimination). Thus, perhaps Professor Yuracko is not wholly
correct in her lament that “the broad language used . . . by the Supreme Court in
Price Waterhouse, is more accurately viewed as judicial rhetoric than legal reality.”
See Yuracko, supra note 179, at 779 n.90.
187
See supra text accompanying note 182.
188
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004) (citing Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).
189
E.g., Stevens v. Saint Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc., 533 F. App’x 624, 628 (6th
Cir. 2013); Rader v. Napolitano, 552 F. App’x 617, 617 (9th Cir. 2013). A typical
instance is, “Have sex with me and I will give you a raise; but if you refuse, I will fire
you.” By definition, quid pro quo harassment explicitly fulfills Title VII’s definition
of discrimination because the employee understands that submitting to her
employer’s sexual demands is necessary either to attain or to maintain a job, a raise,
a promotion, or similar “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
190
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013); see also, e.g., Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (determining that hostile environment
harassment is unlawful if it is so severe, pervasive, or both, that enduring
harassment becomes a term or condition of the victim’s employment). Specifically,
an employer is “strictly liable” if harassment emanates from the victim’s
“supervisors”—those who are authorized to “take tangible employment actions
against the victim”—and the harassment results in a “tangible” employment action,
that is some decision, usually adverse, affecting the victim’s compensation,
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or hostile environment harassment because Title VII secures for
employees a work environment free from the psychological,
economic, social, and employment-related damage harassment
inflicts.191 Accordingly, Title VII prohibits harassment because of
Title VII’s first principle: workers’ intrinsic right to “workplace
equality.”192
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promotions, work assignments, or similar employment terms and conditions. See
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439, 2443. If the supervisor’s harassment does not affect a
“tangible” term of employment or if the hostile environment is caused by the victim’s
nonsupervisory co-workers, the employer may nonetheless be liable if it knew of but
negligently failed to take appropriate steps to stop the harassment or if the employer
was unaware of the harassment because properly notifying the employer likely
would have been a futile or possibly detrimental act on the victim’s part. Id. at 2439.
191
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, quoted in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). As the Harris Court explained:
A discriminatorily abusive work environment . . . can and often will detract
from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on
the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even
without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their . . . gender . . . offends
Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.
Id. at 22, quoted in Suders, 542 U.S. at 133–34.
192
As the Suders Court stated, “[T]he very fact that the discriminatory conduct
was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees
because of their . . . gender . . . offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.”
Suders, 542 U.S. at 133–34 (alterations in original) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 22).
Accordingly, an employer may engage in discriminatory harassment that is
insufficiently “severe or pervasive” to create an unlawfully “abusive” work milieu.
Importantly, Suders and similar decisions do not tacitly support unequal burden
theory by implying that the courts may contrive non-BFOQ yet lawful
discrimination in situations where Title VII’s coverage lawfully is invoked. This
distinction, explicated below, is a bit tricky but fundamental. Absent quid pro quo
harassment, plaintiffs must find another link to § 2000e-2(a)(1)’s explicit text to
prove that the particular non-quid pro quo harassment is unlawful. See supra note
189 and accompanying text. In this regard, the theory of “hostile environment
harassment” holds that although an employee is neither explicitly promised an
employment benefit nor is directly threatened with an employment detriment, the
employer violates the Act if that employee is subjected to discriminatory harassing
treatment such as insults, ridicule, or taunting “so objectively offensive as to alter
the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. This makes
sense because even if non-quid pro quo harassment is predicated on a forbidden
criterion such as sex, unless it is either severe or pervasive enough to comprise an
actual § 2000e-2(a)(1) “term” or “condition” of employment, the harassment does not
meet those textual requisites under Title VII. E.g., Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Redd v.
N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2012). To prove hostile
environment harassment, courts require severity or pervasiveness as a matter of
statutory compliance, that is, to satisfy Title VII’s express text, not as a matter of
policy that less serious harassment is lawful because it is “reasonable” to humiliate
and demean employees so long as the torment is not excessive. Therefore, courts and
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Crucially, but not surprisingly, courts do not excuse the
employer if the victim could have prevented the harassment by
changing her behavior.193 The victim is not required to prove
that the harassment would have continued even if, for instance,
she wore less attractive clothes, applied less makeup, or
otherwise attempted to make herself unappealing to her
harasser.194 Because the victim is innocent, it would be perverse
if to prevail, the victim first had to change her lawful behavior,
comportment, or appearance and thereafter prove that,
nonetheless, the harassment continued. Yet, unequal burden
theory implicitly mandates such proof if the inducement to
harass stems in whole or part from the victim’s mutable
characteristics such as dress, makeup, hair style, and other
aspects of demeanor.195
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commentators cannot use hostile environment harassment as an example to show that
Title VII permits courts to contrive lawful substantive, non-BFOQ discrimination.
There is yet another reason why the doctrine of hostile environment harassment
provides no analogy supporting unequal burden theory. Pursuant to the applicable
legal definitions, grooming rules reviewed under unequal burden theory are not
comparable to hostile environment harassment at all because the affected employee
or employment applicant does not seek to prove that the totality of discrete events
demonstrates an unwritten but manifest discriminatory term or condition of
employment. Rather, as male-only hair-length and female-only makeup rules
exemplify, there is no debate that the particular grooming or appearance
requirement is a “term of employment”—an explicit requisite—to obtain or to retain
a job. Rather, unequal burden really is analogous to quid pro quo harassment, where
employers require employees to accept explicitly discriminatory terms or conditions.
Like the classic harassment scenario, “Have sex with me if you want a raise,
otherwise I will fire you,” compliance with facially discriminatory grooming and
appearance policies is a quid pro quo either to secure an employment benefit, such
as keeping one’s job, or to avoid an employment penalty, such as losing one’s job.
Thus, both quid pro quo harassment and unequal burden situations are per se
discriminatory. The author’s colleague Proffesor Angela Morrison greatly assisted in
the understanding of this significant point.
193
See supra notes 175–86 and accompanying text.
194
Similarly, distressed victims often try to stop or at least lessen the
harassment’s impact through coping tactics, such as seeking counseling or acting the
“good sport” by taking part in the taunting. That the victim could have but did not
get psychological therapy and that she occasionally joined voluntarily in the
“horseplay”—arguably mutable behaviors—do not per se refute that she was
harassed, as courts correctly understand. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters.,
Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 873 (9th Cir. 2001).
195
It is no answer, of course, to claim that harassment is different because a
victim should not be made to suffer the indignity of harassment even when the
harasser is motivated by the victim’s mutable characteristics. The foregoing moral
and legal truth must counsel as well that the same work-qualified victim should not
suffer the indignity of losing or being denied employment due to her refusal to
change her mutable characteristics to conform with her employer’s non-BFOQ sex-
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.196 offers an
exceptional, compelling example. Joseph Oncale, an oil worker
on an eight-person all-male work crew, was harassed because he
acted in a manner his coworkers considered “homosexual.”197 In
a remarkably brief opinion authored by the late Justice Antonin
Scalia, the Court unanimously agreed:
We see no justification in the statutory language or our
precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex
harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. . . . Title VII
prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in the “terms”
or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any
kind that meets the statutory requirements.198

As in Hopkins and earlier harassment cases, the Court
apparently was unconcerned that Mr. Oncale perhaps could have
easily modified his mannerisms, speech phrasings, and other
behaviors evincing an unmanly or homosexual demeanor in the
minds of his coworkers.199 Indeed, possibly such adjustments
would have ended his mistreatment; but the Court neither
expressly nor impliedly required Mr. Oncale to prove that he was
caught in the “double-bind.”200 Of course, the Court foisted no
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based standards. This Article can discern no apparent substantive difference
between harassing a woman for refusing to wear makeup and firing her for so
refusing. In fact, one might easily believe that such firing is the deepest form of
harassment. As discussed supra, the Hopkins Court apparently would agree. See
supra notes 175–86 and accompanying text.
196
523 U.S. 75.
197
Id. at 77.
198
Id. at 79–80 (alteration in original).
199
See generally Oncale, 523 U.S. 75.
200
In this very significant regard, Oncale and similar harassment cases
demonstrate that Hopkins cannot be limited to instances involving “double-bind” or,
as the Supreme Court said, a “Catch 22.” See generally Oncale, 523 U.S. 75. See also
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). As earlier discussed,
considering Ann Hopkins to be an unsuitably mannish female, her employer,
accounting firm Price Waterhouse, denied her promotion to partnership; but had Ms.
Hopkins adopted the female behaviors favored by Price Waterhouse, she likely
would have been considered too weak to be a partner. Thus, no matter what attitude
Ann Hopkins struck, due to her employer’s sexual bias, she could not attain
partnership. See supra notes 165–79 and accompanying text. Although noting Ms.
Hopkins’s distressing dilemma, the Court’s broad and emphatic rationale evinces
that Hopkins applies to any non-BFOQ use of discriminatory stereotypes, not simply
when employees are subjected to the “double-bind.” See supra notes 179–86 and
accompanying text. Indeed, given the vital importance of the point, it is useful to
reiterate that Hopkins specifically and tellingly instructed, “By focusing on [Ann]
Hopkins’ specific proof, however, we do not suggest a limitation on the possible ways
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such requirement because discriminatees are not required to
surrender to the demands of their discriminators.201 Thus,
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of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment
decision . . . .” 490 U.S. at 251–52. Correspondingly, as stressed earlier, after
reviewing 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2, the Court ruled, “The only plausible inference to draw
from [§ 2000e-2(e)(1), the BFOQ] provision is that, in all other circumstances, a
person’s gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her.” Id. at
242 (emphasis added). In light of the above, it is distressing that in Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., the en banc Ninth Circuit erroneously implied that Hopkins
is limited to “Catch-22” situations where, “the very traits that [Ms. Hopkins] was
asked to hide were the same traits considered praiseworthy in men.” 444 F.3d 1104,
1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). But, as shown, the Supreme Court unequivocally
reaffirmed Title VII’s blanket ban against any sex discrimination absent a proven
BFOQ. See supra notes 179–86 and accompanying text; accord Jespersen, 444 F.3d
at 1114 & n.2 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Oncale precludes any lurking doubts to
that effect. As in many harassment scenarios, had Mr. Oncale adjusted his behavior
to assuage his harassers, the harassment might well have stopped or, at least,
diminished considerably. In other words, to forestall further harassment Joseph
Oncale could have changed his behavior without losing either his job or attendant
benefits such as raises and promotions. Nonetheless, his Title VII claim remained
viable although he was not trapped in the Catch 22 or double-bind. Inexplicably, the
Jespersen majority did not discuss Oncale, which is disappointing yet hardly
surprising given that the unanimous Oncale Court’s holding and rationale did not
depend on Mr. Oncale being caught in the double bind. Identically and oddly, neither
of the two Jespersen dissents noted Oncale, a decision that would have bolstered
substantially the dissenters’ otherwise sound rejection of the majority’s holding and
rationale.
201
Proponents of unequal burden theory can find no solace in Oncale’s
admonition:
In same-sex . . . harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and
is experienced by its target. A professional football player’s working
environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the
coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field—even if the
same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s
secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured
by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.
Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable
courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing
among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive.
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82. Plainly, the Court limited its invocation of “context” to
the unique proof essential to hostile environment lawsuits, specifically whether the
victim demonstrates that the irksome behavior has crossed the somewhat elusive
line from irritating but acceptable hazing to illegal discrimination. As explained
supra at notes 189–95 and accompanying text, that requirement is necessitated by
Title VII’s language because for a claim to be cognizable, the hostile environment
must have become effectively a “term” or “condition” of the victim’s employment,
otherwise it does not satisfy the textual requisites of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 36 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_BAYER

460

3/29/2016 4:26 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:401

Oncale, especially understood with Hopkins, confirms that
employers may predicate employment terms and conditions on
discriminatory stereotypes only if doing so is a BFOQ. This Title
VII standard apparently applies to all stereotyping, such as
whether real men wear short hair or whether genuine women
such as Ms. Hopkins and Ms. Jespersen wear makeup.
b.

Title VII’s Protection Is Not Limited to Discriminatory Conduct
That the Enacting Congress Believed To Be Wrongful

The pivotal Oncale decision nicely segues into the Supreme
Court’s second Title VII directive. The Justices neither denied
nor limited Mr. Oncale’s recovery based on the arguably unusual
nature of his statutory claim: male-on-male harassment in a
unisex workforce.202 Indeed, the Court accented that while the
enacting Congress apparently never considered, and possibly
would have been unconcerned with, prejudice against
purportedly womanly men, “statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”203
That a remedial statute ultimately might condemn practices the
enacting legislators found acceptable, even appropriate, is a
well-established and honorable tenet of statutory construction.204
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(2012). But the subjects of unequal burden theory, such as grooming codes, are per
se “terms” of employment and, thus, are comparable not to hostile environment
harassment but to quid pro quo harassment. See supra note 192.
202
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80.
203
Id. at 79. Oncale’s sound rationale that the impact of statutory texts often
transcend the original concerns of the enactors is not an odd occurrence but rather
has been emphasized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. E.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167–68 (2004); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492
U.S. 229, 248 (1989). Indeed, Oncale’s jurisprudence is embraced by Justices who
otherwise often disagree regarding legal philosophy and statutory analysis. E.g.,
Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 719 (2008); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 288 (2006).
204
For instance, citing numerous precedents particularly Oncale, the prevailing
trend is that while homosexuality and transgenderism are not per se protected
classes,
discrimination
against
transgender
persons
due
to
their
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663
F.3d 1312, 1316–19 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2011); Kasti v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
325 F. App’x 492, 493–94 (9th Cir. 2009); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d
1215, 1222–24 (10th Cir. 2007) (discrimination based on a person’s status as
transsexual is not cognizable under Title VII); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co.,
214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198–203
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(9th Cir. 2000) (addressing a claim under both Title VII and the Gender Motivated
Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)). See generally Jason Lee, Note, Lost in
Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender Employment Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 423 (2012); Ilona M. Turner, Comment,
Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561
(2007). Significantly from the administrative perspective, as recently noted by the
Second Circuit, the EEOC likewise has changed its original legal position in light of
Oncale and similar modern precedent:
[T]he EEOC had developed a consistent body of decisions that did not
recognize Title VII claims based on the complainant's transgender status.
See, e.g., Kowalczyk v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, No. 01942053, 1994 WL
744529, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 27, 1994) (concluding that an “appellant's
allegation of discrimination based on her acquired sex (transsexualism) is
not a basis protected under Title VII”); Campbell v. Dep't of Agriculture,
No. 01931730, 1994 WL 652840, at *1 n.3 (E.E.O.C. July 21, 1994)
(recognizing precedent holding that “gender dysphoria or transsexualism is
not protected under Title VII under the aegis of sex discrimination”);
Casoni v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 01840104, 1984 WL 485399, at *3
(E.E.O.C. Sept. 28, 1984) (“[A]ppellant's allegation of sex discrimination on
account of being a male to female preoperative transsexual . . . [is] not
cognizable . . . under the provisions of Title VII.”). It was not until Macy v.
Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20,
2012), . . . that the EEOC altered its position and concluded that
discrimination against transgender individuals based on their transgender
status does constitute sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII.
Id. at *11 & n.16 (alterations in original); see also Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local
40, 790 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 2015).
Addressing a different legal matter, the en banc Eleventh Circuit wrote:
Given prevailing attitudes at the time [42. U.S.C.] § 1985(3) [conspiracy to
deprive one or a class of persons of “the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws”] was enacted, it is
certainly possible, if not probable, that many legislators who voted for the
statute were not concerned about affording legal protection to women as a
class. Nonetheless, we follow the plain meaning of the statute, because
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.”
Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 166 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). Similarly, the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently noted:
[W]hile the specificity of section 628’s [Communications Act of 1934,
§ 628(b), 47 U.S.C. § 548(b)] references to satellite cable and satellite
broadcast programming may reveal the primary evil that Congress had in
mind, nothing in the statute unambiguously limits the Commission to
regulating anticompetitive practices in the delivery of those kinds of
programming by methods addressed to that narrow concern alone.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79).
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We often analogize those who drafted our basic, or earliest,
or most important laws as parents.205 Like good parents, these
lawmakers expected, or should have expected, that subsequent
generations—their progenies—would build on their knowledge,
learn greater lessons, and see more clearly, deeply, and broadly
than the original legislators themselves were either capable or
willing. These subsequent generations may discern rightfully
fresh applications of earlier enactments—enlargements duly
comporting with the letter and dominant spirit of the original
law—in ways that the original enactors might not have
appreciated, or would even have resisted.206 Courts enforcing
non-BFOQ, discriminatory grooming codes as “reasonable”
employment bigotry reject the actuality that law, particularly
civil rights, may, indeed should, mature.
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205
E.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012)
(referring to “the Founding Fathers” who drafted the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights); Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 376 (4th Cir. 2003) (same).
206
A compelling instance is Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
176–77 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§§ 101(2), 1981(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071–72. Thirteen years earlier, the Court held in
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–69 (1976), that a provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, banning racial discrimination in contracts, regulates
private as well as governmental contracts. Patterson determined that even if the
Court had misapprehended the actual intent of the 1866 Congress, Runyon ought
not be reversed because, among other things, it rightly enforces the “prevailing sense
of justice” emanating from Congress’s choice of words and overarching theory of
fairness under § 1981. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174. Equally persuasively, writings of
James Madison evince a pivotal Founding Father attempting to reach not only his
fellows, but also more urgently his metaphorical children with an entreaty this
Article paraphrases as: If I and my contemporaries have done well, do not rest
complacently on our laurels, but rather learn from what we have done and do better.
Specificially, in a remarkably little quoted essay, Madison stated that proposition
with regard to the proposed Constitution itself, “[T]he leaders of the
[r]evolution . . . pursued a new and . . . noble course. . . . They reared the fabrics of
governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of
a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and
perpetuate.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 88–89 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961) (emphasis added). Nearly forty years after the
Constitution’s ratification, Madison expressed a similar hope. “And I indulge a
confidence that sufficient evidence will find its way to another generation, to ensure,
after we are gone, whatever of justice may be withheld whilst we are here.” John D.
Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty,
and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 321 n.906 (quoting Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 24, 1826)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Title VII Leads Rather Than Lags

The foregoing further teaches that Title VII does not merely
codify contemporary societal concepts of legitimate versus
illegitimate discrimination.
Rather, Title VII leads and
transforms, compelling persons and groups either to change their
bigoted attitudes or, at the very least, learn to abide by a legal
order that will no longer tolerate acting out such prejudices. In
this regard, Title VII leads; it does not lag.207 That is, the Act
cuts the greatest path possible, allowing all who are victims a
route to relief. The Act does not simply languish, waiting for a
more progressive legislature or a more tolerant society to declare:
Now, at last, is the time you no longer must endure the
discrimination considered acceptable by the traditionalist general
population, conformist social groups, chauvinistic employers, or
even a fundamentalist Congress.
In that regard, worth emphasizing again, the Oncale Court
recognized that Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in the form
of male-on-male harassment directed against a man considered
not conventionally masculine due to his purportedly womanly,
possibly homosexual manner.208 It was hardly clear that all,
most, or many Americans just before the turn of the present
century would have agreed with the unanimous Court that
federal law does and should protect purportedly effeminate or
homosexual males, especially given that homosexuals are not a
statutorily protected class.209 Such reality did not influence the
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Researchers understand the actuality of this point by contrasting areas
wherein the judiciary is not expert. For instance, “courts may only admit the state of
science as it is. Courts are cautioned not to admit speculation, conjecture, or
inference that cannot be supported by sound scientific principles. ‘The courtroom is
not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort. Law lags science; it
does not lead it.’ ” Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996)).
208
Similarly, several courts have held that “discrimination against a
transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination,
whether it's described as being on the basis of sex or gender.” Glenn, 663 F.3d at
1317 (Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause decision, citing other cases);
see supra note 204 and accompanying text reviewing similar precedent.
209
While individuals may aver colorable unlawful sexual stereotyping based on
employers’ sex-based perceptions regarding such individuals’ actual or seeming
homosexuality, it remains true that under Title VII, homosexuals are not an
expressly protected class. Thus, “[a] claim premised on sexual-orientation
discrimination . . . does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Gilbert
v. Country Music Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing Vickers v.
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A statute should not be extended by construction beyond the
correction of evils sought by it. There is a peril in interpreting
statutes in accordance with presumed legislative purpose,
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Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also, e.g., Dawson v.
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005).
210
As the Fifth Circuit noted nearly a half-century ago, “[I]t would be totally
anomalous . . . to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers [—the
public—] to determine whether the [challenged] sex discrimination was valid.
Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to
overcome.” Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971);
accord EEOC v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1039 n.12 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir.
1982) (same); EEOC v. St. Anne’s Hosp. of Chi., Inc., 664 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir.
1981) (same).
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Justices to suppress Title VII’s plain text and first
principle—discrimination is unlawful unless justified under the
BFOQ defense or some other textually explicit exemption—until,
if ever, empirical research evinced extensive or at least
considerable popular support for Joseph Oncale’s claim or until
Congress decided to add a provision specifically addressing the
Oncale context.
The foregoing discussion of the Supreme Court’s three
directives disproves the mutability and unequal burden doctrines
and, indeed, any similar principle based on a theory of trivial
violations. Hopkins and Oncale underscore that, pursuant to
Congress’s explicit and deliberate definition of discrimination,
practices no longer lawful may nonetheless remain the prevailing
preferences of one or more groups, businesses, industries,
organizations, or communities. For some, perhaps many or even
most, a particular opinion—such as the opinion that women
should wear makeup—may be long and deeply held, steeped in
the sincere belief that such is the natural or better order of
things.
Yet, no less than generally reviled prejudices,
discrimination cloaked by homely wisdom and conventional
prudence is exactly what Title VII abrogates.210 In bleak
contrast, unequal burden theory vindicates blatant sex and race
stereotyping simply on the premise that the reviewing judges
accept such sentiment as at least “reasonable” and discern no
ensuing “unequal” or “unequal” burdens.
Acknowledging, as it must, the foregoing principles, one
noted legal encyclopedia offered a prudent caution:

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 39 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_BAYER

2015]

3/29/2016 4:26 PM

DEBUNKING JUDICIAL MYTHS

465

particularly given that most statutes represent a compromise of
purposes advanced by competing interest groups, not an
unmitigated attempt to stamp out a particular evil.211

Surely aware of the above admonition, the Supreme Court’s
applicable law, especially Oncale, evinces a core point: Whatever
political history and pragmatic compromises might inform Title
VII’s enacting,212 Congress intended that, to the fullest extent its
language and structure permit, the Act truly comprises “an
unmitigated attempt to stamp out a particular evil [specifically,
employment discrimination based on the five statutorily

211

73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 71 (2015) (footnotes omitted).
Although scrupulously debated on its merits prior to enactment, see supra
note 111, the origin of Title VII was not without political drama. E.g., Michael Z.
Green, Proposing A New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years:
Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 312
n.14, 323 n.51-52, 325 n.59 (2001) (history and political considerations attendant to
Title VII) (cited in Lamont E. Stallworth & Daniel J. Kaspar, Employing the
Presidential Executive Order and the Law to Provide Integrated Conflict
Management Systems and ADR Processes: The Proposed National Employment
Dispute Resolution Act (NEDRA), 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 171, 187 n.69
(2013)); John G. Stewart, When Democracy Worked: Reflections on the Passage of The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 145 (2014–15). For instance, the
inclusion of “sex” as a prohibited employment criterion notoriously occurred not
through careful drafting by either congressional proponents or expert committees,
but rather as a floor amendment proposed by Representative Howard Smith as a
last ditch, and clearly failed, effort to defeat passage. E.g., Bayer, supra note 4 at
848–52 (noting, among other things, that contrary to the views of some courts and
commentators, the legislative history of the “Smith Amendment” reveals serious and
thoughtful arguments that likely influenced Congress to take the extraordinary step
of adding “sex” as an additional protected class without first holding full
investigatory hearings); Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of
Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1338–41
(2014) (same).
To cite another prominent example, to secure passage, the Act’s proponents
acceded to demands that, unlike many expert agencies authorized to enforce
specialized laws, the EEOC lacks full enforcement powers. While the agency can
bring lawsuits under its auspices, it cannot administratively resolve private claims.
Rather, somewhat like mediators, the EEOC may attempt to conciliate disputes, but
cannot perform quasi-judicial fact-finding leading to enforceable rulings as can, for
instance, the National Labor Relations Board and the Social Security
Administration. Frank Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946, 955–56 (7th Cir. 1981)
(noting political compromises that enabled the passage of Title VII). Similarly, while
it can issue guidelines worthy of deference, unlike many agencies the EEOC cannot
promulgate regulations with the force of statutory law. Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111 n.6, (2002) (“[W]e have held that the EEOC’s interpretive
guidelines do not receive Chevron deference.”); Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2003).
212
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prohibited criteria].”213 Accordingly, given the foregoing Supreme
Court explications illuminating the Act’s text, purpose, and
policy, judges have no competence to uphold non-BFOQ
discriminatory employment rules as inoffensive and unobtrusive.
5.

The Meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)—Congress
Reiterates Title VII’s “First Principle”

Reversing perhaps an unprecedented number of Supreme
Court decisions,214 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991.215 Of particular significance herein, section 107, codified as
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), reads, “Except as otherwise provided in

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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213
73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 71 (2015); see also Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City,
248 F.3d 465, 473 n.6 (10th Cir. 2011).
214
Congress overturned eight separate opinions issued in 1989, evincing that
Congress was so disappointed in then-recent Supreme Court rulings that it enacted
major statutory reformation within the rather short span of two years. As one
federal district court recounted:
The Act overturns or modifies eight recent Supreme Court decisions:
(1) Section 101 overturns the decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), as regards the scope
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 [limiting § 1981’s ban against racial discrimination in
contracting solely to the formation of contracts]; (2) Sections 104 and 105
overturn the decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642,
109 S. Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989), regarding the legal standards
controlling disparate impact cases; (3) Section 107 overturns the decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d
268 (1989) [regarding its holding that a defendant states a complete defense
in a mixed-motive action if it can prove it would have made the same
adverse employment decision absent discriminatory animus]; (4) Section
108 overturns the decision in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 109 S.Ct. 2180,
104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989), as regards the permissibility of collateral
challenges to affirmative action plans in consent decrees and court orders;
(5) Section 109 overturns the decision in EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244,
111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991), as regards the applicability of Title
VII in overseas workplaces; (6) Section 112 overturns the decision in
Lorance v. AT & T, 490 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 2261, 104 L.Ed.2d 961 (1989)
[Title VII’s statute of limitations to challenge a seniority system begins to
run when the system initially was adopted]; (7) Section 113 overturns the
decision in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,
111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) [no recovery of experts’ fees as part
of recovery of attorneys’ fees]; and (8) Section 114 overturns the decision in
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 92 L.Ed.2d 250
(1986) [Congress did not waive under Title VII Federal Government’s
traditional immunity from interest]. The general effect of the CRA was to
restore the law to the state at which it existed prior to these decisions.
Smith v. Petra Cablevision Corp., 793 F. Supp. 417, 419 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(emphasis added).
215
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (emphasis added).
Indeed, the amendment’s history specifically references Congress’s intent to
return to the status quo ante of 1964. As the 1991 Congress accented, “When
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made clear that it intended to
prohibit all invidious consideration of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin in
employment decisions.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 17, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 710 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Congress passed § 2000e-2(m)
to restore Title VII’s original purpose banning non-BFOQ discrimination.
218
Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 217 (3d. Cir. 2000).
219
See infra notes 230–32 and accompanying text.
220
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
221
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 16–17, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,
709–10.
222
490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989); see supra notes 165–86 and accompanying text
(discussing the Hopkins Court’s analysis of sexual stereotyping under Title VII and
other aspects untouched by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
217
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this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.”216
This Article urges that, as elucidated by its legislative
history, § 2000e-2(m)’s fairly clear language is Congress’s
reaffirmation of Title VII’s first principle: Unless justified by an
express textual exception, the Act proscribes all employment
discrimination predicated on any of the five forbidden
classifications, regardless of whether with purported ease the
affected employees can comply with the employer’s
discriminatory standard.217 While, with some aptness, courts
have stated, “we certainly do not pretend that the text of Section
107(a) [§ 2000e-2(m)] speaks with unmistakable clarity,”218 and
there is some disagreement regarding § 2000e-2(m)’s coverage,219
§ 2000e-2(m)’s purpose was and remains unmistakable: The very
introduction into an employment transaction of race, sex, color,
national origin, or religion comprises a discrete, remediable
violation of the Act.220
Congress put the proposition
straightforwardly: The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reaffirms that
discrimination is itself an unequal burden.221
Doubtless Congress adopted § 2000e-2(m) to overturn the
portion of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that accorded a complete
statutory defense in mixed-motive cases.222 In a mixed-motive
case, the given record proves that the employer imposed the
particular adverse employment action, both to further one or
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more discriminatory purposes and to foster one or more lawful
ends.223 Hopkins ruled that to prevail, a plaintiff does not have to
prove that unlawful discrimination was the sole motive
underlying the challenged adverse employment decision.224
However, the Court erroneously declared that employers enjoy
complete exoneration—a full statutory rebuttal—if the record
shows that they would have taken the same adverse employment
actions absent their discriminatory motives.225
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) reversed that portion of Hopkins. As
the Supreme Court succinctly but tellingly held, “Section
2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only
‘demonstrat[e]’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration
with respect to ‘any employment practice.’ ”226 Naturally, lower
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223
As the Sixth Circuit explained, “[C]laims brought pursuant to Title
VII . . . are often categorized as either single-motive claims, i.e., when an illegitimate
reason motivated an employment decision, or mixed-motive claims, when ‘both
legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision.’ ” Wright v. Murray
Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003)).
224
As the Court in Hopkins noted:
We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a
statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words “because
of,” Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role
played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment
decision she challenges. We conclude, instead, that Congress meant to
obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon sex-based
considerations in coming to its decision.
490 U.S. at 241–42. Indeed, in 1964 the enacting Congress rejected a proposed
amendment that would have limited Title VII’s coverage to discrimination based
solely on any of the forbidden classifications. See Bayer, supra note 4, at 781.
225
The Hopkins Court held:
To say that an employer may not take gender into account is not, however,
the end of the matter, for that describes only one aspect of Title VII. The
other important aspect of the statute is its preservation of an employer's
remaining freedom of choice. We conclude that the preservation of this
freedom means that an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that,
even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the
same decision regarding a particular person.
490 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).
226
Costa, 539 U.S. at 98 (alteration in original) (quoting portions of
§ 2000e-2(m)). A decade later, the Court reiterated that plaintiffs establish Title VII
claims “based solely on proof that race, color, religion, sex, or nationality was a
motivating factor in the employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (2013) (emphasis added) (ruling that § 2000e-2(m) does not
apply to retaliation cases brought pursuant to § 2000e-3(a)). Consistent with the
extensive breadth of Title VII, the Costa Court further ruled that plaintiffs may
prove mixed-motive cases through circumstantial evidence, direct evidence, or both.
Regarding these two forms of proof, “The term ‘direct evidence,’ . . . is simply
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courts echoed the Supreme Court’s crucial determination of
§ 2000e-2(m)’s comprehensive meaning.227 For instance, the
Fourth Circuit aptly declared, “Pursuant to the 1991 Act, the
impermissible factor need not have been the sole factor. As long
as it motivated the adverse action, the plaintiff can establish an
unlawful employment practice.”228
True, Congress markedly limited recovery under
§ 2000e-2(m) if the defendant proves that it would have taken the
same employment action even absent discriminatory intent, thus
demonstrating that the discriminatory intent was not the
“but-for” cause of the employer’s unlawful conduct.229 Moreover,
some courts believe that § 2000e-2(m) covers only mixed-motive
claims while others believe it has a broader application.230
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evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference
or presumption.” Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing
Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys. Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2004));
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2004)). Such direct proof often derives from
defendant’s outright admission of unlawful bias, although not necessarily directed
against the particular plaintiff. “The term ‘circumstantial evidence,’ on the other
hand, is ‘proof of a chain of facts and circumstances’ indicating the existence of a
fact, United States v. Curry, 187 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted),
or ‘[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.’
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (8th ed. 2004).” Id.
227
See, e.g., Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, No. 14-14596, 2016 WL
158820128, at *4–5, (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016); Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).
228
Id. at 318. The Ninth Circuit identically explained, “Indeed, the language of
Title VII and well-settled case law establish that an employer will be held to have
committed an unlawful employment practice when the plaintiff ‘demonstrates
that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.’ ” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t,
424 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Three years later, the Second Circuit echoed, “An
employment decision, then, violates Title VII when it is ‘based in whole or in part on
discrimination.’ ” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Third
Circuit likewise noted that “[s]ection 107(a) [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)]
mandates a finding of liability whenever an illegitimate factor motivates an adverse
employment action.” Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir.
2000).
229
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012). Accordingly, when limited solely to
§ 2000e-2(m) proof, plaintiffs may recover “declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and
costs, and some forms of injunctive relief . . . but the employer’s proof that it would
still have taken the same employment action would save it from monetary damages
and a reinstatement order.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526.
230
In 2003, the Supreme Court noted, “This case does not require us to decide
when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context.” Costa, 539 U.S. at
94 n.1. The Court has yet to address that matter. Regarding the split in authority,
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Courts have also disagreed over which evidentiary or
“burden-shifting” standards to apply under summary
judgment.231 And, it still may be an open question whether
§ 2000e-2(m) comprises a separate statutory cause of action or
purely elucidates the meaning—the coverage—of § 2000e-2,
although the Supreme Court has suggested the latter.232
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the Ninth Circuit held, “Following the 1991 amendments, characterizing the
evidence as mixed-motive instead of single-motive results only in the availability of a
different defense, a difference which derives directly from the statutory text. . . .”
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d on
other grounds, 539 U.S. 90; see also, e.g., Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 n.5
(3d Cir. 2009); Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d
1180, 1195 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987,
992 (D. Minn. 2003). Some courts, by contrast, have held that § 2000e-2(m) applies
only to mixed-motive cases. E.g., Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 215–16 (3d Cir.
2008) (holding that a plaintiff who is not minimally qualified for the job is not
entitled to mixed-motive instruction); Ginger v. Dist. of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340,
1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Watson,
207 F.3d at 218–20; Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141–42 (4th Cir. 1995); cf.
Davis v. City of Clarksville, 492 F. App’x 572, 578 n.7 (6th Cir. 2012) (inferring that
§ 2000e-2(m) only applies to mixed-motive cases). Interestingly and convincingly,
after careful review of applicable precedents, one noted scholar determined that this
circuit split is more conceptual than practical:
It has been true virtually from the beginning that [Title VII] does not
actually require a showing that discrimination is the “single motive” of the
employer in order to establish liability. . . . So, the plaintiff never needs to
prove that discrimination was the only motive or cause of the employer’s
challenged action. That means that liability can be established in all Title
VII cases with a showing that is less than sole cause.
Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead,
Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1923 (2004). For what it is worth,
this Article agrees with Professor Zimmer and adds only that even assuming there is
an actual, sensible difference among plaintiff’s Title VII claims, decisions limiting
§ 2000e-2(m)’s application to mixed-motive cases unduly restrain the reach Congress
unequivocally intended that subsection to exercise.
231
See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 397–401 (6th Cir. 2008)
(detailing different federal circuit court’s respective rulings).
232
In 2003, the Supreme Court inferred the existence of a discrete claim stating
that § 2000e-2(m), “first establishes an alternative for proving that an ‘unlawful
employment practice’ has occurred.” Costa, 539 U.S. at 94. Although possibly dictum,
the Court more recently concluded that “§ 2000e-2(m) is not itself a substantive bar
on discrimination. Rather, it is a rule that establishes the causation standard for
proving a violation defined elsewhere in Title VII.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530; see
also Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, No. 14-14596, 2016 WL 158820, at *5,
(11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016) (accepting Nassar’s statement as a legal ruling). Professor
Sperino sensibly denoted that portion of Nassar as “clarify[ing] the relationship
between different portions of Title VII.” Sandra F. Sperino, Beyond McDonnell
Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 257, 261 n.34 (2013). Accordingly,
§ 2000e-2(m) may not be a separate cause of action, but rather a clarification that
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This flurry of interpretive dilemmas, however, is irrelevant
to the manifest significance of § 2000e-2(m) with regard to
unequal burden theory.233
The congressional report
accompanying the legislation explicitly affirms that if enacted,
§ 2000e-2(m) would “restore the rule applied in many federal
circuits prior to the Hopkins decision that an employer may be
held liable for any discrimination that is actually shown to play a
role in a contested employment decision.”234 In that regard,
§ 2000e-2(m)’s legislative history is unequivocal and consistent:
“[A]ny reliance on prejudice in making employment decisions is
illegal.”235
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plaintiffs can prevail under § 2000e-2 without proving that animus was the but-for
cause of defendants’ actions; although absent but-for causation, the plaintiff’s
recovery is limited to noncompensatory relief. See supra note 229 and accompanying
text.
233
This Article agrees with Dean Van Detta that § 2000e-2(m) was born of
Congress’s frustration with the problematic judicial tendency to limit, through
unnecessarily complex interpretations, Title VII’s language explicitly outlawing
nonexcepted employment discrimination. His cogent lament is worth fully quoting:
[E]ven if there could have been some debate about the full reach of Title
VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 put an end to such debate. The legislative
purpose of the law that gave us section 703(m) was clearly stated, although
little recognized by many amici appearing before the Supreme Court in
Costa. The Act’s purpose is “to provide appropriate remedies for intentional
discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace” in response to
the congressional finding that “legislation is necessary to provide additional
protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.” This is the
congressional equivalent of hitting the bench and bar about the head with a
two-by-four. The haggling and nit-picking that the courts and
commentators have engaged in, trying to maintain the iconic position of the
1973-1989 Supreme Court decisions, is most misplaced in the face of
language of such sweeping breadth and expansive purpose. The legislative
purpose laid out by Congress is quite obvious: to clear the litigation path
for Title VII plaintiffs of the underbrush that the Supreme Court had
planted and tended like some tangled, insular English garden.
Van Detta, supra note 18, at 124 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2(3), 3(1), 105 Stat. 1071). Dean Van
Detta’s rebuke likewise might be applied to the courts’ disagreement regarding the
reach of § 2000e-2(m). Certainly, Congress intended the furthest possible range of
application to realize Title VII’s first principle.
234
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 48 (1991) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586 (Committee on Education and Labor); see also Zimmer, supra
note 230, at 1946 (quoting legislative history); supra notes 222–35 and
accompanying text (quoting Supreme Court and lower court rulings that, pursuant
to § 2000e-2(m), Title VII prohibits any nonexempted discrimination motivated by
animus against the any of the five protected classes).
235
H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (II), at 2 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,
(emphasis added). Identically, the debate comments of one of Congress’s most
respected members regarding civil rights, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy,

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 42 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_BAYER

472

3/29/2016 4:26 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:401

Indeed, § 2000e-2(m)’s legislative history reaffirms Title
VII’s core point, “If Title VII’s ban on discrimination in
employment is to be meaningful, proven victims of intentional
discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of
discrimination must be held liable for their actions.”236 Likewise,
accenting the amendment’s breadth, Congressman Fish assured
his colleagues, “This legislation gives expression to our
recognition that discriminatory practices must be discouraged
regardless of whether they turn out to be outcome
determinative.”237 Consistent with the history informing the
original 1964 enactment,238 nothing in these legislative
statements evince in the slightest that Congress wished to allow
the judiciary either to dilute or to limit § 2000e-2’s ban against
discrimination by excepting facially discriminatory policies under
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underscore Congress’s intent to return Title VII to its first principle: “[A]ny reliance
on prejudice in making employment decisions is illegal . . . .” 136 CONG. REC. 1655
(Feb. 7, 1990) (Sen. Kennedy’s memorandum section entitled Making Clear That Job
Bias is Always Illegal, introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1990). Five months later,
Senator Kennedy accented, “As one of our legal experts testified, the [Hopkins]
decision sent a message to employers that ‘a little discrimination is OK.’ The Civil
Rights Act repairs that hole by affirming that the law is violated whenever
discrimination contributes to an employment decision.” Id. at 16,705 (statement of
Sen. Kennedy). Many other legislators robustly endorsed Senator Kennedy’s
understanding. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 21,984 (statement of Rep. Traficant) (“If
the Price Waterhouse decision is not overturned, then we send the message that
there is nothing wrong with a little overt racism or sexism . . . . We must reaffirm
the principle that title VII tolerates no discrimination.”); id. at 21,993 (statement of
Rep. Collins) (“[The bill] makes it clear that intentional discrimination is never
acceptable, whether as a primary factor or otherwise.”); 137 CONG. REC. 20,026 (Nov.
7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (“[The bill] overturns the Price Waterhouse
decision thus making any reliance on prejudice illegal.”); Id. at 13,541 (statement of
Rep. Cardin) (“The civil rights bill specifies that it is illegal for intentional
discrimination to be any factor in the employment process.”); see also Heather K.
Gerken, Note, Understanding Mixed Motives Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of
1991: An Analysis of Intentional Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped
Interview Questions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1843 n.104 (1993).
236
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II), at 18, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, at 711;
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (I), at 47, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585–86
(Committee on Education and Labor).
237
137 CONG. REC. 30,667 (remarks of Rep. Fish). Representative Fish
expressed the principle as a matter of justice, certainly one of Title VII’s pivotal
considerations: “The Price Waterhouse problem must be rectified because it is unjust
for our courts to ignore reliance on discriminatory employment criteria simply
because an employer can show that ‘its legitimate reason, standing alone, would
have induced it to make the same decision.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). See generally
Gerken, supra note 235, at 1840–45 (discussing § 2000e-2(m)’s legislative history).
238
See supra notes 111, 120 and accompanying text.
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an unequal burden regime nowhere found within the Act.
Rather, Congress reasserted in 1991 what it had directed in
1964: Because “discriminatory practices must be discouraged,”239
any prejudice is unlawful except if it is allowed by a textual
exception.240
Section 2000e-2(m), then, reasserts Title VII’s first principle
Neither
that discrimination itself is redressable injury.241
239

See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, “Both the Senate and the House rejected amendments
[particularly one proposed by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R. Kan.)] that would have
strengthened the standard by requiring a showing that discrimination was a ‘major
contributing factor’ for the hiring decision.” See Gerken, supra note 235, at 1844
(discussing the text of the Kassebaum Amendment, which expired on the floor
without a vote); 136 CONG. REC. H6,784–85 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (rejecting the
LaFalce-Michel-Goodling substitute). But see id. at S15,366 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Jeffords) (arguing that there is little difference between the terms
“major contributing fact” and “motivating factor”). Technically, adoption of the
Kassebaum Amendment would not diminish § 2000e-2(m)’s implicit repudiation of
unequal burden theory because applicable grooming codes and their ilk are per se
discriminatory, thereby more than satisfying the amendment’s proposed “major
contributing factor” language. Nonetheless, rejection of that amendment evinces
Congress’s refusal to see its statutory definition of discrimination either weakened
or narrowed. Therefore, the Kassebaum Amendment’s demise bolsters the argument
that through § 2000e-2(m), Congress reaffirmed Title VII’s “first principle”
prohibiting all discrimination not expressly excepted by the Act’s text itself.
241
Worth accenting in this regard is the forceful Supreme Court constitutional
corollary, elucidated contemporaneously with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and completely consistent with the meaning of the subsequently enacted
§ 2000e-2(m), that discrimination itself—discrimination qua discrimination—is
injurious per se. In a remarkably brief four pages, Anderson v. Martin invalidated
Louisiana’s requirement identifying the race of candidates on election ballots,
pursuant to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964). Arguably, Louisiana’s law engendered an
unconventional form of discrimination because all voters regardless of race were
informed of the race of all candidates. Id. at 402. Thus, outwardly, neither
candidates nor voters were disparately affected due to their respective races.
Nonetheless, the Court stated:
[B]y placing at [sic] racial label on a candidate at the most crucial stage in
the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—the State
furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to
operate against one group because of race and for another. This is true
because by directing the citizen’s attention to the single consideration of
race or color, the State indicates that a candidate’s race or color is an
important—perhaps paramount—consideration in the citizen’s choice,
which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial
lines. . . . The vice lies . . . in the placing of the power of the State behind a
racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court discerned no legitimate reason to offset the State’s
discriminatory contrivance. Id. at 403 (“We see no relevance in the State’s pointing
up the race of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office. Indeed, this
240
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§ 2000e-2(m)’s language nor its emphatic legislative history
allows courts to construct within the Act realms of lawful
discriminatory conduct that fails to satisfy an express textual
Reestablishing what Congress
defense or exemption.242
understood to be Title VII’s meaning when originally passed in
1964, § 2000e-2(m) tells us without hesitation or equivocation
that because discrimination is itself an injury, the offending
employer is obligated to remedy that injury even if indulging
discriminatory animus was neither that employer’s primary or
but-for motive—indeed, even if discriminatory intent was the
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factor in itself ‘underscores the purely racial character and purpose’ of the statute.”).
Of great significance, the challengers did not have to prove that Louisiana’s law
actually influenced voters in any fashion. Rather, the State’s introduction of race
into the electoral process comprised the constitutional violation. See Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 252 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Anderson
clarified that states cannot “encourage citizens to cast their votes solely on the basis
of race”); Rosen v. Brown, No. 1:88CV2973, 1990 WL 384957, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
7, 1990) (understanding Anderson to mean that states cannot turn official forms
such as ballots into “a state-furnished vehicle through which prejudice may be
aroused”). Likewise, in 1964, the Supreme Court substantively affirmed a threejudge district court ruling invalidating Virginia statutes that mandated, as a clerical
matter, separating voter lists and property tax assessments by race. Hamm v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 157 (E.D. Va.) (three-judge panel), aff’d sub
nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam). Even assuming such existed,
the Hamm court would not have been impressed by data showing no ill effects from
the simple racially-based separation of inventories. Citing, among other things,
Anderson, the judges reasoned:
[I]t [is] axiomatic that no State can directly dictate or casually promote a
distinction in the treatment of persons solely on the basis of their color. To
be within the condemnation, the governmental action need not effectuate
segregation of facilities directly. The result of the statute or policy must not
tend to separate individuals by reason of difference in race or color.
Id. at 157 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Although infrequently cited, recent
Justices of arguably dissimilar legal philosophies have extoled Anderson’s expansive
understanding of official invidious discrimination as inherently injurious. Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 460 (2008) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 532 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 186 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130, 159 n.20 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). When it enacted the Civil Rights Act
in 1964, the very year that the Court delivered Anderson, Congress understood that
discrimination in the private context, as in the governmental milieu, is injurious by
definition. Heart of Atl. Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). See
generally supra note 41. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 generally and the portion
encoded as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) specifically simply but resolutely maintain the
legacy of the 1964 Congress and Supreme Court. See supra notes 234–40 and
accompanying text (discussing the legislative histories of Title VII, in general, and
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), in particular).
242
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
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least of its motivations.243 This congressional principle of decency
is at odds with any judicial doctrine that Title VII permits
purportedly “reasonable,” non remedial discriminatory conduct.244
Especially considering the breadth of coverage afforded under
§ 2000e-2(m), had Congress wished to constrain the Act’s
comprehensive definition of unlawful discrimination by excluding
non-BFOQ conduct that reviewing judges consider “reasonable,”
it would have so stated explicitly.245
C.

Dignity Theory Explains Why Disparate Grooming Policies
Are Significantly Injurious

The foregoing has presented essentially a text-based
approach challenging the legitimacy of unequal burden theory.
Still, while constitutionally required to respect explicit statutory
texts and manifest legislative intent,246 doubtless judges are duty
bound as well to judge,247 which includes eschewing “unthinking

243

Id.
When necessary to alleviate proven discrimination, the Act expressly allows
remedial measures based on otherwise forbidden criteria. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see, e.g.,
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (court
ordered race-based affirmative action plans); Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 504 (1986) (holding that Title VII does not preclude
“entry of a consent decree which provides relief that may benefit individuals who
were not victims of the defendant’s discriminatory practices”); United States v.
Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2011). Moreover, due to its remedial
purposes, the judiciary properly has recognized a limited, albeit extratextual regime,
of “voluntary affirmative action” without requiring employers and unions first to
risk liability by declaring that the conditions to which an affirmative action plan is
addressed constitute extant violations of Title VII. See supra note 161 and
accompanying text.
245
In that regard, it surely is significant that the only portion of the Hopkins
decision Congress thought worth overturning was the holding that to be remediable,
proven discrimination must have been the “but-for” cause of the defendant’s
challenged conduct. Congress left untouched the Hopkins Court’s recognition that
enforcing sex-based stereotypes can be unlawful even when the stereotyping
concerns plaintiffs’ demeanor, appearance, dress, and comportment, which are
apparently mutable characteristics—although the Court did not use that particular
term. See supra notes 165–86 and accompanying text. Given that when enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, of which § 2000e-2(m) was a part, Congress took the
extraordinary action of statutorily reversing in whole or part eight Supreme Court
cases, see supra note 214, had it thought claims such as Ms. Hopkins were
unreasonable and had it disagreed with the Court’s explicit reaffirmation that only
BFOQs can justify discrimination, Congress would have so clarified in its
amendments.
246
See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
247
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
244
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obedience to literalism”248 that would render an “absurd
result.”249 Such determinations, however, are not matters of
either judicial discretion or judges’ policy preferences but rather
questions of nice discernment tempered by the judiciary’s
constitutional function to enforce the given statute as thoroughly
as its meaning allows.250 Consequently, courts understand that
an absurd outcome is an “extraordinary consideration”251 arising
only when applications of the given text would seriously
compromise that text’s underlying purposes, not when courts
consider such applications to be poor policy. Therefore, as earlier
accented, “It is well established that ‘when the statute’s language
is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it
according to its terms.’ ”252
Pursuant to these rules of statutory interpretation,
invalidating non-BFOQ sex- and race-based appearance rules is
fully consistent with, indeed mandated by, Title VII’s
antidiscrimination principle. Courts, then, cannot refuse to so
enforce the Act even if they consider the resulting outcomes to be
curious, silly, or even unnerving.253 Rather, courts may only
uphold non-BFOQ discriminatory grooming and comportment

248

United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1961).
E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013).
250
The Supreme Court recently had occasion to reinforce these standards of
statutory interpretation in the contentious area of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), legislation
lacking the clarity of Title VII. Indeed, the Court referred to the ACA as “far from a
chef d’oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 n.
3 (2015) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441–42
(2014). King accented that reviewers must not construe statutory provisions in
isolation but rather, while the discrete langue of each portion is informative, the
statute must be understood as a statute, meaning, to the extent feasible, as an
integrated whole. Id. at 2489. Reference to “context” is essential whether to salvage
clarity from ambiguous text or to confirm the apparent clarity of the reviewed text.
Id. at 2489, 2494. Avoiding absurd results certainly is a contextual aspect of
statutory enforcement.
251
Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 10.
252
Tista v. Holder, 722 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lamie v. U.S.
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g.,
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000);
supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ duties to enforce
statutes as written).
253
See Doe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs of U.S., 519 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir.
2008).
249
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254

Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en

banc).
255
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Id. at 1112–13.
Id. at 1112. While sympathetic to the concept, this Article does not herein
advocate for a “freedom of dress” as does Professor Ramachandran, wherein
individuals might have viable claims based on the assertion that employers have no
presumed authority to compel employees to comport with the employers’ grooming
preferences regardless of whether those grooming preferences discriminate against
any statutorily protected class. See Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 23; see also
supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. Title VII’s text, design and policy
provides sufficient bases to disprove the grooming cases reliance on an unequal
burden theory. However, as a general matter, this author supports the argument
256

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 45 Side A

directives to preclude an absurd outcome. Accordingly, this
writing now turns from the compelling textual arguments
against the unequal burden doctrine to proof that applying the
Act’s first principle to invalidate discriminatory dress and
appearance rules is not absurd.
As a threshold point, contrary to the en banc Ninth Circuit’s
patently misplaced concern, abrogating grooming rules, or any
employment policy for that matter, would not, indeed could not,
be based on a Title VII standard “that every grooming, apparel,
or appearance requirement that an individual finds personally
offensive, or in conflict with his or her own selfimage . . . create[s] a triable issue of sex discrimination.”254
Rather, plaintiffs must plead and prove disparate treatment
based on a statutorily prohibited criterion not only to win, but
also at the initial pleading stage to state a colorable claim
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Likely plaintiffs often are motivated to sue pursuant to,
and in vindication of, their own “self-image.” But it is immaterial
whether they sue to obtain justice under Title VII, to attain
personal satisfaction, out of pure orneriness, on a dare, to indulge
the most conceited and eccentric of “self-images,” or for some
other reason no matter how evidently sensible or seemingly
peculiar. So long as they plausibly can aver and subsequently
prove that the challenged appearance policy is race or sex-based,
plaintiffs have good-faith causes of action that, if procedurally
sound, should succeed unless defendants establish a BFOQ.
Therefore, complaints must suitably allege that the
employer’s offending policies discriminate based on one or more
of Title VII’s forbidden criteria.255 Plaintiffs cannot simply claim
that the challenged employment rules abstractly are “personally
offensive.”256
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More importantly, again contrary to prevailing judicial
perceptions, individuals’ choice of dress, grooming, and other
indicia of appearance are not trivial decisions, but rather are
worthy of respect. As earlier explained, although discrimination
commonly adversely affects victims’ economic and professional
statuses, the Act prohibits as well criteria, standards, or
practices that insult, demean, stigmatize, humiliate, or similarly
harm employees and employment applicants.257 The theory is
straightforward: Absent BFOQ, employers may not use their
status and power to impose the harm of discrimination, not
because the harm injures a protected class, but because the harm
injures discrete individuals due to their membership in the
particular protected class. Ownership or management of an
enterprise no longer entails authority to deny the unique
personhoods—the “self-images,” to borrow the Ninth Circuit’s
term258—of each worker insofar as that unique “self-image” is
linked to race, sex, color, national origin, and religion.259
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that Congress may proscribe employment discrimination but may not limit
protection from such discrimination to a handful of special classes even if those
classes endure the most persistent and most common forms of discrimination. See,
Bayer, supra note 33. In that regard, employees and applicants would enjoy
“freedom to dress” when employers’ regulations arbitrarily limit such freedom.
257
As illustrated supra in notes 190–92, 201 and accompanying text, a
prominent example is hostile environment harassment based on the proposition
that, even absent “tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was
so severe or pervasive that it created a [hostile] work environment . . . offends Title
VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22
(1993). Indeed, the first such Supreme Court decision explained that Title VII
proscribes sexual harassment because, among other things, it is “demeaning and
disconcerting.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), quoted in
Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 757 (8th Cir. 2003).
258
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
259
Thus, for example, Price Waterhouse could not deny Ann Hopkins promotion
to partnership based on her singular combination of personal traits that led some
partners to consider her to be mannish and unfeminine. See supra notes 165–86 and
accompanying text. Equally, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. violated Title VII by
allowing Joseph Oncale’s coworkers, an entirely male work force, to harass him due
to their perception that the particular amalgam of behaviors comprising his
comportment rendered Mr. Oncale inappropriately womanly and seemingly
homosexual. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
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Thus, applying the established moral philosophy particularly
widespread in contemporary civil rights judicial opinions,260 Title
VII protects the personal dignity of employees and employment
applicants.261 Indeed, an early decision striking a male-only
hair-length policy expressed the idea with appropriate passion:
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260
See Bayer supra note 33, at 370–403 (discussing the moral underpinnings of
constitutional civil rights).
261
As the Federal Circuit properly explained, “The purpose of Title VII is not to
import into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to
liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby
to implement the goals of human dignity and economic equality in employment.”
King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994), quoted in Gallagher v. Delaney,
139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir.), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632, n.7 (2d Cir.
1997). Similarly, Justice Souter recognized, “There are definite parallels between,
say, a defamation action, which vindicates the plaintiff’s interest in good name, and
a Title VII suit, which arguably vindicates an interest in dignity as a human being
entitled to be judged on individual merit.” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 247
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (implicitly overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
Recently, the EEOC accented the link between Title VII and human dignity in an
EEOC decision invalidating a Department of the Army decision forbidding a
transgendered female from using the womens’ restrooms and requiring, instead,
that she use a unisex washroom that accommodates only one person at a time.
Lusardi v. McHugh, E.E.O.C. Dec. 0120133395 (E.E.O.C.), 2015 WL 1607756 (Apr.
1, 2015). The EEOC concluded:
But the harm to the Complainant goes beyond simply denying her access to
a resource open to others. The decision to restrict Complainant to a “single
shot” restroom isolated and segregated her from other persons of her
gender. It perpetuated the sense that she was not worthy of equal
treatment and respect … The Agency's actions deprived Complainant of
equal status, respect, and dignity in the workplace, and, as a result,
deprived her of equal employment opportunities. In restricting her access
to the restroom consistent with her gender identity, the Agency refused to
recognize Complainant's very identity. Treatment of this kind by one's
employer is most certainly adverse.
Id. at *10 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
Dignity, identically, has become the overarching concept informing
constitutional due process of law, both generally and as manifested in specifically
enumerated rights. E.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (noting that
the Eighth Amendment’s protection is understood in terms of “the Constitution’s
protection of human dignity”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693
(2013) (holding that section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional
because it “interfere[s] with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity
conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power”); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1213 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating Utah’s ban on same-sex
marriage and accenting the connection between substantive due process and the
dignity of marital relationships). See generally Bayer, supra note 33, at 391–96.
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When this Nation was settled it was hoped that there [would]
be established a society where every individual would be judged
according to his ability rather than who his father was, or what
foreign land his family came from, or which part of town he
happened to live in, or what the color of his skin was. . . . The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was born of that hope. Although the
legal technicalities are many, the message of the Act is
clear: every person is to be treated as an individual, with
respect and dignity.262

Accordingly, Title VII confounds “import[ing] into the
workplace the prejudices of the community”263 for “an employee’s
dignity might require standards higher than those of the
street.”264 Surely these astute and prudent observations are
consistent with, indeed integral to, Title VII’s first principle
proscribing all but textually excepted discrimination. Borrowing
the Federal Circuit’s phrasing, although Title VII’s words accord
no such exemption, unequal burden theory permits employers to
“import into the workplace the prejudices of the community,”265
thus affronting the dignity of workers and job applicants who
wish nothing other than to earn an honest living without
betraying their personhoods to assuage the class-based
prejudices of their employers.
1.

Dignity Requires Treating Persons as “Ends,” Not “Simply as
a Means”

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

262
Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(holding that employer’s male-only hair-length rule violated Title VII); see also
MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:44
(“Denial of job opportunities also results in a denial of dignity and political and
economic empowerment.”).
263
Hillen, 21 F.3d at 1582.
264
McCowan v. Software Spectrum, Inc., No. 08-00-00077-CV, 2002 WL 505138,
at *10 (Tex. App. Apr. 4, 2002). See generally supra notes 135–45, 261 and
accompanying text.
265
Hillen, 21 F.3d at 1582.
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The question becomes: What is “dignity?” Although subject
to varying definitions, this Article urges that dignity is best
exemplified by the moral theory of the noted Enlightenment
philosopher Immanuel Kant. Specifically, this Article joins the
many that embrace “Kantian ethics,” meaning understanding
and applying the overarching moral philosophy espoused by Kant
rather than implementing “Kant’s ethics;” that is, the outcomes
Kant himself likely would claim emanate from using his general
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moral schema to resolve discrete scenarios.266 While worthy of
fuller explication,267 his ideas may be summarized acceptably.
Kant argued that all persons possess innate, immutable “dignity”
derived from humankind’s unique, perhaps divinely bestowed,
capacity to seek and to discern moral truth through reason.268
Because morality is comprised of immutable, transcendent truth,
the correct moral answer is not a matter of, to use the prevailing
term, “striking a balance” to attain some perceived best available
outcome.269 Rather, as noted, the correct moral answer must be
discerned from reason regardless of the resulting outcome for any
answer based on either choosing a preferred outcome or avoiding
a disfavored result merely reveals the personal preferences of
either the commentator or some person or group discussed in the
commentator’s analysis.270
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266
See Bayer, supra note 33, at 347–48 (explaining the difference between
“Kantian ethics” and “Kant’s ethics”).
267
See id. at 346–58. See also Peter Brandon Bayer, The Individual Mandate’s
Due Process Legality: A Kantian Explanation, and Why It Matters, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 865, 896912 (2013), for a more complete elaboration of Kant’s theory of
morality and dignity.
268
Kant was a deontologist; that is, he believed that moral principles are a
priori, thus preceding the existence of humankind. Consequently, morality and its
applications to discrete situations are not humanly created but rather derive from
reason. See Bayer, supra note 267, at 888–96; see also Bayer, supra note 33, at
293–321 (defining terms and explaining why deontology rather than
utilitarianism—also known as consequentialism—correctly explicates morality). As
explained in the above-cited works, morality must be deontological rather than
based on utilitarian or consequentialist theories that the morally correct resolution
of a problem is the one that yields the greatest aggregate happiness or satisfaction.
The very short but compelling reason is that a philosophy of morality predicated on
what engenders the greatest happiness can only prove what all, most, or some
people want. Such philosophy cannot prove that what people want in fact is moral
except by the fiat of defining morality as some measure of aggregate happiness.
Empirically establishing popular preferences alone is not enough to prove why those
popular preferences are moral. For example, no matter how purportedly
sophisticated, any system of morals dependent on collective happiness renders
slavery, rape, and concentration camps moral if the happiness they engender either
generally, or for certain designated individuals or groups, exceeds the misery they
cause either generally, or for certain designated individuals or groups. Unless one
believes those abhorrent practices are made moral through popular acclamation,
proving the immorality of slavery, rape, and concentration camps must stem from
the only possible alternative: deontology’s precept that morality is transcendent,
apolitical, universally applicable, and not a human invention.
269
See Bayer, supra note 33, at 321.
270
See supra note 268 and accompanying text. Therefore, although their
conclusions regarding the rightness vel non of regulating dress, grooming and
comportment may be correct, critics who espouse the balancing inherent in
consequentialism fail to provide an objective, impartial basis to debunk the unequal
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burden theory. For instance, in support of her theory of “freedom of dress,” Professor
Ramachandran stated:
[T]he exercise of certain fundamental rights by workers must at least be
balanced against market forces and employer preferences, given that we
spend such a great deal of time at work and given that, after all, we are
balancing one right against another, such as property versus speech,
contract versus speech, or property versus privacy. When weighing
property and contract rights against other rights, a balance must be struck.
Ramachandran supra note 22, at 50–51 (footnote omitted). Professor
Ramachandran’s statement sounds reasonable until one notices that she does not
sufficiently explain how to perform the purported balancing of rights. Professor
Ramachandran argues eloquently about the link between personal appearance and
the individual’s core sense of self. Id. at 30–61. Upon that analysis, she urges a
familiar position that employers ought not have the authority through grooming
rules to require employees to betray their individual selves unless those rules are
necessary to maintain “core job functions and the core goals of the enterprise in
question” which, interestingly, she refers to as “unduly burden[ing] the industry as a
whole.” Id. at 62. She posits, therefore, that while restaurateurs rationally might
want waitstaff to wear prescribed uniforms, absent proof of “core job functions,”
rationality alone is insufficient to justify imposing such uniforms that could well
impinge on employees’ self-definitions. Professor Ramachandran supposes, perhaps
not illogically, that over time customers would not find it odd that waitstaff provide
their services while wearing clothing of their choice. Id. at 63. Her suppositions may
be empirically correct, but, her “balancing” approach does not really explain why the
employers’ sense-of-self enforced by requiring waitstaff to wear uniforms is less
important than the waitstaff’s sense-of-self except that the employer’s livelihood is
not truly dependent on waitstaff wearing uniforms, and possibly the argument that
the preferences of the many should surpass the preferences of few. The purported
right of employees to demand that the employer change her employment preferences
to preserve the employees’ self definitions is not self-evident as contrasted with the
purported right of the employer to fulfill her self-definition by directing every aspect
of her business.
In support of her position that rights compete and must be balanced,
Professor Ramachandran analogizes a right to housing that implies a corresponding
right of, say, an African-American individual to move into a neighborhood even if the
present homeowners do not want African-American neighbors. See id. at 51–52. Yet,
it is unclear why the accumulated preferences of the bigoted white residents ought
not trump the desire of the African-American would-be purchaser. To highlight this
point, it is worth noting that meaningful enjoyment of a home often concerns
becoming part of the social life of the neighborhood. Therefore, suppose bigoted
white homeowners refuse to invite their new African-American neighbor to their
parties, barbeques, and similar gatherings. It is unclear how Professor
Ramachandran’s balancing approach can tell us whether and why the AfricanAmerican resident’s annoyed white neighbors may or may not ostracize her from
participation in community social gatherings. Balancing cannot resolve whether the
“right” to live in a community trumps or falls to the privacy-based “right” to socialize
with whom we please because the only things that can be “balanced” are the degrees
to which the balancer likes or dislikes various outcomes. We might claim that we are
balancing the intensity of the respective interests of the various parties; but,
performing the balance means that we have to do one of two things. First, we can
discern the intensity of each party’s preferences without judging those preferences
and perform a simple mathematical calculation. If the total intensity of the bigoted
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Of course, persons are imperfect; therefore, their capacities
to fully comprehend morality are imperfect. However, it is the
capacity, not the actuality, of either striving for or attaining
correct moral judgment that renders persons dignified.271
Because human dignity arises from the facility to be moral,
rather than actual moral comportment itself, persons are entitled
to respect, meaning they must be treated in ways that do not
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neighbors is greater than the intensity of the African-American resident, the
neighbors win; if not, the resident wins. Thus, the moral answer according to the
foregoing process is, as consequentialism supposes, a function of empiricism. That
does not seem like a worthy moral basis for, as noted, such balancing would justify
anything. Alternatively, the balancer can decide whose preferences she thinks are
more laudable, thus worthy of enforcement, which, of course, is a subjective
judgment on the balancer’s part. To illustrate, let us presume, as may be likely, that
among the numerous alternatives, the balancer adopts two propositions: (1) The
right of the African-American individual to move into the white neighborhood
outweighs all the bigoted white homeowners’ preferences for racial exclusivity; but,
(2) those homeowners’ personal privacy interests in choosing friends and lovers
allow them to exclude the African-American resident from their private social
functions, such as backyard parties. When asked, the balancer says that she believes
those two propositions together comprise the right balance, but we must then
inquire, “Why?” She might state that the first propositon involves the homeowners’
property rights while the second proposition concerns something more substantial,
their personal right to choose friends. However, such labeling is not highly
informative because it is hardly clear that property rights are less momentous than
personal rights, or that indeed property interests do not involve personal concerns
and vice versa, as the issue of community social interaction demonstrates. The white
homeowners may aver that their personal interests, preferences and identity are
served by neither living near nor having to associate with minority individuals. The
African American may say that her self identity is demeaned if, due to her race, she
is excluded from both neighborhoods and local, private social events held within
those neighborhoods. It is not clear why a commentator would conclude that the
African American may not be demeaned through the denial of housing but may be
demeaned through exclusion from social events. The labeling of the former as
sounding in a property right and the latter as sounding in a privacy right provides
no explication. Accordingly, if the commentator responds, “Based on my life’s
experience and study, this is the balance that makes me feel best,” we must demand
a more objective analysis—her impartial, detached, objective bases underlying her
chosen balance. We insist that she justify her feelings with something other than her
feelings themselves. We need to understand the logic that led her to conclude that
the bigoted neighbors have no moral authority to prevent minority individuals from
purchasing homes but have the moral authority to demean those individuals by
excluding them from parties and similar social functions linked in whole or part to
neighborhood residency. Thus, a meaningful answer cannot be found in a balancing
of personal preferences masked as an impartial study of conflicting rights. Rather,
the solution must lie in some proposition of moral human behavior that is absolute,
that, as Kant rightly taught, stems from reason completely unmoored from the sum
of subjective predilections vindicated by the balancing process.
271
See Bayer, supra note 33, at 348–53.
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compromise their intrinsic dignity regardless of how they
actually behave.272
Accordingly, every individual has an
affirmative, immutable duty to treat all others in a dignified
fashion plus a corresponding immutable right to be so treated by
all others.273
The next matter is: How does one person respect the dignity
of another? Kant notably espoused two applicable, essential
formulae he called categorical imperatives.274 The first holds,
“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law.”275 Put perhaps too
simply, the first categorical imperative echoes the Golden Rule;
that is, your behavior towards others should be based on
standards applicable to all similarly situated persons.
Accordingly, if in response to Smith’s action, Jones takes another
action, then equally Smith, or any person, should be able to take
the action Jones took if Jones, or any similarly situated person,
performs the action Smith took.276
The first categorical imperative is necessary but insufficient
because while it eliminates hypocrisy, it does not assure that any
given “maxim” is a moral “universal law.”277 Thus, we need more;
272

See id. at 350–51.
See id. at 353–56. Indeed, such is the primary philosophical basis for the U.S.
Constitution’s Bill of Rights, particularly its general guarantee of due process of law.
See id. at 358–69 (discussing Kant’s third categorical imperative that to assure
moral order, persons must form societies controlled by overarching governments
predicated on preserving human dignity); id. at 370–403 (discussing American
constitutional law as an example of Kant’s third categorical imperative). In fact, the
revered American jurist and legal theorist Benjamin Cardozo “may have been
correct to say: ‘Our jurisprudence has held fast to Kant’s categorical
imperative . . . . We look beyond the particular to the universal, and shape our
judgment in obedience to the fundamental interest of society that contracts shall be
fulfilled.’ ” Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for the
Common Good, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1615 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 139–40 (1921)).
274
See Bayer, supra note 33, at 353–54.
275
See id. at 354.
276
For example, if Smith hits Jones because Jones insulted Smith, then Smith
can have no moral objections if Jones hits Smith should Smith comparably insult
Jones.
277
“The first formulation lacks a common neutral basis to judge whether the
proposed universal maxim is moral.” Bayer, supra note 33, at 355. For instance,
referring to the situation in note 276, Smith meets the first categorical imperative if
she believes not only that she may hit persons who insult her but also that she
rightly may be hit by anyone she similarly insults. See supra note 270. In that way,
Smith has not carved out a special moral rule for her own benefit that others may
not use against her. Smith’s commendable rejection of duplicity, however, does not
273
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indeed, the essence of Kantian morality is found in the acclaimed
second categorical imperative, “Act in such a way that you
always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the
same time as an end.”278 As that somewhat esoteric quote
logically informs, it is not per se immoral to treat persons as
“means.”
Indeed, human exchanges are predicated on
individuals and groups giving and receiving benefits. Rather,
persons cannot treat others “simply”—only—as “means.”
Persons must respect the dignity of those with whom they
interact by treating others as “end[s]” in themselves.279 “As
Professor Kutz compellingly invoked, ‘[Using] a person [solely]
[for another’s gain] does not sufficiently respect and take account
of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he
has.’ ”280
Accordingly, during our interactions, we respect the dignity
of others—treat them as ends—by not objectifying them, meaning
we do not regard them as though they were inanimate objects
existing only for the use and pleasure of whoever controls
The application to Title VII is evident:
When
them.281
discrimination is based on BFOQs, employers respect the dignity
of employees.282 The clear reason is that no person reasonably
may expect to be hired if she is incapable of performing the given
work. Rejecting unqualified applicants, then, is not using them
inappropriately, as thought they were inanimate.283 Similarly,
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prove that her principle—insults may be met with battery—is morally correct. All
that Smith has shown is that she willingly allows her “maxim” regarding insults to
be applied as a “universal law” applicable to all similarly situated others.
278
See KANT, supra note 38, at 96.
279
Bayer, supra note 272, at 899–903; see Bayer supra note 33, at 354–55.
280
Bayer, supra note 33, at 355–56 (alterations in original) (quoting Christopher
Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 256 (2007)
(quoting ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974)).
281
See id. at 354–58. We morally may use, even abuse, equipment and similar
impassive objects for they have no soul, no dignity, and no sense of self. Logically,
the immorality of abusing without permission somebody else’s object—property—is
not that we have affronted the object, but that the abuse affronts the other person
whose legitimate interest in the object should be respected.
282
See supra notes 133, 261 and accompanying text.
283
A classic example is a police undercover operation in which the race or sex of
the infiltrating officer is essential to success. Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400
F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968) (dictum). For instance, law enforcement might use
a Caucasian agent to infiltrate a “White supremist” organization. Under that
circumstance, a non-Caucasian officer’s dignity has not been demeaned because, due
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refusing to hire or to promote someone solely because she is not
the most qualified available applicant may aggravate and sadden
her. However, because maximizing efficiency is a legitimate
business concern, she has no principled expectation to be
preferred over a better job candidate. Choosing the better
applicant is classically, under Title VII, a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” evincing that, in fact, the given
employer’s decision was not based on an impermissible
criterion.284
In sum, absent BFOQs, employers have no moral
justification to discriminate, which is exactly as Congress
intended.285 Therefore, employers indulging non-BFOQ personal
or customer discriminatory preferences treat employees no better
than objects that exist uniquely for the gratification of those
employers and their patrons.
By imposing bigoted
predilections—stereotypes—that are not essential to business
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to her race or color, that officer simply could not perform the presumably legal and
legitimate job of infiltrating the racist group. Accordingly, the non-Caucasian officer
has no moral expectation—could not rationally agree—that race is an illegitimate
consideration regarding such undercover work. Thus, refusing to consider the nonCaucasian officer to be the infiltrator does not render her an implicit object to be
used for the gratification of her employer.
284
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Of course,
efficiency is not a sufficient basis to justify actual employment discrimination, such
as refusing to hire men who wear long hair. See supra notes 133–46, 261 and
accompanying text (discussing the BFOQ defense).
285
Left for another article is the compelling question whether in the first
instance, civil rights laws are immoral, and thereby unlawful. One might argue that
the government treats persons, even corporate individuals, as objects—as mere
means—by depriving them of the opportunity to use their own property to gratify
personal prejudices. After all, we allow persons to discriminate on virtually any
arguably arbitrary basis in other instances of intimate human interaction, such as
the selection of friends and lovers. Indeed, it may be a violation of the Due Process
Clauses and the First Amendment for government to compel personal
interrelationships. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (holding that the use of a state public accommodations
law to require participation in a privately sponsored parade on public thoroughfare
of an unwelcome group advocating for rights of homosexual and bisexual individuals
violated the First Amendment). Therefore, one might wonder whether moral
arguments demonstrate that, even with good intentions, government may not
outlaw employment discrimination. For now, this Article presumes what likely is the
correct conclusion: Civil rights acts, such as Title VII, are moral statutes that do not
treat violators only as means, not as ends in themselves. Cf. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 537 (1987) (finding that California’s public
accommodations civil rights law did not violate the First Amendment by requiring a
private organization of businessmen, the Rotary Club, to admit women as full
members).
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operations, businesses demean and humiliate individuals by
forcing them to accept the indignity of discrimination as the price
of employment. If there is no BFOQ, the employer cannot treat
employees merely as means—tools or objects—to gratify
unnecessary discriminatory predilections. By logical extension,
because it legalizes such non-BFOQ discrimination, unequal
burden theory defies the moral philosophy of Title VII by allowing
employers to treat employees and applicants merely as conduits
through which employers exercise their discriminatory
preferences.
2.

The Indignity of Non-BFOQ Grooming and Comportment
Rules

C M
Y K
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286
As noted, the unequal burden doctrine would be lawful if it averted “absurd”
applications of Title VII. See supra notes 247–52 and accompanying text.
287
See supra notes 76–90 and accompanying text.
288
604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
289
See Bayer, supra note 4, at 867 n.359 (discussing Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033).
290
Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032–33. The court explained, “While there is nothing
offensive about uniforms per se, when some employees are uniformed and others not
there is a natural tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser
professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal business clothes.”
Id. at 1033. Indeed, the deeply incensed Seventh Circuit avowed that it would have
struck the “career ensemble” scheme had only one of Talman’s female employees
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Because they offend the dignity of workers and employment
applicants, non-BFOQ appearance standards predicated on any
of the Act’s five forbidden criteria are unlawful per se.
Nonetheless, to underscore that such literal applications of Title
VII’s text are not absurd,286 this Article briefly explains the link
between human dignity and grooming. Indeed, even courts
embracing the unequal burden doctrine recognize that, in some
instances, dress and appearance rules can be unduly, thereby
unlawfully humiliating.287 A particularly strong example is
Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chicago,288
which struck the defendant-bank’s rule allowing male employees
to choose their own work-appropriate attire but requiring “female
employees . . . to wear [clothing] . . . selected from what the
employer euphemistically referred to as a ‘career ensemble.’ ”289
Because Talman presumed that women are too untrustworthy
and immature to select their own businesslike attire, the Seventh
Circuit concluded, “[T]he disparate treatment is demeaning to
women.”290 Several courts have followed Carroll’s rationale,
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particularly when the prescribed grooming or appearance
standard is sexually demeaning, provocative, or invites sexual
harassment.291
Consistent with Title VII’s antidiscrimination principle is
the substantial link between individual appearance and
individual identity.292 Specifically, “Our appearances are a
symbolic representation of our self-concepts and convey messages
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found the policy offensive enough to warrant a lawsuit. Id. Perhaps predictably,
seeking to salvage precedents such as the male-only hair-length decisions, the
Seventh Circuit accented that the sex-based humiliation in Carroll is not acceptable
in current society, thus it is more than Title VII allows employers to impose. By
contrast, “[s]o long as they find some justification in commonly accepted social norms
and are reasonably related to the employer’s business needs, such regulations are
not necessarily violations of Title VII even though the standards prescribed differ
somewhat for men and women.” Id. at 1032. The Carroll court’s attempted
distinguishing is, as the judiciary often says, a “distinction without a difference.”
E.g., Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013). Indeed, Carroll does not
demonstrate that Talman Bank’s “career ensemble” for women actually offends
“commonly accepted social norms.” It would not be surprising if sentiments circa
1979 found such sex discrimination acceptable or no more than mildly intrusive. One
can easily imagine the prevailing opinion to be that the issue is only about clothes
during work, and the women should “lighten up.” Furthermore, this Article has
debunked the idea that Title VII does not forbid discriminatory standards, even
those evoking “commonly accepted social norms . . . reasonably related to the
employer’s business needs.” Rather, such commonly are precisely the stereotypes
that Title VII proscribes.
291
See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th
Cir. 2010) (finding that a female employee who was deemed not pretty enough in a
“Midwestern girl” sense stated a claim under Title VII); Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that male-on-male
harassment based on sexual stereotyping was unlawful but that generally
reasonable sex-based dress and grooming standards were not necessarily unlawful
under Title VII); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir.
2000) (reasoning that the refusal of a bank to provide a cross-dressing male with a
loan application unless he wore male-appropriate attire could be a violation of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)); Knox v. Donahoe, No.
C-11-2596 EMC, 2012 WL 949030, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012) (holding that local
postal service office’s attire-rule directed solely at plaintiff did not result in unlawful
sex-based humiliation); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609 n.15
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that sexually provocative uniform for females humiliating
and caused harassment).
292
Because dignity herein is a function of personal identity, a brief definition of
“identity” is useful. “[I]dentity . . . can [be] define[d] as the particular values, beliefs,
and aspects of our selves that we deem so important we consider them self-defining.
Our aversions, desires, beliefs, and choices all make up our identity, but our identity
in turn then affects our aversions, desires, beliefs, and choices.” Ramachandran,
supra note 22, at 32 (emphasis omitted) (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISHMENT, 195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). Of
course, any individual’s choice of identity comes from some combination of genetic
and societal influences.
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to others about how we would like to be perceived.”293 The
significance of pride and self-respect attained through preferred
modes of appearance is difficult to exaggerate.294 Professor
Tirosh offered charmingly, “Like the meaning of a poem, I
suggest, appearance is not a reflection of identity, but a part of
finding, making, and maintaining an identity.”295 Professor
Tirosh’s invocation of poetry is superbly apt for the idea of poetic
depicts things sentimental yet pragmatic, lyrical but stark,
romantic still possibly banal, whimsical if nonetheless
profound—all the consistency and contradictions that, through
choice or happenstance, render each of us unique.296
As much as our taste in friends and lovers, politics and
partialities, careers and diversions, choice of personal
appearance expresses our discrete distinctiveness. Thus, there is
a particularly acute bond between our conceptions of our true
personae and the outward manifestation we create for ourselves.
Even if seemingly careless and random, our clothing, grooming,
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293
May Ling Halim et al., Pink Frilly Dresses and the Avoidance of All Things
“Girly”: Children’s Appearance Rigidity and Cognitive Theories of Gender
Development, 50 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1091, 1091 (2014). Similarly, nearly
thirty-five years ago, commentators concluded, “A hair style . . . is one of the most
visual examples of personality. To prevent the individual’s expression of preference
would be to offend a widely shared concept of dignity.” John D. Ingram & Ellen R.
Domph, The Right To Govern One’s Personal Appearance, 6 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
339, 354 (1981). Justice William O. Douglas, a revered champion of individual
liberty, likewise captured the importance of grooming and individuality:
I suppose that a nation bent on turning out robots might insist that every
male have a crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But the ideas of ‘life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ expressed in the Declaration of
Independence, later found specific definition in the Constitution itself,
including of course freedom of expression and a wide zone of privacy. I had
supposed those guarantees permitted idiosyncrasies to flourish, especially
when they concern the image of one’s personality and his philosophy
toward government and his fellow men.
Ferrell v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 856, 856 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the denial of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit’s upholding of a
public school’s policy disciplining male students who wear long hair); accord Bishop
v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1971) (striking public high school’s hairlength restrictions applicable only to male students).
294
See, e.g., Halim, supra note 293; Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 41–42.
295
Tirosh, supra note 21, at 60.
296
See id. at 57 (“The analogy to poetic language is helpful here because it
enables us to recognize that appearance is never just appearance; it is never a
matter of form and not content, an external and insubstantial issue. The language of
poetry functions not merely to deliver information or develop an argument. Rather,
it is a language that calls attention to itself. In poetry, the medium is inseparable
from the meaning.”).
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makeup, bearing, stance, intonations, and other modes of
appearance evince intensely personal choices alerting the world
how we deem ourselves to be distinctive, conforming, or, more
likely, a blend of both:
Clothes, and other aspects of personal appearance, help us
negotiate the need to conform to the group and the need to
express ourselves as individuals . . . . As such, [appearance,
particularly clothing,] is the place where we form and reform an
identity that is both individual and part of a community or
subculture.297

Similarly, scholars note the inexorable link between personal
grooming and group identity.298 It is hardly revelatory that
groups of various kinds—racial, religious, ethnic, political, social,
or other types—indoctrinate new members and maintain
established loyalties through often intricate frameworks of
norms, principles, customs, and practices including appearance
and comportment rules.299 Indeed, such indoctrination begins
very early in life.300
It is hardly surprising, then, that individuals judge
themselves and are judged by others based on varying concepts of
how group members should or should not comport themselves,
particularly regarding dress, grooming, and other displays of
appearance. This predominant propensity is particularly acute
297

Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 41–42 (emphasis omitted).
“Sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and cultural theorists have long
recognized that fashion and other forms of manipulating appearance play a unique
role in the development of the individual as a member of society—the negotiation
and formation of the public self.” Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 15; see also, e.g.,
Scott A. Hunt & Kimberly A. Miller, The Discourse of Dress and Appearance:
Identity Talk and a Rhetoric of Review, 20 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 69 (1997); Tirosh,
supra note 21, at 57.
299
See, e.g., SHARON R. KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 4, 28 (2002); FRANK
HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 47 (1994); Bayer, supra note 33, at 332–33.
Classically, for example, military uniforms “foster military discipline, promote
uniformity, encourage esprit de corps, increase the readiness of the military forces
for early deployment and enhance identification of [a particular unit] as a military
organization.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 864 F.2d 178,
186 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Div. of Military &
Naval Affairs, State of N.Y., 15 F.L.R.A. 288, 293 (1984)).
300
See Rhode, supra note 21, at 1037–38. Professor Ramachandran observed,
“Children begin to have a visible interest in clothing around the age of two, one that
is deeply influenced by parents ‘who confer their ideas of masculinity and femininity
on young children,’ and therefore encourage girls to develop a stronger and more
detailed interest.” Ramachandran, supra note 22, at 40 (quoting KARLYNE ANSPACH,
THE WHY OF FASHION 290 (1967)).
298
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regarding race, sex, ethnicity, and religion—the criteria
prohibited by Title VII. For instance, Professor Onwuachi-Willig
noted:
Curiously, the hair was considered the most telling feature of
Negro status, more than the color of the skin. Even though
some slaves . . . had skin as light as many Whites, the rule of
thumb was that if the hair showed just a little bit of kinkiness,
a person would be unable to pass as White. Essentially, the
hair acted as the true test of blackness, which is why some
slaves opted to shave their heads to try to get rid of the genetic
evidence of their ancestry when attempting to escape to
freedom.301

Enforcing discriminatory appearance rules, therefore, causes
significant and palpable harm by requiring individuals, as the
price of employment, to subvert their personhoods by complying
with chauvinistic employers’ stereotypical conceptions of how
group members should appear and comport themselves.302 Thus,
“[w]ithout protection from Title VII, protected groups feel
compelled to ‘cover their race and gender by conforming their
behavior and appearance to a white, male norm (known as
workplace assimilation).’ ”303
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301
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1100 (alteration in original) (quoting
AYANA D. BYRD & LORI L. THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF BLACK
HAIR IN AMERICA 17–18 (2001)). Thus, “[f]or minority women in general, and Black
women in particular, hairstyle choices are subject to pressures to conform to
mainstream norms of attractiveness and professionalism.” Ashleigh Shelby Rosette
& Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform to Mainstream Expectations or
Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407, 411 (2007). “Indeed,
a recent study concluded that presenting an image that was both conventionally
attractive as well as professional was easier to attain for white women than for
Black women.” Id. at 410 (citing Rose Weitz, Women and Their Hair: Seeking Power
Through Resistance and Accommodation, 15 GENDER & SOC’Y 667, 682 (2001)).
302
Professor Bandsuch denotes this practice as “trait discrimination”:
Employers . . . use physical traits that are largely irrelevant to job criteria
as a proxy for job-pertinent attributes. For example, employers may relate
grooming, hairstyle, jewelry, glasses, and attire (color, style, and material
of clothing) with characteristics like intelligence, honesty, loyalty, and
discipline. Facial features, nose size, skin color, eye shape, height, and
weight also carry certain connotations about personality and performance,
as do behavioral traits like language, accents, and smoking. Employers use
these traits as signals to assess the abilities and attitudes of individuals as
well as their compatibility with the organization and its values.
Bandsuch, supra note 19, at 289–90 (footnotes omitted).
303
Id. at 293–94 (quoting Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace
Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 380 (2008)).
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Indeed, the harm is exponential because, by way of unequal
burden theory, court enforcement evinces that not only the
particular employer, but also greater society, speaking through
the judiciary, believes that those who do not conform to accepted
group stereotypes may be unworthy of employment because their
appearance preferences are strange, if not actually deviant and
possibly evil.304 Unequal burden doctrine thus perpetuates
popular or elitist criteria describing a given group’s purportedly
natural or normal characteristics as a basis to judge conforming
or nonconforming individuals’ worth, merit, and goodness.305
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304
See, e.g., Tirosh, supra note 21, at 55–56 (arguing that law’s emphasis on
identity—group traits accepted as normal by society or government—inflicts on the
liberty of minorities, including minorities of one, a societal expectation of purported
normalcy). As Professor Onwuachi-Willig profoundly explained in the sex
discrimination context:
Even in the face of changing gender norms in our society,
antidiscrimination law continues to reinforce traditional expectations about
appearance. . . . In upholding these codes, courts give legitimacy to the
gendered beauty expectations for men and women, essentially proclaiming
that desirable men and women adhere to such gender norms.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1094–95.
305
See Rosette & Dumas, supra note 301, at 413–14 (explaining that black
women may conform their hairstyles, among other things, to forestall being judged
according to Caucasians’ stereotypical beliefs about African Americans as less
worthy than whites). As Professor Rhode explained, such cultural indoctrination
begins virtually at birth and continues throughout adulthood with devastating
consequences:
A wide array of research documents a phenomenon that psychologists
describe as “what is beautiful is good.” Less attractive individuals are less
likely to be viewed as smart, happy, interesting, likeable, successful, and
well-adjusted. They are less likely to marry and to marry someone well off;
and surveyed college students would prefer a spouse who is an embezzler,
drug user, or shoplifter than someone who is obese. Unattractive litigants
receive higher sentences and lower damage awards in simulated legal
proceedings, while attractive litigants have an advantage. Not only are the
less attractive treated worse, their unfavorable treatment can erode selfesteem, self-confidence, and social skills, which compounds their
disadvantages.
See Rhode, supra note 21, at 1037–38 (footnotes omitted). Professor Onwuachi-Willig
similarly reported about race:
In a society where straight, long, fine hair (compared to black hair) is
viewed not only as the norm[,] but as the ideal for women, tightly coiled
black hair easily becomes categorized as unacceptable, unprofessional,
deviant, and too political. Image consultants routinely advise black women
to remove hairstyles such as braids and locks.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1107.
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Even assuming there is broad, possibly instinctive,
consensus on what is or is not attractive,306 the sound Kantian
morality of Title VII recoils from validating that consensus as
legally enforceable yet non-BFOQ employment standards. As
earlier noted, by imposing grooming and appearance rules that
are not necessary to performing legitimate work assignments,
employers use their workers purely as means to gratify such
employers’, or their customers’, untoward prejudices. Employers
certainly may use employees as means to perform particular
work through which the employers attain economic benefits,
status within the given field, and other tangible and intangible
advantages. But, by degrading employees’ dress, appearance,
and similar modes of comportment, employers fail to treat
employees as ends in themselves worthy of dignity.
In sum, unless constituting a BFOQ, employers, in
particular, and society, in general, simply have no legitimate
basis to mandate by law workers’ conformity of appearance—a
betrayal of personal identity—as the cost to obtain
employment.307
CONCLUSION—HOW FAR CAN THIS GO?
Pursuant to unequal burden theory, a court could
promulgate a local rule requiring female judges to wear robes
adorned with white lace. After all, no less than male-only hairlength standards and female-only makeup directives, the
hypothetical rule comports with familiar concepts of masculinity
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306
Research confirms what astuteness suggests: Collectives generate a fairly
strong communal sense of beauty contrasted with ugliness. That communal sense
can be measured within specific groups or even across societies:
To be sure, some preferences, particularly those regarding grooming and
body shape, have varied across time and culture. But the globalization of
mass media and information technology has brought an increasing
convergence in standards of attractiveness.
. . . [Research] yield[s] a strikingly high degree of consensus even among
individuals of different sex, race, age, socioeconomic status, and cultural
backgrounds.
See Rhode, supra note 21, at 1035–36.
307
See Tirosh, supra note 21, at 52 (“First, unlike jars of jam, which should be
correctly labeled in order to protect consumers, there is no compelling interest that
people be ‘marked’ correctly. Second, even if the idea that social actors' identities
should be easily and securely decipherable seems at first appealing, this vision of the
social world is oppressive, unresponsive to the dynamic interplay between identity
and appearance, and inapplicable given the complex nature of appearance.”).
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and femininity.308 Moreover, compliance is easy, inexpensive,
and does not impair the ability of female judges to perform their
assigned duties—all factors premising unequal burden
analysis.309 Yet, surely a reviewing court would invalidate any
such rule as demeaning, insulting, and certainly unlawful sexual
stereotyping under Title VII.310
Some might contend that the foregoing hypothetical is
different from the female-only makeup rules, upheld by the
Ninth Circuit in Jespersen, that Harrah’s Reno, Nevada, casino
imposed on its bartenders.311 Specifically the argument would be
that requiring female judges to wear feminine robes insults their
esteemed societal rank as members of the judiciary by implying
that female judges must conform with a perceived societal
concept of womanly appearance while publicly performing their
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308
Legal scholarship has benefited from articles exploring and explaining the
nature of “masculinities” from the intersection of legal, cultural, scientific, and other
relevant perspectives. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries:
Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 713, 720 (2010) (“Masculinities researchers consider how societal norms
shape behavior of individual men and women, how masculinities [“masculine
identities”] are imbedded in the structure of institutions, and how individuals and
groups perform masculinities within those institutions.”); Ann C. McGinley,
Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 364 (2004).
309
Nor is the rule unlawful due to animus based on the belief that female judges
cannot be trusted to dress appropriately. See Carroll v. Talman Savings & Loan,
Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), discussed supra at notes 289–92 and
accompanying text. Rather, the rule seeks to beautify the work environment through
adding a touch of female flourish that may be lost if female judges wear the same
types of somber dark robes as their male colleagues.
310
Arguing that such rules actually are burdensome, Judge Kozinski similarly
opined:
Imagine, for example, a rule that all judges wear face powder, blush,
mascara[,] and lipstick while on the bench. Like Jespersen, I would find
such a regime burdensome and demeaning; it would interfere with my job
performance. I suspect many of my colleagues would feel the same way.
Everyone accepts this as a reasonable reaction from a man, but why should
it be different for a woman? It is not because of anatomical differences,
such as a requirement that women wear bathing suits that cover their
breasts. Women’s faces, just like those of men, can be perfectly presentable
without makeup; it is a cultural artifact that most women raised in the
United States learn to put on—and presumably enjoy wearing—cosmetics.
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski,
J., with two judges, dissenting).
311
See Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 467, 488 n.83 (2007); Jane M. Siegel, Thank You, Sarah Palin,
for Reminding Us: It’s Not About the Clothes, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 144, 170
(2009).
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duties. By contrast, female bartenders enjoy no similar status
and, therefore, may be treated as sexual objects or as inherently
different from men by compelling them to wear makeup although
doing so is not necessary to serve drinks. That argument works
only if one believes that due to the nature of their respective
work, a female judge’s dignity is greater than that of a female
bartender or that the former’s humanity is more worthy of
respect than the latter’s, which is a supposition thoroughly
incompatible with Kantian morality. The differences between
bartenders and judges may justify employment variances
concerning tenure, salaries, and even social status. But, a
bartender is no less of a dignified person than is a judge because
both are human beings whose capacities to act in a moral fashion
are not products of their professions. Accordingly, no less than
female judges, female bartenders cannot be made to conform to
employers’ stereotypical concepts that women, but not men,
should conform with purported standards of femininity, such as
wearing facial makeup. The moral philosophy that informs Title
VII’s letter and spirit, then, forbids imposing discriminatory
employment terms that treat judges, bartenders, or any persons
as purely means—treatment that disdains their dignity.
One frustrated judge bemoaned:

Chief Judge Loken correctly understood, but mistakenly
decried, that the morality of dignity requires nothing less than a
BFOQ to justify the imposition of discriminatory terms and
His lament perhaps is
conditions of employment.313
understandable as coerced conformance with stereotypes
provides boundaries, standards, and rules for those who value
the dependability and constancy of what they like and who have
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312
Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1043 (8th Cir. 2010)
(Loken, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from majority’s ruling that plaintiff stated an
actionable sex discrimination claim against her employer, a motel, that dismissed
her because she appeared too mannish and lacked the “Midwestern girl look”).
313
Katie Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gender
Discrimination, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 169, 207–08 (2009).
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Apparently, the majority would hold that an employer violates
Title VII if it declines to hire a female cheerleader because she
is not pretty enough, or a male fashion model because he is not
handsome enough, unless the employer proves the affirmative
defense that physical appearance is a bona fide occupational
qualification.312
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the power and the selfishness to impose their preferences on
unwilling others. But, morality does not exist to assuage the
sensitivities of any individual or group, even personages as
elevated as federal judges.
Perhaps there is some truth to this hyperbole: “[M]akeup for
a woman is the way of the world; it keeps navigation in the
convoluted social jungle of sexual identities relatively safe. If
women did not wear makeup, we would find ourselves in a
dreadfully vague social environment, an endless game of fluid
identities.”314 More generally, Professor Yuracko worries:
Yet even as a normative ideal, the libertarian reading of the
prohibition is impractical and unappealing.
At its most
expansive, gender libertarianism requires protection for all
forms of gender expression—those that are stereotypical,
atypical, and idiosyncratic; those that are persistent; and those
that are transient. Under this view, gender becomes whatever
people say it is. As gender becomes solely a matter of selfidentification, the distinction between gender and personal
idiosyncrasy becomes one of mere nominalism, and all conduct
becomes potentially entitled to protection.
. . . Herein lies the core tension within the libertarian
interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping:
complete gender freedom is incompatible with any kind of stable
and workable definition of gender, but Title VII requires such a
definition.315
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314
Tirosh, supra note 21, at 72. As Professor Tirosh notes, “The courts are
happy to help prevent this from happening.” Id.
315
Yuracko, supra note 179, at 770–71.
316
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
317
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J., concurring).
318
In that regard, under Title VII’s doctrine—its first principle—the simple idea
of stereotyping should be sufficient to evince the “stable and workable definition of
gender” that Professor Yuracko reasonably seeks. See Yuracko, supra note 179, at
771. For each case, the particular employer’s conception of how men are different
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The world Professor Yuracko describes recalls the untoward
fears mentioned at the outset of this Article316 of a fretting Judge
Richard Posner who bemoaned “a federally protected right for
male workers to wear nail polish and dresses and speak in
falsetto and mince about in high heels, or for female ditchdiggers
to strip to the waist in hot weather.”317 Put generally, it would be
a world where people could define their own peaceful existences
that others would be compelled to respect.318 In light of such
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upheavals, abridging other persons’ dignity may seem to some a
small price, especially when the other persons are paying. That
is the core theory of the unequal burden doctrine.
But, whatever the upheaval, the unacceptable alternative is
Title VII enforced immorality through the lawful denigration of
individuals based on non-BFOQ stereotypes approved by the
Unequal burden theory cannot stand
reviewing courts.319
because as Title VII rightly administers, selling one’s labor
should not require betraying one’s soul.
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from women would provide the discrete, applicable basis to discern Title VII’s two
requisites: (1) Did the employer discriminate on the basis of sex—or one of the other
four forbidden criteria—and, if so, (2) can the employer establish a BFOQ? See also
supra notes 254–56 and accompanying text.
319
Accordingly, Title VII requires employers to respect the dignity of all persons
whether it is men wearing long hair, woman eschewing makeup, or even men
wearing skirts and women wearing neckties.

